Schulz v. Warden

• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York
• Writing for the Court: THERESE WILEY DANCKS, United States Magistrate Judge
• Docket Number: 9:23-cv-0295 (AJB/TWD)
• Decision Date: 31 December 2025
• Citation: Schulz v. Warden, 9:23-cv-0295 (AJB/TWD) (N.D. N.Y. Dec 31, 2025)
• Parties: DONALD SCHULZ, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, Respondent.

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DONALD SCHULZ, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, Respondent.

No. 9:23-cv-0295 (AJB/TWD)

United States District Court, N.D. New York

December 31, 2025

DONALD SCHULZ Petitioner, pro se

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES KAREN FOLSTER LESPERANCE, ESQ. ATTORNEY - ALBANY Attorney for Respondent

REPORT-RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER

THERESE WILEY DANCKS, United States Magistrate Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter has been referred for a Report and Recommendation by the Hon. Anthony J. Brindisi, United States District Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and N.D.N.Y. Local Rule 72.3(c). Petitioner Donald Schulz (“Petitioner”) seeks federal habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Dkt. No. 1. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends the petition be denied and dismissed.

II. BACKGROUND

Petitioner is serving a 156-month term of imprisonment, to be followed by a three-year term of supervision, following conviction in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York for Possession with Intent to Distribute Methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), and Being a Felon in Possession of a Firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). See Dkt. No. 10-1 at 1-2; see also Dkt. No. 10-2 at 2-3.^[1]Petitioner commenced this action on March 2, 2023, while incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution at Ray Brook, seeking application of Federal Time Credits (“FTC”) under the First Step Act (“FSA”). See generally, Dkt. No. 1 at 1-4.

III. PETITION

Petitioner seeks federal habeas corpus relief due to the Federal Bureau of Prison (“FBOP”)'s denial of his application of FTC to reduce his term of confinement. See Dkt. No. 1 at 1. Respondent first contends the instant petition is procedurally barred due to Plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies available to him though the BOP's administrative remedy program. See Dkt. No. 10 at 3-5. More specifically, Respondent avers Petitioner submitted a Request for Admin to the Warden at FCI Ray Brook on or about March 12, 2023, “requesting the application of FSA credit towards early release supervision,” the Warden denied Petitioner's request on March 27, 2023, and Petitioner did not submit an appeal of the Warden's decision to the appropriate Regional Office or the BOP's office of General Counsel. Dkt. No. 10-1 at 5; see also Dkt. No. 10 at 4-5; Dkt. No. 10-6. Respondent further argues Petitioner is not eligible to apply FSA credits due to his “medium” Prisoner Assessment Tool Targeting Estimated Risk and Needs (“PATTERN”) score and has not sought the Warden's discretion to apply FSA credits irrespective of his PATTERN score; therefore, habeas relief is not warranted. See Dkt. No. 10 at 5-7.

In his reply, Petitioner first contests the availability of administrative remedies at FCI Ray Brook. See Dkt. No. 13 at 2. To that end, Petitioner references a BP (10) form sent to the BOP Regional Office, dated December 16, 2022, wherein Petitioner stated:

FCI-Ray Brook CMC Matteau, Unit Team, and Admin. Remedy Coordinator Price are refusing to process Admin. Remedies here at Ray Brook. I submitted a BP9 Admin. Remedy Request to the Warden's Office seeking application of the Earned Time Credit (ETC) that has accrued since December 2018 .... BECAUSE MORE THAN 50 DAYS HAVE ELAPSED SINCE I SUBMITTED MY BP9 TO THE WARDEN'S OFFICE AND IT HAS NOT BEEN ANSWERED, AND THE TIME FOR ANSWERING HAS NOT BEEN EXTENDED, THIS BP 10 IS PROPERLY FILED.

Id. at 4 (cleaned up) (emphasis in original).^[2],^[3] Thus, Petitioner argues he “not only filed one BP (9) but rather two of them ....” Id. at 2. Petitioner further avers he is entitled to application of FTC under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621(g)(1)(B) and (D). See id. at 2-3.

IV. LEGAL STANDARD

Habeas corpus relief is available where a prisoner is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “A § 2241 petition is generally the appropriate vehicle to raise claims arising from a prison official's computation of a prisoner's sentence.” Clapper v. Langford, 186 F.Supp.3d 235, 238 (N.D.N.Y. 2016) (citing Poindexter v. Nash, 333 F.3d 372, 377 (2d Cir. 2003)); see also, e.g., Lugo v. Hudson, No. 9:13-CV-0753 (GTS), 2014 WL 11350815, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. June 16, 2014) (explaining the petitioner's challenge to “the BOP's calculation of his federal sentence,” was “properly brought pursuant to section 2241.”), aff'd, 785 F.3d 852 (2d Cir. 2015); Holton v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 6:22-CV-6528 (CJS), 2023 WL 2965145, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2023) (habeas petitioner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241was “the appropriate vehicle” for the petitioner's claim he was entitled to FSA time credit).

