Schultz v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.

Decision Date05 June 2020
Docket NumberCase No. 18-24023-Civ-TORRES
Citation465 F.Supp.3d 1232
Parties Samuel SCHULTZ, Plaintiff, v. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD., d/b/a Azamara Club Cruises, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

Cathleen Ann Scott, Lindsey Brooke Wagner, Scott Wagner & Associates, P.A., Jupiter, FL, Nina R. Frank, Aliaksandra Ramanenka, Pro Hac Vice, Kathleen Peratis, Pro Hac Vice, Outten & Golden LLP, New York, NY, Paul W. Mollica, Pro Hac Vice, Outten & Golden LLP, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

David M. DeMaio, Gregory Robert Hawran, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Miami, FL, for Defendant.

ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

EDWIN G. TORRES, United States Magistrate Judge The development of maritime and admiralty law has a rich history. From our nation's founding, which owed much of its origin to wooden-hulled vessels navigating the Atlantic Ocean, the law of admiralty has been an essential component of our legal history. So much so that its development was central to the thesis that a national constitution was essential in order for a federal judiciary to adjudicate maritime matters. E.g., The Federalist No. 80, at 478 (A. Hamilton).

Much of that early legal development focused on what law would govern maritime disputes and where those disputes belonged. And central to that debate was the importance of maritime and admiralty law with respect to our relationships with foreign nations. Uniformity of law was thus paramount, thereby giving rise to the broad expanse of federal admiralty and maritime jurisdiction that we follow today.1

Yet, as the Supreme Court has often recognized, maritime law is not a complete and perfect system even though uniformity and consistency are vital.2 One reason for this dilemma may be that so much of what we come to recognize as the law of maritime and admiralty flows from judicial opinions that give rise to a "species of judge-made federal common law."3 Imperfection follows because judicial opinions can be laden with different verbiage and language that the author may not have intended to be magical or dispositive per se, but which over time evolves into binding law. As Justice Holmes once bemoaned, "[i]t is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted in phrases and thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further analysis."4

Take this case. Much thoughtful and deliberate legal labor has been expended to argue about a judicial "test" that, in short, provides that the law of the port may not be applied, absent express and clear Congressional intent, to matters that fall within the "internal affairs" of a foreign-flagged vessel that finds itself in that port. Here that matters because, arguably, the qualifications for employment to serve on extended ocean voyages for a foreign vessel falls within that broad term. Yet the first Supreme Court case that applied that rule by name5 was relying on an earlier case that never used that broad phrase and instead referred to "internal discipline of the ship, and the general regulation of the rights and duties of the officers and crew towards the vessel or among themselves."6 In that narrower light, a seaman's initial qualification for employment seems to fall outside that sphere. But we are bound to apply the "internal affairs" test because later Supreme Court cases chose to utilize the broader phraseology without much distinction or careful qualification.7

Hence the legal landscape that we are presented with includes apparently contradictory and arbitrary distinctions that make little sense in practice, but are quite dispositive in effect. As things now stand, the ADA may indeed apply here, but depending on how far the Court chooses to go. If it goes too far, it may invade the internal affairs of a foreign vessel, which is frowned upon. But the Court can try and apply the statute, notwithstanding the absence of a clear Congressional directive, on a paragraph-by-paragraph basis to a foreign vessel but in piecemeal fashion. Some employees may be covered, others may not. Some tasks may be subject to the ADA, while others are too "internal" and thus exempted. So much for uniformity and consistency.8

The better answer would be to hold that, absent express Congressional authority or, better yet, international treaty, no law of general application like the ADA applies to foreign-flagged vessels. That would force Congress to do its job and properly administer its Constitutional role of enforcing the law of admiralty. We would then not be forced to adjudicate important and substantial cases like this one by deciphering loose judicial verbiage and make more of it than it originally deserved. But clearly that is not the law today so we will do our best to apply the law that governs this case.

