Schuppin v. Unification Church

• Decision Date: 01 July 1977
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 76-87.
• Citation: 435 F. Supp. 603
• Parties: Eric and Elizabeth SCHUPPIN, Jericho, Vermont, Tamara Schuppin b/n/f Elizabeth and Eric Schuppin as her natural guardians and parents v. UNIFICATION CHURCH a/k/a Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity, New York, New York, Sun Myung Moon, Founder and Owner of the Unification Church, Neil Salonen, President, Unification Church.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Vermont

435 F. Supp. 603

Eric and Elizabeth SCHUPPIN, Jericho, Vermont, Tamara Schuppin b/n/f Elizabeth and Eric Schuppin as her natural guardians and parents v. UNIFICATION CHURCH a/k/a Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity, New York, New York, Sun Myung Moon, Founder and Owner of the Unification Church, Neil Salonen, President, Unification Church.

Civ. A. No. 76-87.

United States District Court, D. Vermont.

July 1, 1977.

John A. Burgess, Burgess & Normand, Montpelier, Vt., for plaintiffs Eric and Elizabeth Schuppin.

Robert D. Rachlin, Downs, Rachlin & Martin, Burlington, Vt., for plaintiff Tamara Schuppin.

Jonathan N. Brownell, Stephen C. Walke, Jr., Paterson, Gibson, Noble & Brownell, Montpelier, Vt., for defendants.

COFFRIN, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Eric and Elizabeth Schuppin on their own behalf, and as next friends of their daughter, Tamara, instituted this action to remove Tamara from the Unification Church, also known as the Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity. Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and such other relief as the Court deems meet and just.

The Unification Church is putatively a religious organization under the spiritual leadership of the Reverend Sun Myung Moon, a citizen of Korea and a resident alien who resides in the State of New York when he is present in the United States. Neil Albert Salonen is the President of the Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity and resides in the State of New York. Defendant Salonen states in an affidavit that Rev. Moon is not an officer, director, or employee of the Unification Church.

The Unification Church has drawn much attention nationally due to highly publicized allegations that its members are recruited from among naive and vulnerable young people who are subjected to psychological programming or "brainwashing" which renders them powerless to resist or question the authority of Reverend Moon. While the allegations in this case fit that factual mold, the legal posture of this litigation precludes the Court from reaching the ultimate controversial questions which plaintiffs raise.

From the pleadings it appears that Tamara Schuppin joined or otherwise became associated with the Unification Church in January 1975. At that time she was 18½ years old.¹ Since January 15, 1976, she has resided outside of Vermont. In an affidavit of May 18, 1976, she stated that she had never been adjudicated incompetent to handle her own affairs, nor had a guardian or conservator been appointed for her in any jurisdiction. These assertions have not been contested, although her present mental state has been made an issue by her parents in this action.

Plaintiffs' complaint is divided into twelve sometimes overlapping counts which are premised on alleged violations of the United States Constitution, federal statutes, and Vermont common law. Several of the counts contain allegations of wrongs to Tamara Schuppin herself for which her parents seek remedies on her behalf.

The following is a brief summary of the legal claims asserted in each count.

Count I Tamara Schuppin is being held in involuntary servitude or peonage in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1581.

Count II Tamara Schuppin has been enticed into compulsory service in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1583.

Count III Tamara Schuppin has been mentally restrained from terminating her employment in violation of her rights under the thirteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.

Count IV Defendants have alienated and estranged Tamara Schuppin from her family and friends, thereby interfering with and impairing a relationship described in the complaint as "advantageous."

Count V Tamara Schuppin has been denied the "value of the services" rendered by her for the Unification Church.

Count VI Tamara Schuppin has worked long hours without compensation in violation of 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 and 207.

Count VII Tamara Schuppin's employers have not paid contributions for her benefit under the Federal Insurance Contribution Act (FICA) in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 3101 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 409 and 410.

Count VIII Tamara Schuppin's employers have failed to provide her with a W-2 statement of earnings or to notify her of any withholding of income for taxes in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 3401, 3402 and 6501 and have created anxiety in her that she may be subject to prosecution for failure to pay taxes.

Count IX Tamara Schuppin has been alienated from and deprived of the bond between her parents and herself and of the comfort, joy, happiness and companionship incident to that advantageous relationship.

Count X Defendants did willfully, knowingly and maliciously seduce Tamara Schuppin into joining the Unification Church.