Federal inmates seeking habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 must exhaust their administrative remedies prior to filing a petition. See Carmona v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 243 F.3d 629, 634 (2d Cir. 2001). “This requires compliance with the BOP's four-step Administrative Remedy Program.” Lallave v. Martinez, 609 F.Supp.3d 164, 179 (E.D.N.Y. 2022) (citing 28 C.F.R. § 542.10(a)). “A federal inmate's failure to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him prior to commencing a Section 2241 action may ‘only be excused upon a showing of cause and prejudice.'” Dennis v. Christensen, No. 9:22-CV-0997 (AJB/ML), 2025 WL 1885207, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2025) (citing Carmona, 243 F.3d at 634), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 1554003 (N.D.N.Y. June 2, 2025). However, “[j]udicial exhaustion is not a jurisdictional requirement ....Accordingly, the court may excuse exhaustion if it appears that an administrative appeal would be futile, or because the appeals process is shown to be inadequate to prevent irreparable harm ....” United States v. Basciano, 369 F.Supp.2d 344, 348 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (first citing Howard v. Headly, 72 F.Supp.2d 118, 122 (E.D.N.Y.1999); then citing Howell v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 72 F.3d 288, 291 (2d Cir. 1995)) (additional citations omitted); see also, e.g., Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51, 62 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining, “if an exhaustion requirement is judicially imposed instead of statutorily imposed, a number of exceptions apply that allow courts to excuse a party's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Specifically, exhaustion of administrative remedies may not be required when ‘(1) available remedies provide no genuine opportunity for adequate relief; (2) irreparable injury may occur without immediate judicial relief; (3) administrative appeal would be futile; and (4) in certain instances a plaintiff has raised a substantial constitutional question.'”) (quoting Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280, 1288 (2d Cir. 1996)) (additional citations omitted); Lopez v. Terrell, 697 F.Supp.2d 549, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“The exhaustion requirement for § 2241 petitions, however, is prudential, not statutory, and may be excused at the court's discretion.”), rev'd on other grounds, 654 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2011).

The FSA created parameters for a “risk and needs assessment system” to classify, identify, and provide evidence-based recidivism reduction programs or productive activities for incarcerated individuals. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(a). Such system is used to, inter alia, “determine the recidivism risk of each prisoner . . . and classify each prisoner as having minimum, low, medium, or high risk for recidivism;” “reassess the recidivism risk of each prisoner periodically . . .;” and “determine when a prisoner is ready to transfer into prerelease custody or supervised release in accordance with section 3624 ....” Id. § 3632(a)(1)-(8). Under the FSA, eligible inmates may earn specified time credits per month, if they “successfully participate in recidivism reduction programs or productive activities,” and such time credits “shall be applied toward time in prerelease custody or supervised release,” Id. § 3632(d)(4)(C), however, certain prisoners are ineligible to receive or apply time credits.

Under § 3624, a prisoner is eligible to be placed in “supervised release” if “prisoner has been determined under the System to be a minimum or low risk to recidivate pursuant to the last reassessment of the prisoner.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(D)(ii). Alternatively, a prisoner may be placed in “prerelease custody” if the prisoner either “has been determined under the System to be a minimum or low risk to recidivate pursuant to the last 2 reassessments of the prisoner;” or “has had a petition to be transferred to prerelease custody or supervised release approved by the warden of the prison,” after the warden has determined:

(aa) the prisoner would not be a danger to society if transferred to prerelease custody or supervised release;

(bb) the prisoner has made a good faith effort to lower their recidivism risk through participation in recidivism reduction programs or productive activities; and

(cc) the prisoner is unlikely to recidivate[.]

Id. § 3624(g)(1)(D)(i). The process for a prisoner to petition the warden to be transferred is set forth in BOP Program Statement 5410.01 CN-2. See Dkt. No. 10-1 at 3; Dkt. No. 10-5 at 18-23; see also, e.g., Chandler v. United States, No. 3:25-1248, 2025 WL 3270524, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 2025). The Program Statement explains “[i]nmates may initiate a request . . . by submitting a BP-A0148, Inmate Request to Staff, during their regularly scheduled Program Review. The Unit Manager will submit a request, along with the unit team's recommendation, to the Warden (or designee) for final decision.” Dkt. No. 10-5 at 21.

V. DISCUSSION

A petitioner in a habeas proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 “bears the burden of proving that he is being held contrary to law; and . . . must satisfy his burden of proof by...