With that off our chest, we turn to the particular dispute presented on Royal Caribbean's ("Defendant" or "Royal Caribbean") and Samuel Schultz's ("Plaintiff" or "Mr. Schultz") cross-motions for summary judgment. [D.E. 93, 98]. Both parties filed their respective responses [D.E. 108, 112]. Therefore, the motions are now ripe for disposition. After careful consideration of the motions, responses, relevant authorities, and for the reasons discussed below, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is DENIED and Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part .9

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this action on October 1, 2018 [D.E. 1] with a two-count complaint alleging that Defendant10 violated Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et. seq. , and the Florida Civil Rights Act ("FCRA"), Fla. Stat. §§ 760.01. Plaintiff, a thirty-three year old Wisconsin resident and U.S. citizen, is a singer who applied for employment as part of an opera program onboard the Azamara Journey. The vessel was scheduled to embark on a fourteen-week voyage from Singapore to Stockholm on March 25, 2018 to June 29, 2018. Defendant gave Plaintiff a job offer with a condition that Plaintiff successfully completes a pre-employment medical examination ("PEME") under the guidelines of the International Labour Organization ("ILO").

Prior to the completion of Plaintiff's PEME, MCO Productions LLC ("MCO") and Defendant entered into a licensing and services agreement to provide on-board entertainment to passengers. Plaintiff and MCO entered their own contractual agreement where Plaintiff would "[r]ehearse opera productions, opera cabarets, and recital music for shows aboard Azamara cruise lines ships," with the "[r]ehearsal period begin[ning] March 15, 2018, and end[ing] on March 21st, 2018." [D.E. 92 at ¶ 53]. While the parties disagree on the identity of Plaintiff's employer, either MCO or Defendant compensated Plaintiff for his rehearsal time – all of which took place in the U.S.

Shortly thereafter, Defendant arranged Plaintiff's PEME with a medical vendor and Plaintiff's examination took place in New York City. The examining physician completed a form noting that Plaintiff was fit for duty at sea despite a history of depression and anxiety. However, the physician also included a note that Plaintiff needed psychiatric clearance. A reviewing doctor, a physician at Broward Health, agreed with that assessment and recommended that Plaintiff undergo a psychiatric evaluation. Defendant then informed Plaintiff that he needed to obtain a psychiatric evaluation that would address his history of depression, his current mental status, and his fitness for duty at sea.

To comply with this request, Plaintiff arranged a video session with his former treating psychiatrist, Dr. Bernard Gerber ("Dr. Gerber"). Dr. Gerber wrote a letter, following the session, that Plaintiff was mentally fit for duty at sea. Dr. Gerber also stated that, although Plaintiff suffered from major depression

since the age of 9 and survived a prior suicide attempt11 , Plaintiff had been in remission with the help of medication and psychotherapy. Dr. Gerber found that that there was little to no risk of harm to Plaintiff or others and that the risk of suicidal ideation was low.

Defendant's chief medical consultant, Dr. Benjamin Shore ("Dr. Shore"), then reviewed Plaintiff's medical file in March 2018.12 This included a review of Plaintiff's disclosures on his medical forms and Dr. Gerber's letter. Based on this information, Dr. Shore concluded that Plaintiff was not fit for duty at sea under the applicable ILO guidelines because of Plaintiff's history of major depression

. More specifically, Dr. Shore found that Plaintiff's depression was persistent or reoccurring within the meaning of the ILO guidelines because Plaintiff continued to receive treatment for depression in the form of psychotherapy and medication. Dr. Shore also determined that he could not exclude the possibility that Plaintiff's major depression would reoccur if Plaintiff were on a cruise ship for an extended period without access to medical services. Based on Dr. Shore's assessment, Defendant withdrew its employment offer and Plaintiff filed this action seeking relief under the ADA and the FCRA.

II. APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES AND LAW

The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or (B) showing that materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). On summary judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must...

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