Schultz v. Kaplan

• Decision Date: 12 December 1947
• Docket Number: 52.
• Citation: 56 A.2d 17,189 Md. 402
• Parties: SCHULTZ v. KAPLAN et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

56 A.2d 17

189 Md. 402

SCHULTZ v. KAPLAN et al.

No. 52.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

December 12, 1947

Appeal from Superior Court of Baltimore City; E. Paul Mason, Judge.

Action by Nathan Kaplan and others against Isidor Schultz for declaratory judgment for determination of rights under lease. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Abram C. Joseph, of Baltimore (Louis J. Sagner, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

Ward B. Coe, Jr., of Baltimore (Robert R. Carman Saul H. Brotman, and Carman, Anderson & Barnes, all of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellees.

Before MARBURY, C.J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS GRASON, HENDERSON and MARKELL, JJ.

COLLINS, Judge.

This is an appeal by Isidor Schultz from a declaratory judgment entered in the Superior Court of Baltimore City in favor of Nathan Kaplan et al.

On the 31st day of October, 1933, Lena Kaplan and David Kaplan, her husband, as lessors, and Ruth Schultz, as lessee, entered into a lease for a property at 779 Washington Boulevard for a term of five years beginning on December 20, 1933 and ending on December 19, 1938, at the rental of $50 per month. This lease was subject to the unqualified right of the lessee to terminate the lease at the end of any year upon sixty days' notice prior to the end of such lease. David Kaplan having died on April 30, 1938, Lena Kaplan, his wife, who was his cotenant by the entireties became the owner of the property.

On October 21, 1938, Lena Kaplan, widow, executed a lease to Isidor Schultz, the husband of Ruth Schultz, for the same property, where the said Isidor Schultz was engaged in the meat and grocery business. This lease began on the first day of January, 1939, and ended on the 31st day of December 1943, at a rental of $60 per month during the years 1939 1940, and 1941, and $65 per month for the years 1942 and 1943. This lease also provided that it was 'subject, however, to the unqualified right on the part of said Tenant to terminate this lease at the end of any year of the term above mentioned, accounting from the said 31st day of December, 1939, upon a notice in writing addressed to the said Landlord at her last known address at least sixty days prior to the end of any such year.' (This provision was also contained in the lease of October 31, 1933, supra.) This lease also contained the following provision: 'And it is further agreed that this lease shall continue from term to term at the rental of $65.00 per month unless previously terminated as hereinbefore provided.' (This provision was not included in the lease of October 31, 1933, supra.) Neither of these leases was acknowledged or recorded.

Lena Kaplan died intestate on or about June 15, 1940, survived by the appellees in the instant case as her sole heirs at law to whom the property leased descended from the said Lena Kaplan in fee simple. The appellant, Isidor Schultz, the tenant named in the second lease, held over, with the consent of the appellees, after the termination of the first five-year period under the second lease, that is, after December 31, 1943. In May, 1944, the appellees received an offer from some third party to purchase said premises. The appellant, having been offered the property, refused it and asserted that he had a lease of said premises forever, terminable at the end of any year by the tenant only.

In August, 1944, the appellees here filed a bill in equity in Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City asking that the aforesaid lease be set aside on the ground of fraud. In the bill of complaint filed the appellees, here, recited the provisions in the lease of October 21, 1938, as to its termination hereinbefore quoted, and made the statement in that bill of complaint 'That there is no provision in said lease as to its termination on the part of the landlord or her heirs or assigns. But that the same is operative at the option of the tenant indefinitely.' A decree was entered in that equity case dismissing the bill of complaint because of laches 'without prejudice to the Complainants to pursue any other remedies that they might have if any, the Complainants to pay the costs of these proceedings.'

On January 26, 1946, the appellees here by their attorney sent a registered letter to Isidor Schultz, the appellant here, notifying him to vacate the premises described in the lease on or before February 28, 1946.

