Schuster v. State Dep't of Taxation & Revenue, Motor Vehicle Div.

• Decision Date: 26 July 2012
• Docket Number: No. 32,942.,32,942.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court
• Parties: Eric SCHUSTER, Petitioner–Petitioner, v. STATE of New Mexico DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION & REVENUE, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, Respondent–Respondent, and State of New Mexico, Real Party in Interest.

283 P.3d 288

2012 -NMSC- 025

Eric SCHUSTER, Petitioner–Petitioner,

v.STATE of New Mexico DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION & REVENUE, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, Respondent–Respondent,andState of New Mexico, Real Party in Interest.

No. 32,942.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

July 26, 2012.

Titus & Murphy Law Firm, Victor A. Titus, Farmington, NM, for Petitioner.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Julia Belles, Special Assistant Attorney General, Taxation & Revenue Department, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent and Real Party in Interest.

Rasheed & Associates, P.C., Ousama M. Rasheed, Frechette & Associates, P.C., Todd Hotchkiss, Albuquerque, NM, for Amicus Curiae New Mexico Criminal Defense Lawyers Association.

OPINION

CHÁVEZ, Justice.

{1} Eric Schuster (Schuster) appeals a decision of the Taxation and Revenue Department, Motor Vehicle Division (MVD) to revoke his driver's license pursuant to the Implied Consent Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 66–8–105 to –112 (1978, as amended through 2007). The predominant issue in this case is whether MVD must find that the arrest of a driver charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI) was constitutional as one of the prerequisites to revoking the driver's license. We answer this question in the affirmative and overrule Glynn v. State, Taxation & Revenue Dep't, MVD, 2011–NMCA–031, 149 N.M. 518, 252 P.3d 742 to the extent the Glynn court held that the constitutionality of the arrest need not be decided in DWI license revocation hearings. We hold that the arrest required for a license revocation must be constitutional, which also requires that the police activity leading to the arrest must also be constitutional. Because we hold that the MVD must evaluate the constitutionality of the arrest and the police activity leading to the arrest, for purposes of this opinion we will refer to all such activity as the “arrest”.

{2} The secondary issues concern (1) the district court's jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an MVD license revocation hearing regarding the constitutionality of an arrest, and (2) whether the district court erred in affirming both MVD's revocation of Schuster's driver's license and MVD's finding that the arrest of Schuster was constitutional. We hold that (1) the district court's review of constitutional issues in a license revocation hearing is conducted under its appellate jurisdiction and not under its original jurisdiction, and (2) the district court did not err in affirming MVD's revocation of Schuster's driver's license because the arrest of Schuster was constitutional.

I. BACKGROUND

{3} Between 1 and 2 a.m. of May 30, 2009, Farmington Police Officer David Karst (Karst) observed Schuster driving a motorcycle in the parking lot of a bar when the motorcycle fell over on its side before Schuster reached the roadway. Because he was concerned that Schuster was injured, Karst drove into the parking lot, asked Schuster if he was all right, and then asked Schuster to move his motorcycle approximately fifteen feet away from the entrance to the parking lot. Karst described his purpose in initially approaching Schuster as “[a] welfare check, plain and simple,” to confirm that Schuster was not injured and to assess any damage to the motorcycle for possible insurance claims.

{4} After Schuster moved his motorcycle, Karst exited his vehicle and asked Schuster if he had any injuries and whether there was any damage to his motorcycle. Schuster denied being injured and showed Karst the damage to his motorcycle, which was a bent clutch handle and a bent gear shift. While speaking with him, Karst smelled alcohol on Schuster's breath, noticed that his eyes were bloodshot and watery, and asked Schuster how much he had had to drink that night. Schuster said that he had consumed two beers.

{5} Karst had Schuster perform field sobriety tests, including the walk-and-turn and the one-leg stand tests. Karst also administered the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test to Schuster. Karst testified that Schuster performed these tests poorly. As a result of this investigation, Karst arrested Schuster for DWI and transported him to the San Juan County Detention Center. Upon their arrival at the detention center, Karst read Schuster the Implied Consent Act advisory after which Schuster verbally consented to a breath test. Schuster gave two breath samples, which registered readings of. 13 and .14, respectively indicating that his blood alcohol content exceeded the legal limit. Karst then issued Schuster a notice that his driver's license would be revoked. See§ 66–8–111.1. Schuster requested a hearing before MVD to challenge the revocation of his license.

