Schuster v. Municipal Court

Decision Date28 August 1980
Citation109 Cal.App.3d 887,167 Cal.Rptr. 447
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesRichard SCHUSTER et al., Petitioners and Respondents, v. IMPERIAL COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT et al., Defendant and Respondent, v. The PEOPLE, Real Property in Interest and Appellant. Civ. 22008.

George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Daniel J. Kremer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Richard D. Garske and Patricia D. Benke, Deputy Attys. Gen., for real party in interest and appellant.

Anthony L. Miller, Richard B. Maness and William P. Yee, Sacramento, on behalf of real party in interest and appellant.

Joseph C. Daly, Jr., El Centro, for petitioner and respondent.

Margaret C. Crosby, Alan L. Schlosser, Amitai Schwartz, San Francisco, and Fred Okrand, Los Angeles, as amici curiae on behalf of respondents.

WIENER, Associate Justice.

The question presented here is whether the provisions of Election Code section 29410, prohibiting all anonymous political campaign literature, is constitutional. 1 We decide the statute constitutes on its face an unconstitutionally overbroad restraint of freedom of expression contrary to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, section 2, of the California Constitution. 2 We affirm the judgment granting a writ of prohibition restraining further criminal proceedings for alleged violations of the statute.

I

A complaint filed in the municipal court charged petitioners Richard Schuster, Robert Simon and Melvin Walter Lewis with violating section 29410. They sought a writ of prohibition in the superior court after their demurrer to the complaint in the municipal court was overruled. Their petition was granted. The people appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 904.1, 1110.)

II

Section 29410 compels disclosure on the face of any writing "having reference to an election, or any candidate, or to any measure" of the name and address of the individual "responsible for it." In essence, it constitutes a prohibition of all anonymous political campaign literature, exempting only support statements such as "Yes on," "Vote for" or "Support." Even with the enumerated exemptions, the statute prohibits all anonymous literature which set forth any arguments, information or ideas in support or in opposition to candidates or ballot measures.

The statute, in attempting to regulate political speech, touches the core of First Amendment protection. The First Amendment exists to protect free discussion of governmental affairs (Mills v. State of Alabama (1966) 384 U.S. 214, 218, 86 S.Ct. 1434, 1437, 16 L.Ed.2d 484), for "speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government." (Garrison v. State of Louisiana (1964) 379 U.S. 64, 74-75, 85 S.Ct. 209, 216, 13 L.Ed.2d 125.) The constitutional safeguard was fashioned "to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people." (Roth v. United States (1957) 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1308, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, 269, 84 S.Ct. 710, 720, 11 L.Ed.2d 686; see Hardie v. Eu (1976) 18 Cal.3d 371, 376, 134 Cal.Rptr. 201, 556 P.2d 301.)

"First Amendment freedoms are not only protected from patent restraints, but also from more subtle forms of governmental interference." (Huntley v. Public Util. Com. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 67, 72, 69 Cal.Rptr. 605, 608, 442 P.2d 685, 688, see Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 852, 143 Cal.Rptr. 695, 574 P.2d 766. Since disclosure requirements undoubtedly tend to restrict the freedom to distribute and consequently deter free speech, the latter right encompasses the right to remain anonymous. (Talley v. State of California (1960) 362 U.S. 60, 64, 80 S.Ct. 536, 538, 4 L.Ed.2d 559; Huntley v. Public Util. Com., supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 73, 69 Cal.Rptr. 605, 442 P.2d 685.) Indeed, "(t)he proposition that, under certain circumstances, anonymity is essential to the exercise of constitutional rights is not a novel one. 'Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.' (N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama (1958) 357 U.S. 449, 462, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1172, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488, 1499-1500; Britt v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 853, (143 Cal.Rptr. 695, 574 P.2d 766))" (Ghafari v. Municipal Court (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 255, 260, 150 Cal.Rptr. 813, 815.) Further, "(a) nonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind. Persecuted groups and sects from time to time throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all." (Talley v. State of California, supra, 362 U.S. at p. 64, 80 S.Ct. at p. 538.)

