Schultz v. St. Clair Cnty.
| Decision Date | 21 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 126856 |
| Citation | 2022 IL 126856,201 N.E.3d 1111,460 Ill.Dec. 638 |
| Parties | Larry E. SCHULTZ, Special Administrator of the Estate of Laurene T. Schultz, Deceased, Appellant, v. ST. CLAIR COUNTY et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Rhonda D. Fiss, of Law Office of Rhonda D. Fiss, P.C., of Belleville, for appellant.
K. Andrew Hoerner, of Becker, Hoerner & Ysursa, P.C., of Belleville, for appellees.
Stephen Blecha, of Coplan & Crane, Ltd., of Oak Park, for amicus curiae Illinois Trial Lawyers Association.
Celia Meza, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Myriam Zreczny Kasper and Sara K. Hornstra, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), and Patrick W. Hayes, of Illinois Municipal League, of Springfield, amici curiae.
¶ 1 In this case we are asked to consider whether the absolute immunity provided by section 4-102 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) ( 745 ILCS 10/4-102 (West 2016) ) or the limited immunity provided by section 15.1(a) of the Emergency Telephone System Act (ETS Act) ( 50 ILCS 750/15.1(a) (West 2016)) applies to claims premised on a 911 dispatcher's allegedly intentional or reckless refusal to dispatch emergency services when the caller was unable to provide an exact address.
¶ 2 The St. Clair County circuit court dismissed the claims with prejudice pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) ( 735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2016) ), , that section 4-102 of the Tort Immunity Act provided absolute immunity for plaintiff's claims and that the decedent's conduct was the sole proximate cause of her death. The appellate court affirmed. 2020 IL App (5th) 190256, 448 Ill.Dec. 1, 175 N.E.3d 670. For the following reasons, we hold that the limited immunity of section 15.1(a) of the ETS Act governs this claim, but we affirm the dismissal because decedent's conduct was the sole proximate cause of her death.
¶ 4 In January 2018, plaintiff, Larry E. Schultz, special administrator of the estate of Laurene T. Schultz, filed a wrongful death and survival action against defendants, St. Clair County (County); St. Clair County CENCOM 911 (CENCOM 911), a public safety agency and public safety answering point within the state of Illinois; the Emergency Telephone System Board of St. Clair County (ETSB); and John Doe/Jane Doe, unidentified CENCOM 911 dispatchers. Plaintiff alleged that defendants engaged in willful and wanton conduct by refusing to dispatch 911 services, which resulted in the decedent's death.
¶ 5 Plaintiff specifically alleged that on October 22, 2017, he made multiple calls to 911, seeking a police dispatch to prevent his wife from driving away in her vehicle. He believed she was under the influence of alcohol at the time. According to the complaint, police were initially dispatched to the wrong location, and plaintiff's wife drove away. Plaintiff then made a second request for 911 assistance. He told the 911 dispatcher that his wife was at a local convenience store, provided the name of the store, and indicated that it was near the high school on State Street in Mascoutah, Illinois. Plaintiff alleged that the 911 dispatcher repeatedly advised plaintiff that police would not be dispatched without an exact address and that he should call back when he had it. While plaintiff attempted to locate an exact address, his wife drove away from the convenience store. Shortly thereafter, she drove her vehicle off the road and died from her injuries.
¶ 6 In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that St. Clair County acts as a public agency authorized to provide emergency services, including police and medical services, to its residents. The County established the ETSB to create, manage, and oversee the operation of the 911 emergency system through a central dispatch center, CENCOM 911. CENCOM 911 serves as a public safety answering point responsible for receiving 911 calls and processing those calls according to a specified operational policy. CENCOM 911 employs telecommunicators or dispatchers who transmit information to emergency service providers.
¶ 7 Count I of the complaint was directed against the County. Plaintiff alleged that the County, acting through CENCOM 911 and its employee dispatchers, had a duty to relay accurate information to providers of emergency services and to dispatch those services in a timely manner. In violation of these duties and of those duties set forth in section 15.1(a) of the ETS Act, the County, through its dispatchers at CENCOM 911, acted in reckless disregard and indifference to decedent and the public by dispatching police to the wrong location and by refusing to contact police after plaintiff requested assistance. Plaintiff further alleged that the decedent drove her vehicle off the highway and was killed as a direct and proximate result of the "willful and wanton failure and refusal" of the County, through CENCOM 911 and its dispatchers, to act reasonably regarding the safety and welfare of the residents of Mascoutah.