{6} On July 13, 2009 MVD held an administrative license revocation hearing at which MVD sustained the revocation of Schuster's driver's license. MVD found, in relevant part, that Karst had reasonable grounds to believe Schuster was driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol in accordance with Section 66–8–112(F)(1) and that Karst had arrested Schuster in accordance with Sections 66–8–112(F)(1)–(2). MVD found that Karst had initially contacted Schuster in Karst's community caretaker role and that Karst's expansion of the initial contact into a DWI investigation was based on a reasonable suspicion that Schuster was intoxicated, citing State v. Walters, 1997–NMCA–013, ¶ 26, 123 N.M. 88, 934 P.2d 282 (holding that an officer develops reasonable suspicion to continue an investigation after noting alcohol on the driver's breath). MVD also found that Karst had probable cause to arrest Schuster for DWI because Schuster was in actual physical control of the motorcycle, relying on Boone v. State, 105 N.M. 223, 227, 731 P.2d 366, 370 (1986) (holding that a driver need only be in physical control of a vehicle and not actually driving to form probable cause to arrest), holding limited on other grounds by State v. Sims, 2010–NMSC–027, ¶¶ 10, 30–32, 148 N.M. 330, 236 P.3d 642.

{7} Schuster appealed to the district court which, based on substantial evidence in the record, affirmed MVD's decision sustaining the revocation of his driver's license. Schuster then appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising three issues: whether the district court erred by (1) refusing to hold a de novo hearing to decide the constitutionality of his arrest; (2) finding that the arrest of Schuster was constitutional; and (3) affirming MVD's finding of probable cause because the MVD improperly considered the results of the HGN test. Schuster v. MVD, Dep't of Taxation & Revenue, No. 30,023, slip op. at 2, 2011 WL 2042079 (N.M.Ct.App. Mar.11, 2011). The Court of Appeals affirmed Schuster's first two issues in a memorandum opinion, declining to grant certiorari on Schuster's third issue of whether the district court erred in affirming MVD despite its reliance on the results of the HGN test, id., and therefore did not address it. Schuster did not appeal the denial of certiorari on the third issue and therefore we do not consider it. The Court of Appeals held that Glynn, 2011–NMCA–031, ¶¶ 19, 26, 33, 149 N.M. 518, 252 P.3d 742, controlled the outcome of the case for the first two issues. Schuster, No. 30,023, slip op. at 2, 3.Glynn held that “the [Implied Consent] Act does not require the MVD to address the validity of the underlying traffic stop and because the exclusionary rule does not apply in revocation proceedings, the constitutionality of the stop need not be decided by any tribunal for purposes of license revocation under the Act.” 2011–NMCA–031, ¶ 33, 149 N.M. 518, 252 P.3d 742.

{8} We granted Schuster's petition for writ of certiorari to consider whether (1) MVD must conclude that an arrest as required by Section 66–8–112(F)(2) was constitutional before revoking a driver's license, (2) the district court should review license revocation appeals de novo under its original jurisdiction or for substantial evidence as an appellate court, and (3) the district court erred in affirming the MVD's revocation of Schuster's license. We hold that (1) Sections 66–8–112(E), (F), and (G) require MVD to decide whether the arrest and underlying police activity were constitutional as prerequisites to revoking a driver's license under the Implied Consent Act; (2) a district court reviews an MVD determination of the constitutionality of the arrest as an appellate court; and (3) MVD correctly found that Schuster's arrest and all of the underlying police activity, were constitutional and therefore Schuster's driver's license was properly revoked.

II. DISCUSSIONA. THE ARREST AND UNDERLYING POLICE ACTIVITY MUST BE CONSTITUTIONAL TO SUPPORT THE REVOCATION OF A DRIVER'S LICENSE UNDER THE IMPLIED CONSENT ACT.

{9} Whether MVD must conclude that the arrest of a driver for DWI is constitutional before revoking a driver's license requires us to interpret the relevant provisions of Section 66–8–112. “Statutory interpretation is an issue of law, which we review de novo.” N.M. Indus. Energy Consumers v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm'n, 2007–NMSC–053, ¶ 19, 142 N.M. 533, 168 P.3d 105. When reviewing a statute, we must give effect to the Legislature's intent by first looking at “the plain language of the statute, giving the words their ordinary meaning, unless the Legislature indicates a different one was intended.” Id. ¶ 20.

{10} Section 66–8–112 details the four elements that must be decided by MVD to revoke a driver's license. Failure to find all four elements precludes MVD from revoking a driver's license. § 66–8–112(G). For purposes of this appeal, the only relevant element is whether “the person was arrested”. § 66–8–112(E)(2). Therefore, in this case, if Schuster was not arrested, MVD cannot sustain the revocation of his driver's license. See§ 66–8–112(G). However, we must determine if the Legislature intended to authorize MVD to revoke a driver's license when there is an “arrest” under Section 66–8–112(F)(2) even when the arrest is unconstitutional.

{11} Schuster argues that “arrest” should be read to mean a...