Schuster v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission

• Decision Date: 16 March 1959
• Citation: 395 Pa. 441,149 A.2d 447
• Parties: Henry A. SCHUSTER and Pearl E. Schuster, v. PENNSYLVANIA TURNPIKE COMMISSION, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

149 A.2d 447

395 Pa. 441

Henry A. SCHUSTER and Pearl E. Schuster, v. PENNSYLVANIA TURNPIKE COMMISSION, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

March 16, 1959.

Hubert P. Earle, Chief Counsel, Philadelphia, Prall B Roads, Asst. Counsel, Pottsville, Joseph P. Kane, John A Morano, Scranton, Henry Harner, Chief Counsel, Harrisburg for appellant.

J H. Oliver, Homanich, Dutka & Yavorek, Paul H. Price, William J. Oliver, Scranton, for appellees.

Before CHARLES ALVIN JONES, C. J., and MUSMANNO, BENJAMIN R. JONES, COHEN and McBRIDE, JJ.

BENJAMIN R. JONES, Justice.

In this eminent domain proceeding two issues are presented: (1) were any property rights taken?; (2) was the jury verdict excessive?

The Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission (herein called Commission), in connection with the proposed construction of the Northeast Extension of the Turnpike, on January 18, 1954, by an appropriate resolution, condemned certain land located in Lackawanna County for the purpose of a 200 foot wide right of way. The actual construction of a section of the Turnpike across this land did not commence until May 1956. On June 4, 1956 Henry A. Schuster and Pearl E. Schuster (herein called Schusters), claiming certain property rights belonging to them in the land had been 'taken' by the Commission's condemnation, petitioned the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County for the appointment of a board of viewers which board was duly appointed. The Commission then petitioned the court to join as a party in the proceeding one Robert Y. Moffat, trading as Moffat Coal Company (herein called Moffat) alleging that Moffat was the title-holder of the land in question. This petition was refused by the court below. ^[1]

On February 26, 1957, after hearings, the board of viewers awarded Schusters damages in the amount of $47,652.80. Exceptions filed to this award by both parties were dismissed in a written opinion by President Judge T. Linus Hoban. The Commission having requested a jury trial, the matter came on for trial before Judge Michael J. Eagen and a jury and resulted in a verdict in favor of Schusters in the amount of $67,000. From a judgment entered on that verdict the Commission took this appeal.

The Commission initially contends that the Schusters did not have any property rights or interest in the land which was 'taken' by the condemnation. An understanding of the Commission's position in this respect requires a review of the factual background surrounding the ownership of the land in question, a background well summarized in the opinion of the court below.

'As of December 31, 1938, the complete legal title in fee in the lands involved was in the Glen Alden Coal Company. This included ownership of the surface of the land and everything underneath. On that date, the owner corporation entered into a written contract with Robert Y. Moffat as an individual giving him the right to mine and remove the coal minerals underneath the surface of the land. On December 31, 1941, the rights of Robert Y. Moffat under this contract were assigned in writing to the Continental Archbald Coal Company, a corporation owned and controlled by the Moffat family. On July 1, 1953, the Glen Alden Coal Company conveyed all of its interest in the land (surface and subterranean rights) to Robert Y. Moffat, as an individual.

'In May 1946, Earl Lamb, General Manager for all of the Moffat interests, and the plaintiff, Henry A. Schuster, entered into an oral agreement whereby the latter was given the right to enter upon the land, mine and remove the coal underneath for sale purposes; the Moffat interests were given the right to purchase the coal for a stipulated price if they so wished, otherwise to be paid a tonnage royalty for all coal removed; the area to be mined was limited and defined under the agreement and approximated 65 acres. (While the record fails to show it this type of arrangement for individuals to mine and remove the coal from lands owned by the larger coal companies is typical and frequent in the hard coal fields). The contract could not be cancelled by Moffat before exhaustion of the coal except for good reason and cause. This arrangement between the Moffat interests and the plaintiff was known to the Glen Alden Coal Company and carried on over the years with its tacit approval.

'Shortly after this agreement was reached, the [Schusters] entered upon the land which was then in a wild and undeveloped state and proceeded to develop a coal mine operation.

