Schultz v. Village of Lisle
| Decision Date | 02 October 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 44741,44741 |
| Citation | 53 Ill.2d 39,289 N.E.2d 614 |
| Parties | William SCHULTZ et al., Appellees, v. The VILLAGE OF LISLE, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Richard J. Hill, of Johnson & Hill, Geneva, for appellant.
Leonard Bosgraf, Chicago, for appellees.
Plaintiffs are owners of four adjoining lots located on the northest corner of the intersection of Route 53, a north-south highway, and Burlington Avenue, an east-west street, in Lisle, Illinois. They filed a declaratory judgment action in the circuit court of Du Page County against the Village of Lisle praying that its zoning ordinance be declared void and ineffective to prevent plaintiffs from developing their property for an automobile service station, that the Village be restrained from interfering with the development of the property for this use, and that on the filing of proper applications the Village be ordered to issue the necessary permits. The trial court granted plaintiffs the relief sought. The appellate court affirmed (4 Ill.App.3d 427, 273 N.E.2d 89) and we granted the Village's petition for leave to appeal.
The zoning ordinance of the Village of Lisle provides for six classifications: (1) 'A' Residence districts, permitting single family dwellings, libraries, schools, parks, churches, etc., (2) 'B' Residence districts, permitting two family dwellings, private clubs, greenhouses, institutions, and hospitals, (3) 'C' Residence districts permitting multiple family residences, lodging and boarding houses and apartment hotels, (4) Community Business districts, permitting a wide range of business activities but not including gasoline service stations, (5) Commercial Business districts, permitting more intensive business uses including gasoline service stations, and (6) Light Manufacturing districts. Plaintiffs' property is located in a district zoned 'A' Residence district, which is the most restrictive classification. They filed an application with the Village for rezoning the property to a Commercial Business classification which permits the construction of gasoline service stations. This classification is next to the least restrictive classification of the ordinance. Following a hearing, the zoning board of appeals recommended to the Village board that the application be denied. Thereafter the Village board denied the plaintiff's application for the rezoning of its property.
This case does not present the zoning question in the customary manner. In many zoning cases the application for rezoning has previously been denied and the court is presented with the question of whether the existing zoning classification is arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive as applied to the subject property and whether it is reasonably related to the public health, safety, and morals. The burden is on the plaintiff to establish these elements as against the presumption of the validity of the zoning ordinance. However, in this case in the trial court witnesses for the Village admitted that the proper classification of the property is not for single-family residences. They stated the property should retain a residential classification but should be classified for multiple family dwellings. The appellate court, referring to these admissions in the evidence of the Village, stated that plaintiffs had met their burden of proving the invalidity of the existing zoning ordinance as applied to their property. The court held that in addition to establishing the invalidity of the zoning ordinance the plaintiffs also have the burden of showing that their proposed use of the property is reasonable. The appellate court reviewed the evidence relating to the reasonableness of the proposed use as a service station and concluded that plaintiffs had sustained their burden of proving this use to be reasonable and held that the finding of the trial court to this effect was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
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Amalgamated Trust and Sav. Bank v. Cook County
...fails to prove the proposed use reasonable, the court need not consider the validity of the ordinance. (Schultz v. Village of Lisle (1972), 53 Ill.2d 39, 289 N.E.2d 614; Finfrock v. City of Urbana (1976), 39 Ill.App.3d 641, 349 N.E.2d 491.) Accordingly, despite the defendants' failure to ap......
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Cosmopolitan Nat. Bank v. Cook County
...188.) This court can set aside a zoning ordinance to the extent necessary to allow a proposed specific use. (Schultz v. Village of Lisle (1972), 53 Ill.2d 39, 42, 289 N.E.2d 614.) Here, the specific use proposed was an interim use as a sanitary landfill; Sexton's end-use plans were continge......
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Cosmopolitan Nat. Bank v. Cook County
...ordinance may be set aside only to the extent necessary to permit the specific use proposed by the landowner (Shultz v. Village of Lisle (1972), 53 Ill.2d 39, 289 N.E.2d 614). Accordingly, in reviewing the validity of a zoning ordinance, a court should not inquire whether the property as pr......
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Glenview State Bank v. Village of Deerfield
...of the existing zoning ordinance and then show that the proposed use for the subject property is reasonable. (Schultz v. Village of Lisle (1972), 53 Ill.2d 39, 41, 289 N.E.2d 614; Gunderson, 156 Ill.App.3d at 101, 108 Ill.Dec. at 642, 508 N.E.2d at 1219.) In La Salle National Bank v. County......