On March 7, 1946, the appellees here filed in the Superior Court of Baltimore City a 'Declaration and Prayer for Declaratory Judgment' in which they alleged the execution of the aforesaid leases and the terms thereof, the filing of the bill of complaint in August, 1944, the dismissal of that bill of complaint and the decree thereon, the notice by registered mail to the appellant to quit said premises on February 28, 1946, the failure of the appellant to quit the premises, the desire of the appellees to sell the property and liquidate their assets, the controversy between the parties and the desire of the appellees for a determination of their status and other legal relations under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Acts of 1945, Chapter 724.

The appellees asked: the recovery of the premises leased and $1,000 for their damages; if the plaintiffs are not entitled to the possession of said land that the court give judgment declaring the second lease void and that the existing tenancy is one from year to year terminable at the end of each year of said tenancy by both landlord and tenant; if said second lease is not void that the court give a judgment declaring that by construction the second lease is terminable by both landlord and tenant at the end of each five-year renewal thereof; if said second lease is not terminable at any time that the court give judgment otherwise declaring the nature of the estates, rights, status and other legal relations of the parties arising under said second lease; and for other and further relief under the said 'Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act' as plaintiff's case may require. A demurrer was filed to the declaration on the special grounds that the declaration disclosed on its face a cause of action cognizable only in equity and that plaintiffs had heretofore submitted to the jurisdiction of the equity court which had full power and authority to dispose of all matters essential to the determination of plaintiffs' rights. Judge Dickerson overruled this demurrer. After pleas were filed, the case was heard by Judge E. Paul Mason who found that under the terms of the lease the notice of termination could be given by the landlord as well as the tenant. He entered a judgment that the appellant was in lawful possession of the premises under an extension of the second lease dated October 21, 1938, which lease unless previously terminated as therein provided may by at least six months' written notice to the defendant, 'be terminated by the landlords or their successor in title as of December 31, 1948, or, in their election, as of the last day of any five-year period accounting from said date', and that costs be paid by the plaintiffs. From that judgment the appellant appeals here.

Appellant contends that Chapter 724 of the Acts of 1945, known as the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is unconstitutional. The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act was first adopted in this state by Chapter 294 of the Acts of 1939, codified as Article 31A in the 1939 Code. This Court after the adoption of that Act held that where there exists an immediate cause of action between the parties for which one of the common remedies of law or equity is adequate and available, a proceeding for a declaratory judgment is not appropriate within the contemplation of that Act. Caroline Street Permanent Building Association No. 1 v. Sohn, 178 Md. 434, 13 A.2d 616; Morgan v. Dietrich, 179 Md. 199, 16 A.2d 916; Brown v. Trustees of M. E. Church, 181 Md. 80, 85, 28 A.2d 582. The purpose and intent of Chapter 724 of the Acts of 1945 was to make the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act concurrent with existing remedies and to declare that the existence of another adequate remedy at law or in equity should not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases in which it was appropriate. Ryan v. Herbert, Md., 47 A.2d 360. Appellant contends that the declaration in the case at bar is really in form and substance a bill in equity and that the procedure in this case is of an equitable nature. He points out that the Circuit Court of Baltimore City under Article 4, Section 29, of the Constitution of Maryland has exclusive jurisdiction in equity within the limits of Baltimore City, and that the declaration here amounts to a bill in equity which is brought in the Superior Court of Baltimore City which has no jurisdiction in equity, and that Chapter 724 of the Acts of 1945 conferring equity jurisdiction on a law court is unconstitutional.

Article 75, Section 3 of the Code provides in part: 'Any declaration which contains a plain statement of the facts necessary to constitute a ground of action shall be sufficient * * * without reference to mere form.' It is plain that the question raised in the declaration now before us is a legal rather than an equitable question. An effort is made to have the title to real estate adjudicated and to recover possession thereof and this is a legal not an equitable question. Bernei v. Sappington, 102 Md. 185, 191, 62 A. 365; Finglass v. George Franke Sons Company, 172 Md. 135, 190 A. 752.

The appellees also ask a declaration of the legal relations of the parties arising under said second lease.

It was pointed out in the case of Stinchcomb v. Realty Mortgage Company, 171 Md. 317, at page 322, 188 A. 790, 792 '[Courts adhere] to the rule that when title is in dispute, and no irreparable damage from the...