Schuman v. Peddicord

• Decision Date: 26 February 1879
• Citation: 50 Md. 560
• Parties: HANNAH S. SCHUMAN, by Her Next Friend, H. W. Hesen v. THOMAS J. PEDDICORD.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

50 Md. 560

HANNAH S. SCHUMAN, by Her Next Friend, H. W. Hesen v. THOMAS J. PEDDICORD.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

February 26, 1879

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Garrett County, in Equity.

The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

The cause was submitted to BARTOL, C.J., BRENT, MILLER, ALVEY and ROBINSON, JJ.

William Brace and Benj. A. Richmond, for the appellant.

The deed in question purports to convey only certain real estate described in it by metes and bounds, and nowhere either states that this was all the grantors' real estate, or conveys in general terms all other real estate owned by them. All their personal property is conveyed in terms, and this is followed by a statement, that "it is expressly intended * * * to transfer * * * every species of personal property which they possess." Seeming to negative any presumption that it was also intended to convey all their real estate. It is scarcely necessary to quote authorities to show that such a deed is void. Rosenburg v. Moore, 11 Md. 377; Barnitz v Rice, 14 Md. 24; Bridges v. Hindes, 16 Md. 101; Ins. Co. v. Wallis, 23 Md. 173.

If the deed is void, the property remained in the grantors. Bridges v. Hindes, 16 Md. 101, 105; Ins. Co. v Wallis, 23 Md. 173, 184. Estoppels, wherever they exist, are mutual. Ins. Co. v. Wallis, 23 Md. 184; Thomas v. Turner, 16 Md. 105; Grove v. Todd, 41 Md. 633.

Thos. J. Peddicord, for the appellee.

Can the appellant attack the validity of her own deed, or is she estopped?

The true principle of estoppel as applicable to deeds, is to prevent circuity of action and to compel parties to fulfill their contracts. Though a deed may be void as fraudulent against creditors, or against the policy of the law, it is good by way of estoppel against the donor and grantor, or their executors, and those claiming under them. 6 H. & J. 61; 6 H. & J. 116; 7 H. & J. 417; 4 H. & J. 329; 5 G. & J. 314; 1 Gill, 430.

A deed made by a debtor, with intent to defraud his creditors, although void under the Statute of Elizabeth as against creditors, as against the debtor is good and valid. 7 G. & J. 132; Ib. 96.

When a feme eovert parts with her property by any mode or form of conveyance, executed according to law, she is, by her own voluntary act, precluded from disavowing it, and is bound by the conditions and terms of her deed. 6 Gill, 28.

Robinson J., delivered the opinion of the court.

The appellant, a married woman, united with her husband in an assignment of property for the common benefit of their creditors; and this bill is filed by the wife, to set aside the assignment as fraudulent, because it does not upon its face embrace the entire property of the grantors.

Whether the assignment is liable to the objection now urged against it, is a question not necessary to be decided here, for if it be conceded that it does not embrace all the property of the grantors, real and personal, and is therefore void under the Stat. of 13 Eliz.; it is nevertheless binding on the grantors. Stewart v. Iglehart, 7 G. & J. 132; Freeman v. Sedgwick, 6 Gill, 28; Dorsey v. Smithson, 6 H. & J. 61; Chessman v. Exall, 6 Exch. 341; Cushwa v. Cushwa, 5 Md. 44; Newson v. Douglass, 7 H. & J. 417.

The Statute of Elizabeth was passed for the protection of creditors, and it declares accordingly that all conveyances, etc., with "intent to delay, hinder or defraud" creditors shall be void.

Its provisions, however, do not in any manner affect the rights of the parties to the conveyance, and these must therefore be determined by the principles of the common law. By the common law it is well settled that no one shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. In such cases the maxim of " in pari delicto" applies, and the grantee is permitted to retain the property not from any merit of his own, but because the law will not lend its aid to a party seeking to set aside his own fraudulent act. Nellis v. Clark, 4 Hill, 424; Steuart v. Kearney, 6 Watts, 453; Murphy v. Hubert, 16 Pa. St. 50.

But although a fraudulent conveyance is binding on the grantor, yet it is declared by the statute to be void, as to creditors, and as against them, it has been repeatedly held that no title passes to the grantee. Bridges v. Hindes, 16 Md. 101: Ins. Co. v. Wallis, 23 Md. 173; Blondheim v. Moore, 11 Md. 377; Barnitz v. Rice, 14 Md. 24.

Nor is it necessary in order to bring the conveyance within the spirit of the statute, that there should be an actual intent on the part of the grantor to perpetrate a fraud. If the necessary effect and operation of the instrument be to hinder,...