Schwartz v. Heeter
| Decision Date | 13 September 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 02A03–1109–DR–401.,02A03–1109–DR–401. |
| Citation | 975 N.E.2d 820 |
| Parties | Cortney L. SCHWARTZ, Appellant/Cross–Appellee/Respondent, v. Jodi S. HEETER, Appellee/Cross–Appellant/Petitioner. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Cornelius B. Hayes, Fort Wayne, IN, Andrea R. Trevino, Bobilya Law Group LLP, Fort Wayne, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Perry D. Shilts, Shilts Law Office, Fort Wayne, IN, Attorney for Appellee.
Cortney L. Schwartz (“Father”) appeals the trial court's order of summary judgment construing a “true up” provision in the settlement agreement entered in the dissolution of his marriage from Jodi S. Heeter (“Mother”). Mother cross-appeals, challenging the trial court's construction of the provision and seeking appellate attorney's fees.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
The parties present several issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as:
I. Whether the trial court erred when it construed the settlement agreement's “true up” provision to apply the previous year's Child Support Guidelines for each year's determination of Father's “true up” payments;
II. Whether Mother may, upon remand, be granted relief based upon her previously-filed Petition for Modification of Support; and
III. Whether Mother is entitled to appellate attorneys' fees under Appellate Rule 66.
Father and Mother were married in 1992. The marriage produced two children. On July 9, 2008, Mother filed her petition for dissolution of the marriage. On February 20, 2009, the parties entered into and jointly filed with the trial court a Marital Settlement Agreement (“the agreement” or “the settlement agreement”), in which the parties agreed, among other things, to a determination of Father's child support obligations. In this regard, the agreement provided:
The parties agree that the required support obligation shall be fixed and [Father] shall pay the sum of $430.00 per week (or $860.00 every two [2] weeks), if paid bi-weekly) [sic] to the Clerk of Allen County for the support of the parties' minor children by direct deposit into an account created by [Mother] for this purpose. The parties further agree to the following, on an annual basis, to account for irregular income:
True Up
At the conclusion of each calendar year, starting with 2009, the parties' respective weekly child support obligation shall be adjusted and recalculated by taking the amount of their gross taxable income from their tax return(s) for that year, dividing it by 52 weeks, and using this amount at line 1 of the [Child Support Obligation Worksheet], with all other factors remaining the same for purposes of calculating the parties' adjusted child support obligation. [Father] shall pay the difference between his weekly adjusted child support obligation, multiplied by 52 weeks, to [Mother] by May 1st of each year. As a part of this process, [Father and Mother] shall provide each other with a copy of the federal income tax return along with all attachments and schedules thereto.
The above support and methodology is [sic] a compromise by the parties to avoid litigation.
The determination of Father's weekly support obligation of $430 was based upon an estimate of $5872 for Father's weekly income and an estimate of $500 for Mother's weekly income, and was calculated using the 2009 Child Support Guidelines.2 The terms of the agreement were incorporated into the decree of dissolution of marriage, which the trial court entered on February 20, 2009.
In early 2010, Father recalculated his weekly support obligation for purposes of compliance with the “true up” provision of the agreement for 2009, and used the 2009 Guidelines' formula to make this determination. Based upon the results of the parties' 2009 federal income tax returns, Father determined that his weekly child support obligation for 2009 was $579, which is $149 per week more than the $430 weekly payment provided for by the agreement. Multiplying the difference by forty-four, which represented the number of weeks in 2009 during which the decree of dissolution was in effect, yielded a “true up” amount of $6,556. Father remitted this amount to Mother on May 5, 2010, and filed a Report to Court and Notice of Compliance to this effect on May 6, 2010.
On June 11, 2010, Mother filed her Objection to Report to Court and Notice of Compliance, in which she stated that Father had not complied with the provisions of the agreement, and this non-compliance left an outstanding support arrearage of more than $47,000. Along with the Objection, Mother filed a Petition for Citation for Contempt (“the Petition”), which alleged that Father's “true up” payment was insufficient under the terms of the agreement. In the alternative, the Petition requested relief in the form of a motion for modification of Father's child support obligations because of “a change of circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the prior support order unreasonable.” App. at 66.