Count XI As a result of "mind control, restraints, and techniques, together with physical manifestations of control," Tamara Schuppin is not competent to make rational decisions on her own behalf. Therefore, plaintiffs Eric and Elizabeth Schuppin seek to have her competence adjudicated in this Court.

Count XII Defendants, interlopers, did destroy the mutually advantageous, loving relationship that had existed among plaintiffs prior to her association with defendants.

Because Tamara Schuppin has served notice of dismissal upon the Court and all other parties to this action,² we must first consider whether her parents have any standing to assert any claims on her behalf as next friend or in any other capacity.

I. The Status of Tamara Schuppin as a Plaintiff

Tamara Schuppin has sought no legal remedy for any wrongs on her own behalf in this litigation. In fact, as noted above, she has attempted to dismiss the action and extricate herself from this lawsuit. She is within three weeks of her twenty-first birthday and has legally been an adult at all times relevant to this action.³ Through counsel, she argues that this Court has no jurisdiction over her, that she has disclaimed any interest in this case, and that she is fully competent to make such determinations.

Plaintiffs Eric and Elizabeth Schuppin admit that Counts I, II, III, V, VI, VII, VIII, and X must fail if they are not permitted to go forward as next friends of their daughter.⁴ Such rights as they may have had because of their daughter's infancy to prosecute an action in her behalf as parents and natural guardians or next friends clearly ceased when Tamara became of full age. Robinson v. Frost, 54 Vt. 105, 111 (1884), accord Railway Express Agency v. Huntress, 51 A.2d 379 (Mun.Ct.App.D.C. 1947). Since their daughter is an adult, they have standing to initiate a suit in her behalf as next friends only if she is incompetent to do so herself. Indeed if she is in fact incompetent, and within its jurisdiction, the Court should appoint a guardian ad litem or next friend to protect her interests. Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(c).

If the competence of an individual before the Court is in question, the issue is properly raised, and the circumstances appropriate, the Court has the power to require a mental examination of a party before it. Fed.R.Civ.P. 35. See Smith v. United States, 174 F.Supp. 828 (S.D.Cal.), appeal dismissed, 272 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 954, 80 S.Ct. 868, 4 L.Ed.2d 871, reh. denied, 362 U.S. 992, 80 S.Ct. 1080, 4 L.Ed.2d 1024 (1960). However, it is inconceivable that a presumably competent adult should be required by a federal court to undergo a mental examination in order to become a plaintiff in a suit in which she has entered an appearance by counsel to explicitly deny any interest.

The recent order of the United States Supreme Court in Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 97 S.Ct. 436, 50 L.Ed.2d 632 (1976) is instructive. In that case, the Court terminated a stay of execution which had previously been granted because the Court lacked jurisdiction with respect to the "next friend" application. Chief Justice Burger, concurring in the Court's termination of the stay, said that such jurisdiction would arise "only if it were demonstrated that Gary Mark Gilmore is unable to seek relief in his own behalf." He continued:

Since Gary Mark Gilmore has now filed a response and appeared in his own behalf, through his retained attorneys, any basis for the standing of Bessie Gilmore Gilmore's mother to seek relief in his behalf is necessarily eliminated. The only possible exception of this conclusion would be if the record suggested, despite the representations of Gary Mark Gilmore's attorneys, that he was incompetent to waive his right to appeal under state law and was at the present time incompetent to assert rights or to challenge Bessie Gilmore's standing to assert rights in his behalf as "next friend."

429 U.S. at 1014, 97 S.Ct. at 438 (Burger, C. J., concurring).

Tamara Schuppin's parents submit that the record in this case does suggest that their daughter is incompetent to assert her rights on her own behalf and that a psychiatric examination would establish that incompetence. The Court is unable to concur in that conclusion. Even assuming arguendo that plaintiffs' allegations regarding the machinations of the Unification Church are true, the only scintilla of evidence in the record that Tamara is incompetent is a report of a psychiatrist who has never seen, spoken with, or examined Tamara Schuppin. His conclusion that "there is reason to believe that Tamara Schuppin is presently incompetent to make important decisions in the manner of a normal adult person" is based on (1) previous examinations of ten Unification Church members, (2) extensive discussions with Tamara's parents, and (3) tape recordings of telephone conversations Tamara had with her parents and letters she has written to them. Whatever pertinence his conclusion might have is so attenuated by the remoteness of his inquiry from its subject that it cannot be deemed to authorize this court to intrude on Tamara Schuppin's privacy to compel her to undergo psychiatric...