Schwan's Sales Enterprises v. Idaho Transp., 31286.

Citation136 P.3d 297,142 Idaho 826
Decision Date25 April 2006
Docket NumberNo. 31286.,31286.
PartiesSCHWAN'S SALES ENTERPRISES, INC., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Idaho

Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, Idaho, for appellant. Michael D. Gaffney argued.

Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields, Chartered, Boise, Idaho for respondent. Larry C. Hunter argued.

JONES, Justice.

At about 10 o'clock one April evening in 2001, a Schwan's employee (named Forman) drove one of the company trucks past a stop sign and through the intersection of U.S. Highway 91 and Wicks Road1 in Bingham County. His truck collided with another vehicle, and two people in the vehicle he hit were killed. Forman pleaded guilty to two counts of vehicular manslaughter. He was on company time when the accident occurred, and Schwan's settled with the decedents' parents. Schwan's then sued the Idaho Transportation Department (Department), Bingham County, and that county's road and bridge district for contribution, subrogation, and indemnification. The company alleged the defendants acted negligently in the placement of the stop sign and in the non-placement of a stop-ahead warning sign. A jury returned a verdict finding Schwan's and the Department each fifty percent liable. (Bingham County and its road and bridge district had by then been dropped from the lawsuit.) The Department moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, and the district court declined to grant either. The court later awarded attorney fees under Idaho R. Civ. P. 37(c). The Department appealed, and, finding little merit in the appeal, we affirm.

I.

To give some context to the dispute on appeal, we deem it beneficial to briefly introduce some of the facts and issues presented in the lawsuit. The intersection at issue is located in rural Bingham County. It forms a T. On the night of the accident Forman was on the road that dead-ends at the intersection, forcing the driver to go left or right. Near that intersection, the road Forman was on widens a bit. The intersection was marked with a stop sign, but the road down which Forman was traveling was not marked with a stop-ahead sign. The stop sign is not directly perpendicular to the road because of the widening of Wicks Road as it intersects Highway 91. Rather, it is offset somewhat to the right and at a slight angle. The visibility of the stop sign was an issue at trial.

The guidelines for sign placement are established very generally by statute, and slightly less generally provided for in a document called the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (Manual). In 1994, the Department formally studied intersections in the area and concluded that a stop-ahead sign at this particular intersection was unnecessary. Schwan's theory was that due to the intersection's configuration, the stop sign was not readily visible. Thus, it alleged, the intersection warranted a stop-ahead sign, the agency was duty-bound to put one up, and the agency's failure to do so was a substantial factor in the Forman accident.

During trial, both parties introduced evidence about whether a stop-ahead sign should have been placed along the road prior to the intersection. Photographs of the road and intersection were introduced. One such photograph, taken after the accident, showed that a stop-ahead sign had been placed along the road. Admission of this evidence was stipulated to prior to trial, but the agency had previously objected to any introduction of this evidence. There was also testimony about whether the sign would have made any difference. The district judge allowed Forman to testify about what he would have done had he seen the stop-ahead sign. The judge also allowed Forman to testify about why he pleaded guilty to vehicular manslaughter. During the jury's deliberations, it (the jury) passed a note to the judge asking him about the relationship between the Manual and the 1994 study. The judge told the jury to reread the instructions.

II.

In the ensuing paragraphs, we discuss most of the Department's points of contention on appeal. Those we do not discuss were not presented to the district court in the context of the Department's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for new trial. In other words, while some of the errors asserted might have been independent grounds for appeal, Idaho R. Civ. P. 50(b), the Department only appealed the denial of the motions. Yet, some of the complaints about the orders denying the Department's motions were not presented within the context of the motions and the Department has not alleged those errors as independent grounds for reversal. Having failed to present these issues to the district court and, having failed to argue them independent of the motions, it should come as no surprise that we decline to address them. See Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430, 436, 80 P.3d 1031, 1037 (2003).

A.

Our discussion begins with the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

1.

When a trial judge receives such a motion, the judge begins the inquiry by asking him or herself whether there is substantial evidence in the record upon which the jury could properly find a verdict for the party against whom the judgment notwithstanding the verdict is sought. See Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 763, 727 P.2d 1187, 1191 (1986). The judge's task in answering this question is to review all the evidence and draw all the reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 764, 727 P.2d at 1192. (The party seeking a judgment notwithstanding the verdict admits the truth of all the other side's evidence and every legitimate inference that can be drawn from it. Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 252-53, 678 P.2d 41, 44-45 (1984).) The judge is not an extra juror, though; there is no weighing of evidence or passing on the credibility of witnesses or making of independent findings on factual issues. Gmeiner v. Yacte, 100 Idaho 1, 4, 592 P.2d 57, 60 (1979). Instead, the judge must determine whether the evidence is substantial—that is, whether it is of sufficient quality and probative value that reasonable minds could arrive at the same conclusion as did the jury. Mann v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 95 Idaho 732, 736, 518 P.2d 1194, 1198 (1974).

Our task on appeal of an order denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is the same as that of the trial judge is when he or she considers the motion. Quick v. Crane, supra, 111 Idaho at 764, 727 P.2d at 1192. Whether the trial court should have entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is purely a question of law. Id.

2.

The Department tells us the record does not contain substantial evidence upon which a reasonable jury could have concluded the lack of a stop-ahead sign was a substantial factor in the accident. Its main complaint is that all the evidence is speculative. A time-honored objection, speculation is generally understood to be "the art of theorizing about a matter as to which evidence is not sufficient for certain knowledge." Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 565, 97 P.3d 428, 432 (2004) (discussing speculation in the context of a challenge to expert testimony) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1255 (5th ed.1979)). Our rules of evidence, specifically Rules 602 and 701, generally do not permit speculative testimony.

Schwan's disagrees with the Department's characterization of the evidence. It points us to a number of facts adduced at trial that qualify as substantial evidence. To identify but a few: the stop sign was difficult to see due to the intersection's configuration, the sign was intermittently obstructed, and Forman testified that had he seen a stop-ahead sign he would have known an intersection was coming and slowed down to turn right. Additionally, photographs were admitted showing how perceptible (or imperceptible) the stop sign was both at night and during daylight hours. Drawing all the inferences in Schwan's favor, we believe the jury could have concluded that the absence of a stop-ahead sign was a substantial factor in the accident.

The Department contends, however, that Forman's testimony about what he would have done had he seen a stop-ahead sign was not admissible. We don't agree. It's fair to say that most people who have obtained a driver's license know what a stop-ahead sign looks like, what it tells a driver, and what a driver is supposed to do when a driver sees such a sign. Given the common experience shared by drivers upon the public highways, the jury could have inferred that had Forman seen a stop-ahead sign he would have known a stop sign was coming and acted appropriately. The jury did not need Forman's testimony to demonstrate that, had he seen a stop-ahead sign, he would have known a stop sign was ahead. Forman was not hypothesizing about some far-fetched possibility grounded in neither established fact nor undisputable common experience. And besides, whether he would have stopped wasn't the issue—he was asked and simply affirmed that he knew what a stop-ahead sign looked like and what it meant.

B.

We next consider the Department's motion for a new trial.

1.

Idaho R. Civ. P. 59(a) delineates several bases on which a party may seek a new trial. The Department contends that the district court should have granted it a new trial under Rule 59(a)(6) (insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict) and under Rule 59(a)(7) (legal errors committed at trial). We review orders denying motions for new trial for an abuse of discretion. Pratton v. Gage, 122 Idaho 848, 850, 840 P.2d 392, 394 (1992). Such a review entails this three-part inquiry: (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards...

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