OPINION
TALIAFERRO
Judge.
Plaintiff seeks to recover judgment in personam against
defendant, a foreign corporation, domiciled in the state of
New York, for an alleged balance due on sales of scrap iron
and steel, consummated in the state of Louisiana. It is
alleged that defendant, through its agents and officers, has
been doing business in the state for the past several years,
such business being the buying of scrap iron and scrap steel
therein, and particularly in the cities of New Orleans, Lake
Charles, and Shreveport, wherein this suit was filed; that
after making purchases of said material in and about the city
of Shreveport, shipment thereof was made to New Orleans or
Lake Charles, at which ports said material is sold to foreign
purchasers for overseas shipment, "and accordingly has
been loading same out of Lake Charles and New Orleans,
Louisiana, destined for foreign ports." From these
allegations of fact, plaintiff draws the legal conclusion and
avers that defendant has subjected itself to the jurisdiction
of the courts of this state.
Pursuant
to plaintiff's prayer, service of citation and petition
was made on the secretary of state, as is authorized by
section 26 of Act No. 267 of 1914.
Defendant's
exception to the court's jurisdiction is as follows:
"Now
into court through undersigned counsel comes the Long Island
Machinery & Equipment Company, appearing herein for the
purposes of this exception only and not subjecting itself to
the jurisdiction of this court for any other purpose, excepts
to the jurisdiction of this court to hear and to determine
this cause for the following reason, to-wit:
"That
defendant is a corporation, incorporated and domiciled in the
State of New York; that it has not been licensed to do
business in the State of Louisiana and has not appointed an
agent or agents for the service of process in the State of
Louisiana; that it has no agents for any purpose who are
residents of the State of Louisiana, and maintains no office
nor place of business of any kind in the state; that it is
engaged exclusively in the interstate and foreign commerce;
and that the contract sued on herein was the purchase of
materials for shipment to the Kingdom of Japan and required,
as plaintiff well knew, a continuous movement from
Shreveport, Louisiana, to Lake Charles and thence by ship to
Japan with only interruption in movement at Lake Charles, as
was required for inspection and loading on a ship; that
defendant does no continuous business in Louisiana, but comes
into the state by non-resident agents casually and
intermittently and for a short time only for the limited
purpose of purchasing scrap iron for interstate and foreign
shipment, and that it has never done a local business in the
State of Louisiana and that at this time it is not engaged in
business of any sort in the State of Louisiana that the
defendant herein is not a corporation required by law to
maintain an agent for the service of process in the State of
Louisiana; and that even if the court finds it is required by
the State of Louisiana to appoint an agent for service, then
in that event defendant alternatively shows that plaintiff
has not complied with section 26 of Act. No. 267 of the
Legislature of 1914, accordingly service of process on the
defendant herein through the Secretary of Louisiana is null
and void and does not subject defendant to the jurisdiction
of this court.
"Wherefore,
exceptor prays that this exception to the jurisdiction of
this court to hear and determine this cause be maintained,
and that plaintiff's demand be dismissed with
costs."
The
exception was tried and submitted upon an agreed statement of
facts, which we have incorporated in full:
"The
defendant is a corporation, incorporated and domiciled in the
State of New York; it has not been licensed to do business in
the State of Louisiana and has not appointed an agent or
agents for the service of process in the State of Louisiana;
it has no agents for any purpose who are residents of the
State of Louisiana and maintains no office nor place of
business of any kind in the State.
"It
is engaged in the business of buying and selling scrap iron
and steel.
"It
maintains no office in the State of Louisiana, but its
officers and agents come to the State of Louisiana and
purchase scrap iron and steel, from various persons located
and doing business in the State of Louisiana.
"It
has this scrap iron and steel shipped either to Lake Charles,
Louisiana, or New Orleans, Louisiana, where it is inspected
and unloaded. After being inspected by the representatives of
the defendant Corporation, the scrap iron and steel which
meets the requirements is loaded and shipped either to other
parts of the World, usually to the Kingdom of Japan, or to
other States of the Union.
