Schwartz v. Adams Cnty. Reg'l Sewer Dist.
| Decision Date | 25 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | Cause No. 1:21-CV-14-HAB |
| Parties | NOAH B. and MARTHA M. SCHWARTZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ADAMS COUNTY REGIONAL SEWER DISTRICT, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Plaintiffs, adherents to the Amish faith, seek a declaratory judgment and injunction from the Court preventing Defendant from forcing them to connect to a sanitary sewer system. Defendant, in turn, has asked this Court to require Plaintiffs to join several state and local health and environmental entities as necessary defendants. Defendant's Motion to Join Necessary Parties, having now been fully briefed (ECF Nos. 25, 26, 28, 32), is ripe for determination.
The joinder of parties was raised early and often by Defendant. In its Answer, filed on March 5, 2021, Defendant's Fourth Affirmative Defense alleged that "Plaintiffs have failed to join necessary parties." (ECF No. 16 at 19). At the same time, Defendant filed a motion (ECF No. 17) seeking to require Plaintiffs to notify the State of Indiana that the constitutionality of a state statute was being challenged, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.1(a) and N.D. Ind. L.R. 5.1-1. Plaintiffs notified the Court on March 26, 2021, that the required notice had been provided to the Indiana Attorney General. (ECF No. 21). The notice triggered the right, but not a requirement, of the Indiana Attorney General to appear and defend the constitutionality of the contested state statute. The Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b), also certified to the Indiana Attorney General that this suit challenged the constitutionality of a state statute. (ECF No. 24).
While the parties waited to see if the Indiana Attorney General would appear, Defendant filed the instant motion. In its motion, Defendant seeks the joinder of the Adams County Commissioners (the "Commissioners"), the Adams County Health Department (the "Health Department"), the Indiana State Department of Health ("ISDH"), and the Indiana Department of Environmental Management ("IDEM") (collectively the "Joinees"). While Defendant addresses each Joinee individually, its argument boils down to one, overarching point: if Plaintiffs prevail, their human waste removal processes will be subject to oversight by the Joinees. Accordingly, Defendant asserts, each Joinee has an interest in the outcome of this case and must be joined. For their part, Plaintiffs argue that any regulatory violations can be addressed through later enforcement proceedings, obviating any need for joinder.
Required joinder is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, which provides, in pertinent part:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1). "The purpose of Rule 19 is to permit joinder of all materially interested parties to a single lawsuit so as to protect interested parties and avoid waste of judicial resources." Askew v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., 568 F.3d 632, 634 (7th Cir. 2009). The test for an indispensable party "is whether justice cannot be done unless [the party] is joined." Wade v. Hopper, 993 F.2d 1246, 1249 (7th Cir. 1993) (quotation omitted). It is the party advocating for joinder that "generally has the initial burden to establish the absent person's interest." In re Veluchamy, 879 F.3d 808, 819 n.4 (7th Cir. 2018). Determinations about proper joinder are of necessity highly discretionary, involving intensely case-specific decisions about the fairest and most economical way to adjudicate claims. Rutherford v. Merck & Co., Inc., 428 F.Supp.2d 842, 855 (S.D. Ill. 2006).
While Defendant lists the foregoing legal requirements, its arguments are not addressed to any specific subsection of Rule 19. As Defendant notes (see ECF No. 32 at 6-7), Plaintiffs don't mention Rule 19 at all in their filing. Accordingly, the Court's analysis is hampered by a lack of on-point legal argument from either side. As best as the Court can divine from the pleadings before it, the dispute seems to revolve around the requirements of Rule 19(a)(1)(B)1; Defendant's primary point appears to be that the Joinees have interests in this action that must be addressed by this Court. Having reviewed the filings and the relevant case law, the Court must disagree.
The Seventh Circuit has characterized a necessary party under Rule 19(a)(1)(B) as a person that "claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and that interest will either be endangered by going forward in her absence or else will threaten to whipsaw an existing party with inconsistent obligations." J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. McDonald, 760 F.3d 646, 653 (7th Cir. 2014). In arguing that the Joinees have such an interest, Defendant overstates the relief sought by Plaintiffs. Defendant repeatedly asserts that Plaintiffs are asking for permission to violate state and local health regulations. (See ECF No. 26 at 9) ("The Plaintiffs seek to create a residential wastewater system that conflicts with [IDEM] requirements."); (ECF No. 26 at 10) ("[T]he Plaintiffs ask for a permanent injunction allowing them to dispose of their waste under their own set of rules without any government involvement."). Aside from the fact that Plaintiffs effectively disclaim any such request in their Response (see ECF No. 28 at 4-5), the Court does not read the Complaint as demanding any such relief.
Damages aside, Plaintiffs' requested relief is limited to "[a] declaration and injunction ordering that Defendant may not insist and require that Plaintiffs connect to the Pleasant Mills Sewer System or any other municipal sewer system." (ECF No. 2 at 11). Conspicuous by its absence is any request that the Court bless Plaintiffs' current waste removal practices, or any future waste removal practices. Certainly, the Complaint does not ask for a complete dispensation from all wastewater regulations; Plaintiffs concede that they would be subject to enforcement actions by the Joinees should their privies violate applicable statutes and administrative code sections. (ECF No. 28 at 4). The existence of the right to pursue future enforcement actions belies the notion that the Joinees have interests that would be endangered by going forward in their absence. See Ammex, Inc. v. McDowell, 443 F.Supp.3d 863, 876 (E.D. Mich. 2020) ().
For much the same reason, there is no concern about inconsistent obligations. A determination that Plaintiffs need not connect to a municipal sewer system is not the same as a determination that they are relieved of governmental oversight altogether. Rather, as Defendant points out, Indiana has regulatory guidance on general sewage disposal requirements for any dwelling "that is not connected . . . to a sanitary sewer system." 410 IAC 6-8.3-52. There would be nothing inconsistent in relieving Plaintiffs of the obligation to connect to a sanitary sewer system while at the same time holding them to applicable health codes. To the contrary, that very situation appears to have been expressly contemplated by the drafters of the Administrative Code.
The existence of an administrative process leads the Court to question whether it even could hear any concerns raised by the Joinees at this stage. Any governmental determination that Plaintiffs were in violation of applicable health codes would be subject to an...
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