Schultz v. Tribune Nd Inc. F/K/A Newsday Inc.

• Decision Date: 08 December 2010
• Docket Number: No. 10–CV–2652 (JFB)(ETB).,10–CV–2652 (JFB)(ETB).
• Citation: 754 F.Supp.2d 550
• Parties: Gerard SCHULTZ, Plaintiff,v.TRIBUNE ND, INC. f/k/a Newsday, Inc., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

754 F.Supp.2d 550

Gerard SCHULTZ, Plaintiff,

v.TRIBUNE ND, INC. f/k/a Newsday, Inc., Defendant.

No. 10–CV–2652 (JFB)(ETB).

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Dec. 8, 2010.

Joseph O. Giaimo and Jade L. Fuller of Giaimo Associates, LLP, Kew Gardens, NY, for plaintiff.Cliff Fonstein, Eric Hoffman, and Adam McClay of Sidley Austin LLP, New York, NY, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge.

Plaintiff Gerard Schultz (“plaintiff” or “Schultz”) commenced this action in New York State Supreme Court, Suffolk County, against defendant Tribune ND, Inc., formerly known as Newsday, Inc. (“defendant” or “Newsday”), alleging that defendant violated his rights under New York State Human Rights Law Section 296(1)(a) when it terminated him from his employment with Newsday. Defendant removed the action to this Court, and plaintiff has moved to remand the case to state court. Defendant opposes plaintiff's motion to remand and, in turn, has filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's Amended Complaint. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court concludes that plaintiff's claims are completely preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461, and, thus, defendant's removal of the action to federal court was proper. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion to remand is denied.¹

I. Background

A. Facts

On June 3, 2010, Schultz filed an Amended Complaint against Newsday in an action pending in New York State Supreme Court, Suffolk County, alleging that Newsday discriminated against him in violation of New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”) Section 296(1)(a) and seeking $1.6 million in damages. ( See Am. Compl. ¶ 26, Prayer for Relief ¶ (a); Notice of Removal ¶¶ 1–2.) Specifically, Schultz claims that Newsday discriminated against him “by terminating him solely because of his absence from employment while on disability in order to deprive him of his short term and long term disability benefits.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 25.)

As set forth in the Amended Complaint,² Newsday hired plaintiff as a truck helper in or about July 1980. ( Id. ¶ 6.) Since that time, Newsday has continuously employed plaintiff in a variety of positions, including as road foreman, assistant foreman of night operations, and, finally, as sales manager of Long Island Single Copy Sales, a position to which plaintiff was promoted in or about 1996. ( Id.) On or about January 19, 2001, plaintiff severely injured his back in an automobile accident unrelated to his employment. ( Id. ¶ 7.) Although plaintiff returned to work on January 26, 2001, he had to undergo spinal surgery as a result of his injuries on May 29, 2002, and was unable to work until approximately November 1, 2002. ( Id. ¶¶ 8–9.) When plaintiff returned to his job at Newsday, he was able to “resume [ ] his normal employment duties and activities” despite continuing pain in his back. ( Id. ¶ 9.)

Subsequently, on August 9, 2004, plaintiff was required to undergo a second corrective spinal surgery, after which he went on short-term medical leave from the date of the surgery until February 24, 2005. ( Id. ¶ 11.) During this time, plaintiff was entitled to receive his full salary pursuant to the terms of Newsday's Disability Plan coverage (“Disability Plan”).³ ( Id. ¶ 14.) Notably, under the terms of the Disability Plan, if plaintiff was deemed permanently disabled by the end of his short-term medical leave, he would be eligible to receive long-term disability benefits totaling $936 a week, plus additional benefits, for the rest of his life. ( Id. ¶¶ 15, 28.)

On or about September 2, 2004, approximately one month after plaintiff's short-term medical leave had begun, Newsday informed plaintiff that he had been terminated. ( Id. ¶ 13.) As explained in a letter from Newsday dated September 3, 2004, plaintiff was fired based on his “participation in fraudulent circulation practices, [his] failure to be forthright with company attorneys during the investigation, and [his] violations of the company's Code of Conduct.” ( Id. Ex. B.) Plaintiff, however, claims that “the allegations in the termination letter were untrue, wrongful ... and made with the fraudulent intent of terminating plaintiff's employment while on disability and terminating plaintiff's disability benefits.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff states that he was “absolutely truthful” with Newsday's attorneys ( id. ¶ 21), that he “never engaged in wrongful conduct” ( id. ¶ 22), and that the “sole reason” Newsday terminated him “while he was on disability ... was to prevent him while disabled from receiving short term disability benefits for twenty six (26) weeks and life time long term disability benefits.” ⁴ ( Id. ¶ 24.)