"The
Corporation has been engaged in this method of procedure for
several years with reference to its Louisiana business; that
all of the scrap iron and steel in Louisiana, as above set
forth, is shipped out of the State of Louisiana.
"The
said agents of defendant come into Louisiana only casually
and intermittently and for a limited purpose of purchasing
and shipping scrap iron or steel out of the State; and do
likewise in other States of the Union except the State of New
York."
The
court sustained the exception and dismissed the suit, giving
written reasons for its action. On motion for a rehearing,
plaintiff alleges:
"3.
Mover shows that the court has erred in its construction of
the words "casual' and "intermittently',
placed in the Stipulation of Facts and has taken it to mean
that the actions of the defendant are in no sense continuous.
"4.
That as a matter fact the business engaged in by the
defendant consists of regularly purchasing scrap iron and
steel and selling it, as set forth in the agreed Statement of
Facts.
"5.
That it is not continuous in the sense that it maintains an
office here and continually does business. That on the other
hand, the defendant comes into the State of Louisiana, every
year in order to make these purchases. That it does not make
these purchases daily, but canvasses the trade intermittently
every year.
"6.
That the business of the defendant is therefore such as to
subject it to the jurisdiction of the court.
"7.
That the statement in the stipulation that the business done
by the defendant was casual and intermittent is a statement
of law and not of fact and cannot be accepted without a
stipulation of actual facts constituting such a business is
casual and intermittent."
This
motion was overruled. The court supports its denial of the
motion by written reasons.
The
question here presented is whether defendant is engaged in or
doing business within the state of Louisiana in such manner
and to such extent as to render it amenable personam to the
jurisdiction of its courts, it being admitted that exceptor
has not established an office or appointed an agent therein
for service of process. The lower court lucidly discussed the
question and gave sound reasons for resolving it favorably to
the exception. We adopt these reasons as reflecting our own
opinion of the matter and incorporate them herein:
"The
plaintiff, a resident of the Parish of Caddo, sues in this
court the defendant, a corporation incorporated under the
laws of the State of New York and there domiciled. The suit
is to recover what is claimed to be the balance due on the
sale of scrap iron from plaintiff to defendant, and for
damages growing out of said failure to pay the balance. In
other words, the suit is one strictly in personam.
"The
plea to the jurisdiction is submitted on an agreed statement
of facts, which statement shows that the defendant is
domiciled in the State of New York; is not licensed to do
business in the State of Louisiana; has not appointed an
agent or agents for service of process in the State of
Louisiana, and has no agents for any purpose who are
residents of the State of Louisiana, and maintains no office
or place of business of any kind in this state; that
defendant is engaged in the business of buying and selling
scrap iron and steel; that its officers and agents come to
the State of Louisiana and purchase scrap iron and steel in
this state; that this scrap iron and steel is shipped either
to Lake Charles or New Orleans, where it is inspected and
unloaded, and that after being inspected by the
representatives of the defendant, the accepted scrap iron and
steel is loaded and shipped to other parts of the world,
usually to the Kingdom of Japan or to other states of the
Union. That defendant has been engaged in this method of
procedure for several years with reference to its Louisiana
business, and that said agents of defendant come into
Louisiana only casually and intermittently and for the
limited purpose of purchasing and shipping scrap iron and
steel out of the state.
"It is contended by counsel for plaintiff that the
defendant has waived any plea to the jurisdiction by filing
in the alternative an objection to the citation, but all
reference to the citation in this case is merely for the
purpose of showing that the court had no jurisdiction, and
such is not, in its proper sense, an exception to the
citation and does not serve as a waiver of the plea to the
jurisdiction. "Inasmuch as there is no allegation and no
proof one way or the other that the defendant was at the time
the present suit was brought doing any business in the State
of Louisiana, it might be said that the case of Gouner v.
Missouri Valley Bridge & Iron...