Schwab v. Coots
| Decision Date | 27 October 1880 |
| Citation | 7 N.W. 61,44 Mich. 463 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | SCHWAB v. COOTS. |
A sheriff was proceeded against, under the act for the punishment of contempts in aid of civil remedies, for intentional and gross misconduct in omitting to do his duty under an execution in, and colluding to further the procurement of an injunction against further proceedings. The superior court, in which such proceedings were had, denied the application for his punishment. Held, that its action would not be reviewed on certiorari.
Certiorari to supreme court of Detroit.
Alfred Russell, for plaintiff in certiorari.
Edwin F. Conely, for defendant in certiorari.
The proceedings in this cause arose under the act for the punishment of contempts in aid of civil remedies. Coots, who is sheriff of Wayne county, was entrusted with an execution from the superior court of Detroit on a judgment in favor of relator against Salmon S. Matthews and others. This judgment was based on a trespass by Matthews who was United States marshal and seized as belonging to parties named Schott and Feibish, property belonging to Samuel Schwab the relator. Considerable litigation has arisen in various ways out of these proceedings, which have been before this court once for consideration as to the validity of that judgment. Mabley v. Judge of Supreme Court, 41 Mich. 31, and indirectly in Hudson, Relator, v. Judge of Superior Court, not yet reported except in 2 N.W. 919, Mich. 369.
Without going into full details, it is perhaps enough for the present to say that respondent was charged with intentional and gross misconduct in omitting to do his duty under the execution and in colluding to further the procurement of an injunction from the United States circuit court against further proceedings. This injunction was relied on to relieve him from punishment.
The superior court denied the application to punish the sheriff, and a certiorari is brought to review that action. It is claimed for respondent that no review can be had of this proceeding denying redress, because it would require this court to give what would be substantially an original judgment, which it has no power to render. Several cases have come before us, which were cited on the argument in which we have reviewed and affirmed or reversed judgments against respondents whereby they have been subjected to liability to pay money or stand imprisoned. Upon such cases there is no room for doubt. Such judgments are as final as any other money or final judgments, and this court has power to review in some way all final judgments. But the question whether a refusal to give any relief is a final judgment is different, and must depend somewhat on its effect on the rights of the relator.
The usual methods of obtaining redress for grievances are by actions for damages. There are some cases where a party has an election of remedies, and when the result of the remedy chosen is decisive. In such cases there is no difficulty.
Under the present statutes it is expressly provided that in case an order is finally made adjudging payment of a certain sum by respondent, his payment of it shall preclude any other proceeding to recover for the wrong. Comp.Laws,� __. But we find nothing in the statutes which provides that these proceedings shall in themselves either stay or supersede any other legal remedies which the relator may resort to; and until actual payment nothing seems to be suspended or barred. When the statute contains an express provision concerning the effect of such collateral proceedings it cannot very well be applied under a different state of...
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