Schwartz v. United States

• Citation: 217 F. 866
• Decision Date: 08 September 1914
• Docket Number: 1255.
• Parties: SCHWARTZ v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

217 F. 866

SCHWARTZ v. UNITED STATES.

No. 1255.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

September 8, 1914

Joseph R. Curl and John C. Palmer, Jr., both of Wheeling, W.Va. (A M. Belcher, of Charleston, W. Va., on the brief), for plaintiff in error.

Stuart W. Walker, U.S. Atty., of Martinsburg, W. Va., and John A Howard, of Wheeling, W. Va., for the United States.

Before PRITCHARD and WOODS, Circuit Judges.

WOODS Circuit Judge.

The question to be decided in this cause is whether the assignments of error present any valid reason for the reversal of a judgment of the District Court by which Meyer Schwartz was held to be guilty of contempt and sentenced to imprisonment for 60 days.

In the case of West Virginia-Pittsburg Coal Co. v. John P. White and others the District Judge granted a temporary restraining order, dated September 29, 1913, directed to the defendants as officers of the United Mine Workers of America and as individuals, 'and all persons combining and conspiring with the said designated persons and all other persons whomsoever. ' The tenor of the order was to enjoin interference with plaintiff's business by using threats, force, intimidation, or persuasion to induce its employes to break their contracts or leave their work, or by using like means to induce any person to refuse to accept employment with plaintiff, and to enjoin trespassing on plaintiff's premises for the purposes above indicated. The charge against Schwartz seems to fall under the italicized portion of the following provision of the order:

'From interfering in any manner whatsoever, either by threats, violence, intimidation, persuasion, or entreaty, with any person in the employ of plaintiff who has contracted with and is in the actual service of plaintiff, to entice or induce him to quit the service of plaintiff, or to fail or refuse to perform his duties under his contract of employment, and from ordering, aiding, directing, assisting, or abetting, in any manner whatsoever, any person or persons to commit any or either of the acts aforesaid.'

By petition filed November 11, 1913, the plaintiff alleged:

'Meyer Schwartz, who keeps a store near your petitioner's Locust Grove mine, after being advised of the terms and provisions of the said restraining order, has continued to furnish a meeting place for your petitioner's striking employes and to assist in inducing your petitioner's striking employes to remain away from their work, in violation of their respective contracts of employment.'

The affidavit of Virgin, attached to the petition as a part of it, alleges service of the order on Schwartz, his acts of furnishing a place for the striking miners to hold their meetings as near as possible to the mines, and of providing a conveyance and a driver for two of the officers of the United Mine Workers to go over the plaintiff's property to a meeting of the strikers.

A rule to show cause was issued, and the hearing fixed for December 1, 1913. On that day the court, on motion of plaintiff, made an order naming a number of persons, including Schwartz, who had appeared and submitted themselves to the court in response to the rule to show cause, and reciting its opinion that the petition and affidavits showed a criminal contempt, and directing that the proceedings be entitled 'United States v. Van Bittner' and others, Meyer Schwartz being named as one of the defendants, that the cause be docketed on the law side of the court on the criminal docket, that the petition and affidavits and the orders relating to the contempt proceedings be filed as a part of the record in the criminal case, and that the contempt proceedings 'shall not be further prosecuted in this suit in equity, but shall be prosecuted on the law side of the court as a criminal contempt case.'

After hearing the arguments, the court on the following day made an order refusing to dismiss the bill, and granting a temporary injunction identical in language with that of the restraining order. At the same time an order was made staying further proceedings until the further order of the court.

By petition filed on January 17, 1914, West Virginia-Pittsburg Coal Company represented to the court, by petition and affidavits, that, although the defendants had appeared in open court on December 2, 1913, and promised to desist from the acts charged as contempt, and to comply strictly with the order of injunction, they nevertheless had continued to violate the order in many particulars set out. An attachment was issued against Schwartz, and he was required to show cause why he should not be punished for the alleged contempt. At the hearing on January 27, 1914, the court, after denying the motion of defendant's counsel to quash the petition, and after hearing the evidence, adjudged the defendant guilty of contempt and sentenced him to imprisonment for 60 days.

Although out of logical order, for the sake of clearness, we consider first the error assigned that the charge against Schwartz should have been dismissed for indefiniteness. It is true that Schwartz is not specifically charged by name in this last petition and the affidavits attached; yet, reading them in connection with the first petition and the affidavits thereto attached, it appears that the only charge in the last petition which involves him is that of maintaining at petitioner's mine, near Colliers, tents occupied by a number of strike agitators who 'live in the most disorderly manner, drinking, fighting, shooting, and disturbing your petitioner's employes who live near by.' This definite charge is against all the defendants, and was notice to Schwartz of the accusation he had to meet.

But aside from that, the original petition and affidavits, as we have pointed out, contained distinct and definite charges against him, and the order suspending his trial on these charges did not affect his liability to answer them. Under that order making the United States a party, transferring the cause to the criminal docket, and directing the original petition and affidavits to be filed in the criminal proceeding, the charges and specifications contained in the original papers stand against the defendant as the basis of the criminal proceedings. There is no fixed formula for contempt proceedings, and technical accuracy is not required. It is sufficient if the offense is set out, so that the defendant is clearly informed of the charges against him and whether a criminal or civil contempt is alleged; and this is to be determined by examination of the entire record. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., ...