On or about June 24, 2005, plaintiff filed a complaint against Newsday with the New York State Division of Human Rights (“Division of Human Rights”) asserting violations of the NYSHRL, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). (Jade L. Fuller Affirmation In Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (“Fuller Aff.”) ¶ 11.) On April 28, 2006, the Division of Human Rights dismissed plaintiff's complaint on the grounds of “administrative convenience” to allow him to “pursue this matter by litigation in Federal Court.” ( Id. Ex. B at 1.)

B. Prior Action

On September 1, 2006, Schultz filed a complaint against Newsday and a number of other defendants, alleging violations of the FMLA, the ADA, ERISA, and the NYSHRL. (Fuller Aff. ¶ 13.) The Honorable Frederick Block dismissed all of plaintiff's federal claims on summary judgment in a Memorandum and Order dated October 7, 2009. See Schultz v. Tribune Co., Inc., No. 06–cv–4800 (FB)(RER), 2009 WL 3246737 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2009) (“ Schultz I ”). A review of Judge Block's opinion reveals that plaintiff's factual allegations in Schultz I differ from those raised in the instant case. In particular, it appears that plaintiff's primary allegation in Schultz I—which has not been asserted in the current case—was that he was fired “in retaliation for his role as a ‘whistleblower’ on a scheme whereby the newspaper reported inflated circulation figures in order to charge higher rates to advertisers.” Id. at *1. Indeed, Judge Block specifically noted that plaintiff “consistently and ardently maintain[ed] that his termination was in retaliation for his role as a ‘whistleblower,’ and not on account of his taking medical leave (FMLA), his disability (ADA), or his entitlement to disability benefits (ERISA).” Id. Consequently, because plaintiff had failed to connect his termination to any of his rights under the relevant statutes, Judge Block granted Newsday's motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's federal claims in its entirety. Id.

As to plaintiff's remaining state NYSHRL claim,⁵ Judge Block declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over that claim and dismissed it without prejudice to renewal in state court. Id. at *4–5.

C. Procedural History

On June 10, 2010, defendant removed the current action to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. (Notice of Removal ¶ 3.) Plaintiff filed a motion to remand on July 26, 2010. Defendant filed its opposition to plaintiff's motion along with a cross-motion to dismiss on September 10, 2010. Plaintiff filed its reply in support of its motion and in opposition to defendant's motion on October 1, 2010. Defendant filed its reply on October 11, 2010. The Court heard oral argument on December 3, 2010, at which time the Court denied plaintiff's motion to remand and stated that a written opinion, as set forth herein, would follow.

II. Motion to Remand ⁶

A. Removal Jurisdiction Standard

Generally, a case may be removed from state court to federal court “only if it could have originally been commenced in federal court on either the basis of federal question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction.” Citibank, N.A. v. Swiatkoski, 395 F.Supp.2d 5, 8 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441. If a federal district court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a case removed from state court, the case must be remanded. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “When a party challenges the removal of an action from state court, the burden falls on the removing party to establish its right to a federal forum by competent proof.” In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:00–1898, MDL 1358(SAS), M 21–88, 2006 WL 1004725, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Further, “[i]n light of the congressional intent to restrict federal court jurisdiction, as well as the importance of preserving the independence of state governments, federal courts construe the removal statute narrowly, resolving any doubts against removability.” Lupo v. Human Affairs Int'l, Inc., 28 F.3d 269, 274 (2d Cir.1994) (quoting Somlyo v. J. Lu–Rob Enters., Inc., 932 F.2d 1043, 1045–46 (2d Cir.1991)); accord Fed. Ins. Co. v. Tyco Int'l Ltd., 422 F.Supp.2d 357, 367–68 (S.D.N.Y.2006).

In determining whether federal subject matter jurisdiction exists, a court may examine only the “well-pleaded” allegations in the complaint and, consequently, “must disregard allegations that a well-pleaded complaint would not include [such as] allegations about anticipated defenses.” Sullivan v. Am. Airlines, 424 F.3d 267, 271 (2d Cir.2005). Thus, under this doctrine, known as the “well-pleaded complaint rule,” a federal court has federal question jurisdiction over an action “only if ‘plaintiff's statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based’ on federal law.” Romano v. Kazacos, 609 F.3d 512, 518 (2d Cir.2010) (quoting Vaden v. Discover Bank, ––– U.S. ––––, 129 S.Ct. 1262, 1275, 173 L.Ed.2d 206 (2009) and citing Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987)). Thus, the plaintiff typically is deemed “the master...