Schultz v. Henry Ericsson Co.
| Decision Date | 07 October 1914 |
| Docket Number | No. 9316.,9316. |
| Citation | 264 Ill. 156,106 N.E. 236 |
| Parties | SCHULTZ v. HENRY ERICSSON CO. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Branch C Appellate Court, First District, on Error to Municipal Court of Chicago; Hosea W. Wells, Judge.
Action by August Schultz against the Henry Ericsson Company. A judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the Appellate Court, First District (182 Ill. App. 487), and defendant appeals. Affirmed.Frank M. Cox, and R. J. Fellingham, both of Chicago, for appellant.
Meek & McDonald, of Chicago, for appellee.
This was an action of the fourth class in the municipal court of Chicago for personal injuries sustained by appellee by falling from a scaffold or runway on which he was working while in the employ of the appellant. A trial was had, in which the jury assessed the damages of plaintiff at $1,000. Motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment were overruled, and judgment entered on the verdict, from which appellant prosecuted a writ of error to the Appellate Court for the First District, where the judgment was affirmed. A certificate of importance and an appeal were granted by that court, and the case certified to this court for further review.
Appellant's chief contentions are: (1) That the statement of claim is insufficient to sustain an action under the statute for willful violation of the provisions of the Employment Act relating to the construction of suitable scaffolds, hoists, cranes, or other mechanical contrivances used in the erection, or construction of buildings, etc.; (2) that the evidence fails to establish a case of common-law negligence against appellant; (3) that, even if the statement of claim is sufficient to permit a recovery under the statute, appellee has failed to establish by his proofs such a willful violation of the statute as to authorize a recovery thereon; and (4) that the manner of the construction of the scaffold was not the proximate cause of the injury. The contentions will be considered in the order above enumerated.
[1] From the evidence it appears that on and prior to June 21, 1909, appellant was engaged in the construction of a steel and brick building on Indiana avenue, in Chicago, on which the work had been completed to about the level of the second floor, where the masons were then at work on the north wall. The materials used-brick and mortar-were loaded in wheelbarrows on the ground floor. The wheelbarrows were run onto a hoist near the center of the building and by it raised to the second floor, where they were wheeled by the workmen over scaffolds or runways to the place where such materials were used. Around the hoist a platform was built, from which a scaffold or runway was constructed to the west wall, and along the west wall to the north wall, where the masons were at work. The runway from the platform to the west wall was about 5 or 6 feet in width, and along the west wall it was between 10 and 11 feet in width, being constructed of 13 10-inch planks laid lengthwise along the wall. Along the west wall, and about a foot from the wall, mortar boards were laid, and next to the motar boards the brick were dumped in piles about 2 feet high along the full length of the runway; the piles sloping down to a few brick on the east edge of the piles, which extended onto the runway, leaving a clear space of about 5 or 6 feet from the pile of brick to the east side or edge of the runway. No guard rails or other contrivances were constructed along the runway to pervent men or materials from falling off; but a single plank platform was laid about 18 inches east of the runway, for the purpose of enabling the men at work on the runway to step on it in case they lost their balance and fell from the runway. In going to and returning from the place where the masons were at work on the north wall the wheelers would be required to pass one another at various places on this runway. At the time of his injury appellee was about 35 years of age and had had about 2 years' experience in such work, having at various times worked for appellant and other contractors at this kind of work. At the time he was injured appellee was engaged in wheeling a wheelbarrow load of mortar to the masons at work on the north wall of the building. The hoist was so constructed that when a loaded wheelbarrow came up an empty one would go down. The loaded wheelbarrows, as they came up, would be taken from the hoist by the men in rotation as they returned from their trip, so that on each trip the wheelers would have a different wheelbarrow. When the wheelbarrow came off the hoist its handles would be to the south, and the wheeler would take hold of the handles, back the wheelbarrow off, turn to the west and wheel his load to the end of the runway leading to the west wall, and thence north along the runway on the east side of the west wall to the place where the masons were at work. At this time 7 or 8 men were engaged in wheeling materials