Schultz v. United States Dep't of State

Decision Date27 October 2022
Docket NumberCiv. 22-00059 LEK-WRP
PartiesBRENDAN SCHULTZ, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DOES 1 THROUGH 100, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Hawaii

ORDER: DISMISSING, WITH PARTIAL LEAVE TO AMEND PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR INJUNCTION AND RESERVING RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN DISTRICT COURT WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES OR COSTS

Leslie E. Kobayashi United States District Judge

On July 15, 2022, pro se Plaintiff Brendan Schultz (Schultz) filed his Amended Complaint and Request for Injunction (“First Amended Complaint”). [Dkt. no. 9.] Schultz previously filed an Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (“Application”). [Filed 2/8/22 (dkt. no. 3).] The Court has considered the Application as a non-hearing matter pursuant to Rule LR7.1(d) of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii. For the reasons set forth below, the First Amended Complaint is hereby dismissed. However, Schultz will be allowed to file a second amended complaint to try to cure the defects in the First Amended Complaint. Because Schultz is allowed to file a second amended complaint, the Application will not be ruled upon until the second amended complaint is filed and screened. Schultz's second amended complaint must be filed by November 28, 2022.

BACKGROUND

Schultz's original complaint, [filed 2/8/22 (dkt. no. 1),] was dismissed through the screening process because he failed to sufficiently allege plausible claims against the United States Department of State (Department of State). See generally Order: Dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint and Request for Injunction; and Reserving Ruling on Plaintiff's Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs, filed 5/31/22 (dkt. no. 7) (5/31/22 Order”).[1]

According to the First Amended Complaint, Schultz resides in Honolulu Hawai'i. [First Amended Complaint at ¶ I.A.] The defendants named in the First Amended Complaint are the Department of State and the Institute of International Education ("IIE"). [Id. at ¶ I.B.] Schultz asserts that federal question jurisdiction exists in this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. [Id. at ¶ II.]

Schultz brings this action under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI), and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). [Id. at ¶ II.A.] Schultz alleges the Department of State and/or the IIE violated his civil rights because he was discriminated against when he was not selected to interview for a 2022 Fulbright scholarship. See id. at PageID #: 59. Schultz applied to the Fulbright United States Student Program before the October 12, 2021 deadline. [Id.] He alleges that, although he “was extremely well qualified for the Fulbright U.S. Student program when accessed [sic] by the publicized criteria for such award,” on January 26, 2022, the IIE “informed [him] that he was not selected for an interview for the Fulbright program without providing any rationale.” [Id.]

Schultz further alleges the IIE “does not appear to have anti-bias training for Fulbright program evaluators,” and does not have a “civil rights grievance process by which [he] can seek to rectify a civil rights violation.” [Id.] Schultz also alleges “the Department of State and the Executive Branch have no procedure to efficiently rectify discrimination in a timely manner that would prevent irreparable harm to [him].” [Id.] Schultz states that [a]ny reasonable person who compares [his] application for the Fulbright program with the criteria outlined on the Fulbright program's website would conclude that [he] is well qualified for the Fulbright program and immensely qualified for the particular Fulbright award for which he applied.” [Id.]

Schultz alleges that, because he received at least eight awards from the Department of State and the Department of State “routinely publishe[d his] accomplishments through official media channels,” the rejection of his Fulbright application is “perplexing and illogical.” [Id. at PagelD #: 62.] Schultz alleges he was “discriminated against as a result of being a Jew . . . .” [Id. at PageID #: 65.] He also alleges the Department of State retaliated against him after they learned of his lawsuit against it because, since the initiation of his suit, the Department of State has rejected all twelve of Schultz's applications for grants in 2022. See id. at PageID #: 63. In comparison, Schultz alleges he received four out of the six grants he applied for in 2021. See id. Schultz seeks: (1) “a preliminary injunction to advance . . . to the finalist selection process for his 2022 Fulbright U.S. Student program application”; (2) compensatory damages; (3) punitive damages; (4) general and special damages; (5) statutory damages; (6) equitable relief; (7) interest; and (8) any other appropriate relief. [Id. at ¶ V.]

STANDARD

“Federal courts can authorize the commencement of any suit without prepayment of fees or security by a person who submits an affidavit that demonstrates he is unable to pay.” Smallwood v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, CV. NO. 16-00505 DKW-KJM, 2016 WL 4974948, at *1 (D. Hawai'i Sept. 16, 2016) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)).

The Court subjects each civil action commenced pursuant to Section 1915(a) to mandatory screening and can order the dismissal of any claims it finds “frivolous, malicious, failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but requires” the court to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim);[2] Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (holding that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners”).

Id. at *3.

In addition, the following standards apply in the screening analysis:

Plaintiff is appearing pro se; consequently, the court liberally construes her pleadings. Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The Supreme Court has instructed the federal courts to liberally construe the ‘inartful pleading' of pro se litigants.” (citing Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam))). The court also recognizes that [u]nless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect . . . a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint's deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action.” Lucas v. Dep't of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th. [sic] Cir. 2000).
Despite the liberal pro se pleading standard, the court may dismiss a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on its own motion. See Omar v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987) (“A trial court may dismiss a claim sua sponte under [Rule] 12(b)(6). Such a dismissal may be made without notice where the claimant cannot possibly win relief.”) ....

Flores v. Trump, CIVIL 16-00652 LEK-RLP, 2017 WL 125698, at *1 (D. Hawai'i Jan. 12, 2017) (some alterations in Flores) (some citations omitted), reconsideration denied, 2017 WL 830966 (Mar. 2, 2017).

DISCUSSION
I. Failure to State a Claim

Federal question jurisdiction exists over Schultz's claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). Schultz, however, fails to provide sufficient facts to raise plausible Fifth Amendment, APA, Title VI, or RFRA claims. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

A. Fifth Amendment Claims
1. Claim Related to the Fulbright Application Denial The Court previously dismissed Schultz's Fifth

Amendment claim against the Department of State because Schultz did not allege the Department of State conducted the selection process for the Fulbright application. See 5/31/22 Order, 2022 WL 1749098, at *3. In his First Amended Complaint, Schultz realleges that the IIE conducted the selection process. See First Amended Complaint at PageID #: 67. Because Schultz does not allege the Department of State was involved in the selection process, Schultz's Fifth Amendment claim against the Department of State related to the denial of his Fulbright application must be dismissed. [I]t is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect[s] with Schultz's Fifth Amendment claims against the Department of State related to the denial of his Fulbright application. See Lucas, 66 F.3d at 248 (citations omitted). Schultz was previously granted leave to amend his Fifth Amendment claim against the Department of State to allege how it was involved in the purported discrimination, and Schultz failed to cure the defect. Allowing him another opportunity to amend would be futile. See, e.g., Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009), as amended (Feb. 10, 2009) (stating the failure to cure defects identified in the dismissal of a prior version of the complaint “is a strong indication that the plaintiffs have no...

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