'This involved an expenditure of many thousands of dollars in the construction and driving of a slope from the surface to the coal area; the building of several buildings and roadways on the surface necessary to the operation.

'In 1953, after Moffat had gained complete title to the land, the plaintiff, Henry A. Schuster, and Earl Lamb, representing the Moffat interests, had further discussions wherein the previous agreement was affirmed and the [Schusters] urged to carry on their coal mining operation on the property.'

Schusters continued their mining operations until the work of construction began. At the time of the condemnation Schusters owned several buildings which were located on the land: a cap house (for the storage of blasting caps used for detonating the dynamite with which the coal was blasted), a steel garage and warehouse, a powderhouse, an oilhouse, a coal pocket and storehouse beneath the structure (for the storage of coal taken from the mines), and a hoisting engine house. The latter was vital to the mining operations in that it housed the hoisting equipment by means of which the coal was hauled in cars up the slope from the underground mine. The coal which Schusters mined was not directly under the surface of the land over which the Turnpike established its right of way but underneath land which immediately adjoined the land taken and, in order to reach and mine this coal, Schusters had driven a slope approximately 1,800 feet long. As a result of the Turnpike construction certain buildings were torn down, other buildings were moved to new locations outside the Turnpike right of way, a new road permitting ingress and egress to and from the mining operations was constructed and the entry to the slope had to be altered and its grade changed from 20~-25~ to approximately 30~.

We repeat that the Commission, taking the position that Schusters' damages were not compensable, specifically argues that only 'land' was 'taken' and that Schusters neither owned the land nor had interest whatsoever in the 'land' taken.

The Commission's power of eminent domain arises from the Pennsylvania Turnpike Northeastern Extension Act. ^[2] Under this statute the Commission is empowered to condemn 'any lands, interest in lands, property rights, rights of way, franchises, easements and other property * * *.' By its resolution of January 18, 1954 the Commission established a Turnpike right of way over the instant land 200 feet in width. By its terms this resolution condemned not only the land covered by the right of way but also 'utility, rights-of-way, and all lands, rights, easements, franchises and all other property necessary or convenient for the construction or efficient opersation and maintenance of the section of the Northeast Extension' of the Turnpike. While the Commission argues that it condemned only 'land' or an 'interest in land', yet it does submit that the 'pivotal question' is 'whether or not appellees [Schusters] owned land or such interests in land or property rights in land as would entitle them to compensation * * *'

'It is well recognized in Pennsylvania that there may be three estates in land, namely, coal, surface, and right of support, so that one person may own the coal, another the surface, and the third the right of support.' Smith v. Glen Alden Coal Company, 347 Pa. 290, 304, 32 A.2d 227, 234. Insofar as the instant tract of land is concerned, at the time of condemnation the ownership of all three estates--the coal, ^[3] the surface and right of support--was in Robert Y. Moffat. ^[4] Our inquiry is whether, exclusive of Moffat'sownership, Schusters had any property right or interest in this tract of land which was directly affected by the Commission's condemnation so as to entitle them to compensation.

Schusters rely upon an oral agreement to establish their property rights and interest. While ownership ^[5] of all three estates in this tract of land prior to July 1, 1953 was in the Glen Alden Coal Company, such ownership was subject to a written lease made in 1938 by Glen Alden to Moffat under the terms of which Moffat was to furnish all labor, materials, tools and equipment, etc., to mine and remove all the coal in portions of certain coal veins for a period of five years and thereafter until terminated by either party giving written notice one year in advance to the other of an intention to terminate. The coal was to be delivered in a run-of-mine (i. e. unprepared) condition to Glen Alden and the lease was not to be sublet or assigned without Glen Alden's written consent. ^[6] This lease was assigned in 1941 to the Continental Archbald Coal Company ^[7] by Moffat with Glen Alden's written consent. In 1946 Schusters made an oral agreement with one Earl Lamb, the general manager of all the Moffat interests, including Continental Archbald Coal Company and Moffat, under the terms of which agreement Schusters were granted the right to mine and remove the coal from No. 1 Dunmore vein in an area comprising 65 acres of the entire area embraced in the Glen Alden-Continental Archbald lease. None of the parties in interest--Glen Alden, Moffat or Continental Archbald--ever questioned Lamb's authority to enter into this agreement. The record clearly indicates that all the parties not...