in iron wheelbarrows, some being filled with brick and others with mortar. About 25 wheelbarrows were employed altogether on the work. In taking the wheelbarrow from the hoist to the place where the masons were at work the men wheeling the loaded wheelbarrows would pass those returning with the empty wheelbarrows at various places on the runway. Appellee commenced work at about 8 o'clock that morning and was directed by the superintendent to go to work on the second floor, wheeling brick and mortar to the masons. The first trip he made he noticed the width between the brick piles and the east edge of the runway or scaffold and the piles of brick, but had no trouble in passing prior to the last trip. At about 10:30 o'clock in the morning he received a load of mortar as it came up the hoist and proceeded to the west runway or scaffold and north on it about 20 feet, where he met another one of the laborers, Donato Magliano, returning on the westerly said of the runway with an empty wheelbarrow. Magliano stopped with his wheelbarrow as close to the brick pile on the west as he could, and appellee, with his wheelbarrow on the second plank from the east edge of the runway, attempted to pass Magliano. The trays or hoppers on the wheelbarrows were about 2 1/2 feet in width, so that a space of about 2 inches only was left between the trays of the wheelbarrows in passing when the wheeler walked on the second plank or 15 inches from the unguarded edge of the platform, with the outside edge of the tray of the heavily loaded wheelbarrow even with the edge of the runway. In attempting to pass Magliano a wire in the rim of the tray of the wheelbarrow used by appellee touched the other wheelbarrow and unbalanced him, and his wheelbarrow dumped over on the east edge of the scaffold, throwing most of the mortar on the lower floor and appellee off the runway and over the single plank east of the runway to the first floor and seriously injured him. Appellee did not know of the wire projecting from his wheelbarrow, as each trip he made he had a different wheelbarrow. As a result of the accident he was removed to the hospital in a dazed condition, where he was confined to his bed for a period of two or three weeks as a result of injuries to his head, shoulders, chest, and ankle; the injury to the ankle being the most serious, as some of the ligaments were torn, necessitating the putting of the foot in a plaster cast. As a result of his injuries he was unable to work for a period of about 30 weeks and required to receive occasional treatments from his physician for a period of about a year and a half. It was stipulated on the trial that appellee had none of the injuries of which he now complains before this accident.
Appellant introduced no evidence, and at the close of plaintiff's case moved the court to instruct the jury to find the defendant not guilty, and submitted the proper instruction therefor in writing. The court denied the motion, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty and assessed plaintiff's damages at $1,000, upon which the court entered judgment, after overruling motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment.
[2][3] The substance of the statement of claim filed by appellee, in so far as it is material to be considered here, is that it is for injuries sustained June 21, 1909, while in the employ of appellant as a common laborer, by reason of its failure to furnish him a proper, safe, and sufficient scaffold upon which to work, etc., to the damage of appellee in the sum of $1,000. Appellant insists that these allegations of the statement of claim are insufficient to sustain an action under the statute, for the reason that no reference is made to the statute in the statement of claim. Section 3 of the Municipal Court Act (Hurd's Stat. 1913, p. 723) provides that in all cases of the fourth and fifth classes the issues shall be determined without other forms of written pleading than those expressly prescribed and provided for. Section 40 of the same act provides that suits of the fourth class shall be commenced by filing a praecipe for a summons and a statement of plaintiff's claim, and:
‘If the suit be for a tort, it shall consist of a brief statement of the nature of the tort and such further information as will reasonably inform the defendant of the nature of the case he is called upon to defend, but nothing herein contained shall be construed to require the statement of claim in any action for a tort to set forth the cause of action with the particularity required in a declaration at common law.’
In Edgerton v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co., 240 Ill. 311, 88 N. E. 808, we had occasion to consider the nature and effect of a statement of a plaintiff's claim or cause of action in suits of this class. It was there said:
‘As to this class of cases under the Municipal Court Act, where no written pleadings are required, the same rule will govern as controls the form of actions before justices of...
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