Schwartz v. Kelly

• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Writing for the Court: Before BROWN; INGLIS
• Citation: 99 A.2d 89,140 Conn. 176
• Parties: SCHWARTZ et al. v. KELLY et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
• Decision Date: 21 July 1953

Page 89

99 A.2d 89 140 Conn. 176 SCHWARTZ et al.
v.
KELLY et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. July 21, 1953.
Appeal Dismissed Nov. 30, 1953. See 74 S.Ct. 227.

[140 Conn. 177]

Page 90

H. L. Koizim and G. A. Vardamis, South Norwalk, with whom, on the brief, were A. D. Slavitt and Robert A. Slavitt, South Norwalk, for appellants (plaintiff).

Louis Weinstein, Asst. Atty. Gen., with [140 Conn. 178] whom, on the brief, was William L. Beers, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellees (defendants).

Joseph E. Klau, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, were E. Gaynor Brennan, Joseph K. Sherman, Stamford, and David M. Shea, Hartford, argued the cause as amicuscuriae.

Before [140 Conn. 176] BROWN, C. J., and BALDWIN, INGLIS, O'SULLIVAN and CORNELL, JJ.

[140 Conn. 178] INGLIS, Associate Justice.

In this action the plaintiffs, a group of package store permittees, seek to enjoin the liquor control commission from enforcing Public Act No. 200, enacted by the 1951 General Assembly, General Statutes, Cum.Supp.1951, §§ 904b-907b. The trial court rendered judgment for the defendants and from that judgment the plaintiffs have appealed.

The act in question provides that no out-of-state shipper, manufacturer of wholesaler permittee shall sell or offer for sale any alcoholic liquor the container of which bears a label stating the brand or the name

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of the owner or producer, unless a schedule of minimum consumer resale prices for each brand has been filed with the liquor control commission and such schedule is then in effect. An exception is made providing that permission for such sale or offer may be granted by the liquor control commission 'for good cause shown and for reasons not inconsistent with the purposes of [the act], and under such terms and conditions as the liquor control commission deems necessary.' Cum.Supp.1951, § 904b.

The schedules of retail prices so filed are to continue operative for such periods as the commission shall specify, not exceeding four months, and are to be given wide publicity in various prescribed ways. The act further provides: 'No permittee authorized to sell alcoholic liquor at retail for off-premises consumption shall sell, offer to sell, solicit an order for or advertise any alcoholic liquor at a price less than [140 Conn. 179] a minimum consumer resale price then in effect, unless written permission of the liquor control commission is granted for good cause shown and for reasons not inconsistent with the purposes of [the act], and under such terms and conditions as the liquor control commission deems necessary.' § 904b(c). The commission is authorized, § 905b, to adopt regulations for the enforcement of the act and to permit noncompliance when practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships will otherwise ensue. A violation of the act or any regulation thereunder is punishable by suspension or revocation of the violator's permit and by other penalties. § 906b.

The claim of the plaintiffs is that the act is unconstitutional on three grounds: (1) It violates the due process clauses of both the federal and the state constitutions, (a) because it is not within the police power and (b) because it is discriminatory; (2) it provides for an improper delegation of legislative power; (3) it contravenes the interstate commerce clause of the federal constitution.

In passing upon the constitutionality of a statute, a court is bound to make every presumption and intendment in favor of the statute and to sustain it unless it is clearly invalid. Northeastern Gas Transmission Co. v. Collins, 138 Conn. 582, 586, 87 A.2d 139; Mills v. Gaynor, 136 Conn. 632, 637, 73 A.2d 823; Lyman v. Adorno, 133 Conn. 511, 514, 52 A.2d 702. This fundamental principle applies with full force in the determination of whether a statute is within the police power and, therefore, does not deprive a person of his liberty or property without due process of law. In such a consideration it is not for the court to pass upon the economic advantages or disadvantages of the statute. It is not for the court to say whether the legislation is wise. The [140 Conn. 180] court's only function is to determine whether the object of the enactment is within the power of the legislature and, if so, whether the particular statute bears a reasonable and substantial relation to the object sought to be accomplished and is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. Carroll v. Schwartz, 127 Conn. 126, 129, 14 A.2d 754.

Although the act here in question does not contain a statement of the objects sought to be accomplished, the purposes which the General Assembly had in mind in adopting it are easily discernible. They were both to promote temperance in the consumption of intoxicating liquor and, by stabilizing the industry, to encourage observance of the Liquor Control Act by those who are permitted to sell liquor not to be consumed on the premises. It may reasonably be presumed that, without the establishment of a minimum retail price for branded liquor, price wars among retail dealers are apt to occur. The cutting of prices which occurs during such wars may induce persons to purchase, and therefore consume, more liquor than they would if higher prices were maintained. Moreover, the cutthroat competition...