The close relationship of free speech to the political process in this state, emphasized by our state Supreme Court in Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center (1979) 23 Cal.3d 899, 907-908, 153 Cal.Rptr. 854, 592 P.2d 341, has recently been confirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins (1980) --- U.S. ----, ----, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 2040-2041, 64 L.Ed.2d 741. Article I, section 2, of the California Constitution affords protection more definitive and inclusive than the First Amendment. (Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, supra, 23 Cal.3d 899, 908, 153 Cal.Rptr. 854, 592 P.2d 341.)

The right of free speech whether under the state or federal Constitution is not absolute. (See Canon v. Justice Court (1964) 61 Cal.2d 446, 457, 39 Cal.Rptr. 228, 393 P.2d 428. The exercise of that right must be compatible with the presentation of other essential rights in a free society which enjoy competing interests. (See Pennekamp v. State of Florida (1946) 328 U.S. 331, 352-355, 66 S.Ct. 1029, 1040-1042, 90 L.Ed. 1295 (conc. opn. of Frankfurter, J.).) Thus "(w)here a government restricts the speech of a private person the state action may be sustained only if the government can show the regulation is a precisely drawn means of serving a compelling state interest. (Citation.)" (Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of New York (June 20, 1980) --- U.S. ----, ----, 100 S.Ct. 2326, 2334, 65 L.Ed.2d ----; see also, People v. Glaze (1980) --- Cal.3d ---, 166 Cal.Rptr. 859, 614 P.2d 291 (Crim. No. 21123, 80 Daily Journal DAR 2275.) The state cannot pursue its legitimate purpose "by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved." (Shelton v. Tucker (1960) 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct. 247, 252, 5 L.Ed.2d 231; N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama (1964) 377 U.S. 288, 307-308, 84 S.Ct. 1302, 1314, 12 L.Ed.2d 325; Britt v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.3d 844, 856, 143 Cal.Rptr. 695, 574 P.2d 766.) We conclude this to be an appropriate case to weigh the magnitude of the state interest against the statute's encroachment upon First Amendment freedom.

III

The United States Supreme Court has, on numerous occasions, struck down requirements of disclosure where there was either a failure to establish a compelling state interest and/or a failure to establish a relationship between a compelling interest and the announced method of securing it. The court has declared unconstitutional the requirement that names and addresses of sponsors be printed on handbills (Talley v. State of California, supra, 362 U.S. 60, 80 S.Ct. 536, 4 L.Ed.2d 559), the requirement that organizations disclose membership lists (Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Com. (1963) 372 U.S. 539, 83 S.Ct. 889, 9 L.Ed.2d 929; Louisiana v. National Ass'n For Adv. of Col. People (1961) 366 U.S. 293, 81 S.Ct. 1333, 6 L.Ed.2d 301; Bates v. City of Little Rock (1960) 361 U.S. 516, 80 S.Ct. 412, 4 L.Ed.2d 480; National Ass'n for A. of C. P. v. State of Alabama (1958) 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488); and the requirement that individuals disclose organizational membership (Shelton v. Tucker (1960) 364 U.S. 479, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231).

Talley v. California, supra, 362 U.S. 60, 80 S.Ct. 536, 4 L.Ed.2d 559, involved a Los Angeles ordinance banning distribution of handbills which did not state the names of the author and distributor. In holding the ordinance facially unconstitutional the Supreme Court recognized the importance of anonymity for protecting free speech. In spite of this firm grounding of a right to anonymity as an integral part of the guarantee of freedom of speech, freedom of the press and freedom of association under our state and federal constitutions, section 29410 criminalizes the exercise of this right with respect to any political campaign literature. In California, proponents of unpopular causes and members of controversial organizations must proclaim their individual identities along with their ideas.

The constitutional right to distribute anonymous literature acknowledged in Talley should include conduct of persons who wish to publish and distribute literature concerning candidates or issues in an election campaign. To distinguish Talley on the grounds that section 29410 applies only during election campaigns is to ignore the salutary influence of free and open debate at a time when it is probably needed the most. (See Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy (1971) 401 U.S. 265, 272-273, 91 S.Ct. 621, 625-626, 28 L.Ed.2d 35.) Even the innocent, concerned citizen who wishes to share his knowledge at election time with others in the community will not be able to write an informed letter to the editor of the newspaper involving a candidate for any office, even for the local school board, and request that his name be withheld without fear of exposing himself and the newspaper to criminal liability. As fatigued as we may be with the numbing rhetoric of political campaigns and elections, free discussion during these...

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