Schutt v. Schumacher, 960015

Decision Date29 May 1996
Docket NumberNo. 960015,960015
Citation548 N.W.2d 381
PartiesRaymond F. SCHUTT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Rosalind SCHUMACHER, Defendant and Appellee. Civil
CourtNorth Dakota Supreme Court

William P. Zuger, of Zuger Law Offices, Bismarck, for plaintiff and appellant.

Curtis L. Wike, of Fleck, Mather & Strutz, Bismarck, for defendant and appellee.

SANDSTROM, Justice.

Raymond Schutt appealed from a judgment dismissing his action against Rosalind Schumacher to recover damages for injuries he received in a two-vehicle accident. Schutt also appealed from the trial court's order denying his motion for a new trial. We hold the jury's finding Schutt did not sustain a serious injury in the accident is supported by substantial evidence and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Schutt's motion for a new trial. We affirm the judgment and the order denying a new trial.

I

Schutt incurred injuries to his neck, back, and left shoulder when his vehicle collided with Schumacher's vehicle at an intersection in Beulah on October 21, 1992. In January 1995, Schutt sued Schumacher for his pain and suffering and other noneconomic damages. Schumacher admitted the accident was her fault, but she asserted she was exempt, under N.D.C.C. § 26.1-41-08(1)(a), from liability to pay for Schutt's noneconomic damages because Schutt did not sustain a serious injury in the accident. The case was tried before a jury, which returned a special verdict finding Schutt did not sustain a serious injury and, upon that verdict, the district court entered judgment dismissing Schutt's action with prejudice. Schutt moved for a new trial on the ground there was not substantial evidence to support the jury's finding he did not sustain a serious injury. The district court denied the motion, and Schutt appealed.

The district court had jurisdiction under N.D. Const. Art. VI, § 8, and N.D.C.C. § 27-05-06(2). The appeal was filed in a timely manner under N.D.R.App.P 4(a). This Court has jurisdiction under N.D. Const. Art. VI, § 6, and N.D.C.C. § 28-27-01.

II

Schutt asserts the only issue on appeal is whether "[t]here was no evidence at trial to support the jury verdict." We exercise a limited review of jury findings. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine only whether there is substantial evidence to support it. Beavers v. Kaiser, 537 N.W.2d 653, 657 (N.D.l995). We uphold a jury's special verdict on appeal whenever possible and will set aside a special verdict "only when it is perverse and clearly contrary to the evidence." Reisenauer v. Schaefer, 515 N.W.2d 152, 157 (N.D.1994).

Under N.D.C.C. § 26.1-41-08 of the North Dakota Auto Accident Reparations Act, a "secured person" 1 is exempt from liability for noneconomic loss unless there is a serious injury. A "serious injury" is defined by N.D.C.C. § 26.1-41-01(21) as "an accidental bodily injury which results in death, dismemberment, serious and permanent disfigurement or disability beyond sixty days, or medical expenses in excess of two thousand five hundred dollars...." Schutt had the burden of alleging and establishing at trial he sustained a serious injury and therefore met the no-fault threshold for recovering noneconomic loss. Erdmann v. Thomas, 446 N.W.2d 245, 246 (N.D.1989).

A

During the trial, Schutt introduced a summary of medical expenses totaling $2,967.25. Schumacher did not object to admission of the exhibit, and Schutt argues Schumacher, by not objecting, conceded Schutt has exceeded the $2,500 medical expense threshold for a serious injury. Schutt's argument is without merit. Evidence of medical expenses can be admitted without expert medical opinion that the expenses were necessitated by the defendant's conduct, and, once admitted upon a foundational showing the evidence is relevant, the question whether the medical expenses were incurred as a result of the defendant's wrongdoing is for the jury to decide. Erdmann v. Thomas, 446 N.W.2d 245, 248 (N.D.1989). Schutt's attorney has not cited any authority for his argument a party's failure to object to admission of evidence constitutes an implied stipulation to the truth of the facts the evidence attempts to demonstrate.

Schumacher's attorney made her position eminently clear in a letter, dated October 31, 1995, to Schutt's attorney:

"This letter will confirm our telephone conversation on October 26, 1995, wherein we agreed to stipulate to foundation as to medical records although we reserve any and all other objections."

Again, during pretrial conference with the court, Schumacher's attorney expressly stated there was a stipulation only to the "foundation" on the medical records. Both attorneys then agreed the court would instruct the jury "one of the questions in this case is whether or not it's a serious injury that is defined by statute as being more than $2,500.00 in medicals and disability going beyond 60 days." Clearly, Schumacher did not concede this issue.

B

Schutt testified he sustained neck, upper back, and left shoulder injuries in the October 1992 accident. He also candidly acknowledged, however, he had experienced frequent shoulder, neck, and back pain before the accident. After the accident, he received chiropractic treatments for a year, and he testified his neck and back injuries were resolved by December 1993. Schutt also sought treatment for his shoulder pain from two orthopedic surgeons, who recommended he do physical therapy exercises to "build up the other muscles."

Schutt testified he reinjured his neck and back in November 1994 when he was involved in a second motor vehicle accident. After that accident, he saw Dr. Michael Martire, the outpatient medical director at the Medcenter One Rehabilitation Center, who concluded Schutt may have suffered a "partial tear of the rotator cuff" with "chronic left shoulder pain secondary to left rotator cuff tendinitis...

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7 cases
  • Gisvold v. Windbreak, Inc.
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • 19 Abril 2007
    ...of the evidence." Brandt, 2002 ND 117, ¶ 25, 647 N.W.2d 674; Larson v. Kubisiak, 1997 ND 22, ¶ 6, 558 N.W.2d 852; Schutt v. Schumacher, 548 N.W.2d 381, 384 (N.D.1996); Marohl v. Osmundson, 462 N.W.2d 146 (N.D.1990); Mauch v. Manufacturers Sales & Serv., Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338, 344 (N.D.1984);......
  • Ingalls v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Group
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    ..."[t]he jury's finding as to future total disability has no factual support." As we recently explained again in Schutt v. Schumacher, 548 N.W.2d 381, 382 (N.D.1996), to review a jury's findings, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine only if substantial......
  • Larson v. Kubisiak
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • 12 Febrero 1997
    ...trial court erred in failing to grant a new trial for insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict. III ¶6 In Schutt v. Schumacher, 548 N.W.2d 381, 384 (N.D.1996) (quoting Marohl v. Osmundson, 462 N.W.2d 145, 146-147 (N.D.1990)), we summarized the standard for reviewing a trial cour......
  • Vanover v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co.
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    • 3 Septiembre 1996
    ...or damage to reputation because of the three letters. This court exercises "a limited review of jury findings." Schutt v. Schumacher, 548 N.W.2d 381, 382 (N.D.1996). "We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine only whether there is substantial evidence to ......
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