¶ 8 Count II set forth similar allegations against CENCOM 911. Plaintiff additionally alleged that CENCOM 911 manned the dispatch line with improperly trained and/or unqualified employees, failed to properly supervise dispatchers who performed with utter indifference to the safety and welfare of the public, including decedent, and recklessly abandoned its own protocol and purpose by refusing to dispatch police to a known location to intercept decedent.
¶ 9 Count III was directed against the ETSB. Plaintiff alleged that the ETSB acted in reckless disregard for decedent's safety by failing to manage the selection of dispatchers to ensure qualified employees were providing 911 services. Plaintiff also alleged that the ETSB acted in reckless disregard for decedent's safety by failing to monitor CENCOM 911's implementation of the ETS Act to protect decedent and the public from CENCOM 911's refusal to properly train and/or control the actions of its dispatchers.
¶ 10 Count IV was directed against the 911 dispatchers and set forth similar allegations as in counts I and II. Count V alleged a claim against the County pursuant to section 27-6 of the Survival Act ( 755 ILCS 5/27-6 (West 2016) ).
¶ 11 In response, defendants filed a combined motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code ( 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2018) ). Relevant here, defendants argued that the complaint should be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code (id. § 2-619(a)(9) ) because they were immune from civil liability under section 4-102 of the Tort Immunity Act ( 745 ILCS 10/4-102 (West 2016) ). Further, defendants maintained that plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed because decedent's conduct was the sole proximate cause of her injuries and death.
¶ 12 The circuit court granted defendants’ motion, finding, in pertinent part, that they had absolute immunity from civil liability under section 4-102 of the Tort Immunity Act, and that decedent's negligence was the sole proximate cause of her injuries and death.
¶ 13 The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's dismissal. 2020 IL App (5th) 190256, 448 Ill.Dec. 1, 175 N.E.3d 670. Relying in part on this court's holding in DeSmet v. County of Rock Island , 219 Ill. 2d 497, 302 Ill.Dec. 466, 848 N.E.2d 1030 (2006), the appellate court held the absolute immunity found in section 4-102 of the Tort Immunity Act applies where liability is premised on the failure of a dispatcher to dispatch police in a timely fashion. 2020 IL App (5th) 190256, ¶ 13, 448 Ill.Dec. 1, 175 N.E.3d 670. After examining the purpose and provisions of the ETS Act, the court was not convinced that section 15.1 applied to situations in which a 911 dispatcher allegedly failed or refused to dispatch emergency services. Id. ¶ 17. Instead, the court found that section 15.1 was limited to "provid[ing] an immunity for failures within that infrastructure and technology itself." Id. Moreover, the court stated section 15.1 "was not designed to supersede the immunities set forth in the Tort Immunity Act." Id.
¶ 14 Justice Wharton dissented. He believed the majority's interpretation overlooked the express language in section 15.1 that makes its limited immunity applicable to the performance or provision of 911 services. Id. ¶¶ 24-25 (Wharton, J., dissenting). He also thought the plaintiff's allegations may involve the 911 infrastructure and that DeSmet was not controlling. Id. ¶ 31.
¶ 15 We allowed plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Additionally, we allowed motions for leave to file amicus curiae briefs from the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association, the City of Chicago, and the Illinois Municipal League. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).
¶ 17 The claims at issue in this appeal were dismissed by the circuit court pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code. A motion to dismiss brought under that section admits the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint but asserts affirmative matter that defeats the claim. Smith v. The Vanguard Group, Inc. , 2019 IL 123264, ¶ 9, 432 Ill.Dec. 673, 129 N.E.3d 1216. When ruling on such a motion, a court must accept as true all well-pled facts in the plaintiff's complaint and any reasonable inferences that arise from those facts.
Patrick Engineering, Inc. v. City of Naperville , 2012 IL 113148, ¶ 31, 364 Ill.Dec. 40, 976 N.E.2d 318. Our review of the dismissal of a section 2-619 motion is de novo. Rehfield v. Diocese of Joliet , 2021 IL 125656, ¶ 23, 450 Ill.Dec. 677, 182 N.E.3d 123.
¶ 19 Our review of the dismissal in this case requires us to construe the immunity provisions of section 4-102 of the Tort Immunity Act and section 15.1(a) of the ETS Act. This court has never considered the scope of immunity provided in the ETS Act or the interplay between the immunities provided by section...
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