The core of Mother's objection was that Father “incorrectly relied upon the no-longer existing Guideline Schedules associated with the 2009 Support Guidelines.” App. 67. Basing her objection on the changed support calculations set forth in the 2010 Support Guidelines, Mother argued that Father's weekly support obligation for 2009 under the “true up” procedure was $1,655.93. Less the agreed-to $430 weekly payment amount, Father's remaining weekly support obligation under Mother's calculation was $1,225.93. Thus, Mother argued that the appropriate “true up” payment was $53,990, of which Father had paid only $6,556, leaving an arrears of $47,388.3 App. at 67–69. Mother argued that Father's claimed underpayment was a willful violation of the terms of the “true up” provision, but requested that if the court determined otherwise that Father's support obligations be modified retroactive to the date of the Petition.
On December 22, 2010, Father moved for summary judgment and requested that the trial court rule in his favor on all the claims Mother raised in the Petition. On December 29, 2010, Father moved for a continuance and stay in proceedings on Mother's Petition pending the trial court's decision on his motion for summary judgment. On January 3, 2011, the trial court denied this motion, but scheduled a July 8, 2011, hearing on both the Petition and Father's motion for summary judgment. Also on January 3, 2011, Father filed a written motion requesting the trial court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law as provided by Indiana Trial Rule 52.
On January 24, 2011, Mother filed her response to Father's motion for summary judgment and submitted a cross-motion for summary judgment. On February 28, 2011, Father filed his response to Mother's cross-motion for summary judgment and reply to Mother's brief in response to his own motion for summary judgment.
On April 29, 2011, Father filed his Report to Court and Notice of Compliance, which set forth Father's calculation of the “true up” amount he owed for 2010. Again basing his calculations on the 2009 Child Support Guidelines, Father determined that his weekly child support obligation for 2010 was $552 per week. Less the $430 per week already remitted during 2010, this resulted in a difference of $ 122 per week and a “true up” amount of $6,344 for 2010. Father remitted payment in this amount to Mother.
On May 20, 2011, Mother filed her objection to Father's Report and a Verified Petition for Citation for Contempt (“the Second Petition”). In the Second Petition, Mother again argued that Father improperly applied the 2009 Child Support Guidelines when he should have used the Guidelines in effect for the year during which Father was to make his “true up” payment. Based upon the 2011 Guidelines, Mother argued that Father's weekly support obligation upon application of the “true up” provision should have been determined to be $1290, which, less the $430 per week already paid, yielded a remaining weekly support obligation of $860. This would result in a “true up” payment for 2010 of $44,720. Based upon this, and taking into account the $6,344 Father had already paid, Mother's Second Petition argued that Father was $38,376 in arrears for his 2010 child support obligation. Also on May 20, 2011, Mother filed a supplement to her prior motion for summary judgment and to her response to Father's motion, which incorporated her allegations in the Second Petition into the summary judgment proceedings.
On August 8, 2011, the trial court entered its order on Mother's motion for summary judgment. Interpreting the “true up” provision, the trial court concluded that Father's “true up” payment of $6,556 was correctly determined based upon the 2009 Guidelines, but that Father's “true up” payment for 2010 should have been based upon the 2010 Guidelines. Because Father paid $6,344 to Mother as his “true up” payment for 2010, the trial court's construction of the agreement determined Father's payments to be in arrears by $38,376, and ordered that Father pay this amount to Mother by December 8, 2011. Thus, the trial court partially granted and partially denied each party's motion for summary judgment.
This appeal ensued.
Father and Mother both challenge the trial court's construction of the “true up” provision of the settlement agreement.
In reviewing an appeal from a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for summary judgment, we stand in the same position as the trial court and review the motion de novo. Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ind.2009). Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is no question of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). A trial court's entry of summary judgment “arrives on appeal ‘clothed with a presumption of validity,’ ” and...
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Schwartz v. Heeter
...panel of the Court of Appeals reversed and found the clause required Father to use the 2009 Guidelines each year. Schwartz v. Heeter, 975 N.E.2d 820, 825–26 (Ind.Ct.App.2012). Judge Mathias dissented and would have affirmed the trial court. Id. at 830. We granted transfer to encourage paren......
- In re Kriesel, 49S00–1205–CO–253.