Schwartz v. Urban Redevelopment Authority of Pittsburgh

• Decision Date: 02 July 1963
• Citation: 192 A.2d 371,411 Pa. 530
• Parties: Jerome J. SCHWARTZ, Appellant, v. The URBAN REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY OF PITTSBURGH, Pennsylvania, a Corporation, and the City of Pittsburgh, a Municipal Corporation. Lee B. SHAPERO, Appellant, v. The URBAN REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY OF PITTSBURGH, Pennsylvania, a Corporation, and the City of Pittsburgh, a Municipal Corporation.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 371

192 A.2d 371

411 Pa. 530

Jerome J. SCHWARTZ, Appellant, v. The URBAN REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY OF PITTSBURGH,

Pennsylvania, a Corporation, and the City of

Pittsburgh, a Municipal Corporation.

Lee B. SHAPERO, Appellant, v. The URBAN REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY OF PITTSBURGH,

Pennsylvania, a Corporation, and the City of

Pittsburgh, a Municipal Corporation.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

July 2, 1963.

Rehearing Denied July 26, 1963.

Harold Gondelman, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

David W. Craig, City Sol., Mead J. Mulvihill, Jr., Asst. City Sol., Pittsburgh, for City of Pittsburgh.

Theodore L. Hazlett, Jr., William H. Mendlow, Pittsburgh, for Urban Redevelopment Authority.

Before BELL, C. J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, COHEN and MUSMANNO, JJ.

O'BRIEN, Justice.

These appeals involve two actions in equity, instituted by the respective appellants against the Urban Redevelopment Authority of Pittsburgh [Authority] and the City of Pittsburgh [City]. Appellant Schwartz, as trustee for a corporation to be formed, and appellant Shapero, in his own behalf as a taxpayer and in behalf of other taxpayers of the City, filed complaints in equity seeking: 1. to enjoin the Authority and the City 'from taking any action to sell, grant, convey, lease, mortgage, encumber, pledge or in any manner dispose or attempt to dispose of' a certain parcel of land in a redevelopment area to Bell Telephone Company or others; 2. to require the Authority to show cause why the parcel of land should not be conveyed to Schwartz; and 3. compel the authority to accept Schwartz' proposal.

The two suits involved identical questions of fact and law and were consolidated for trial. At the conclusion of appellants' case, the Chancellor granted appellees' motions for a compulsory nonsuit. The court en banc refused appellants' motions to take off the judgments of nonsuit, thereby giving rise to these appeals.

Rule 1512, P.R.C.P. 12 P.S.Appendix provides for the entry of nonsuits in actions in equity as follows:

'The court may enter a non-suit against the plaintiff under the some circumstances, subject to review in the same manner and with the same effect as in actions at law.' (Emphasis supplied).

We are therefore guided by the principles that a nonsuit should be entered only in a clear case, and, on appeal from the refusal to take off a compulsory nonsuit, the plaintiff must be given the benefit of all favorable testimony and every reasonable inference of fact arising therefrom and all conflicts therein must be resolved in favor of plaintiff. Miller v. McMinn's Industries, 410 Pa. 234, 188 A.2d 738 (1963), and cases cited therein.

From the pleadings and the evidence, the following facts appear to be uncontroverted: The Urban Redevelopment Authority of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania is a corporate body created under the provisions of the Urban Redevelopment Law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Act of May 24, 1945, P.L. 991, 35 P.S. § 1701 et seq., as amended. The City of Pittsburgh is a municipal corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and is an indispensable party to the proceedings by virtue of the provisions of the Urban Redevelopment Law, since it is required to approve the proposed sale, lease or transfer of any real property in a redevelopment area.

The Authority, by the exercise of the power of eminent domain, obtained title to and razed the area known as the Lower Hill Redevelopment Project, Redevelopment Area No. 3. After the construction of new streets and grades, sewers and utility lines, the Authority, in January, 1959, compiled and circulated to interested persons a booklet known as the 'Land Disposition Documents' and invited proposals from the public for bids to purchase the tracts of land in the redevelopment project. Appellant Schwartz submitted a proposal to purchase Lot 'E' in the redevelopment project area for $200,000.00 which was in excess of the total asking price of the Authority, the asking price being $196,100.00. The proposal for the construction of a drive-in hotel was a commercial use and qualified as a proper use for commercial land in the Redevelopment Project area. Lot 'E' is zoned commercial C-4 under the Zoning Ordinance of the City of Pittsburgh and one of the permitted uses for lots so zoned is a hotel. The 'Land Disposition Documents' circulated by the Authority state that one of the permitted land uses and buildings for an area zoned C-4 included hotels.

The term 'hotel' as defined in Article 2 of the Zoning Ordinance is a building designed for occupancy primarily as a temporary aboding place of individuals who are lodged, with or without meals, in which building (a) there are more than ten sleeping rooms, (b) fifty per cent or more of the gross floor area devoted to residential uses in suites, (c) incidental business may be conducted, (d) there may be club rooms, ball rooms and common dining facilities, and (e) such hotel services as maid, telephone and postal service are provided.

Appellant Schwartz testified that his proposal was for a hotel within the definition of the zoning ordinance.

The proposed uses for zoning classifications in a redevelopment project area arise by certification to the redevelopment agency by the City Planning Commission of the area in the Lower Hill for redevelopment. The City Planning Commission prepared a Redevelopment Area Plan dated June 7, 1955 and in conformity with this Redevelopment Area Plan, the Authority prepared a proposal for the redevelopment of Redevelopment Area No. 3. After a public hearing, duly advertised in accordance with the Urban Redevelopment Law, the proposal and Redevelopment Area Plan were approved by the City Planning Commission and by the Council of the City of Pittsburgh. In all of the actions by the Planning Commission, the Authority and City Council, Lot 'E' was zoned C-4 and among its permitted land uses and buildings was that of a hotel.

The Schwartz proposal to purchase parcel 'E' was rejected by the Authority. In its letter to Schwartz rejecting his proposal, the Authority stated:

'While a motel, being a commercial use, qualifies as a proper use for commercial land in the Lower Hill project, the Board's decision hinged on their desire to see commercial development on parcel F [the parties agree that the parcel is 'E'] which would relate more directly to the needs and desires of the 935 families eventually to occupy the apartments to be constucted by Webb & Knapp on parcel G directly across the street from the parcel in which you were interested.'

The report of the Authority staff, relative to the Schwartz proposal contains the following language:

'We feel that the development of this site for motel purposes, while in keeping technically, with the Redevelopment Area Plan controls on land use, would not be ideally compatible with either the existing commercial uses along Fifth Avenue or with the residential development north of Colwell Street.'

Subsequent to the rejection of the Schwartz proposal, the Authority entertained a proposal from the Bell Telephone Company, to erect, on parcel 'E', a building to house electronic computers employed in the preparation of bills for Bell's customers, the proposed purchase price being $196,100.00.

For appellants to challenge the rejection of the Schwartz proposal, they must show that the Authority has acted capriciously, arbitrarily or in bad faith. Blumenschein v. Housing Authority of Pittsburgh, 379 Pa. 566, 109 A.2d 331 (1955); Eways et al. v. Reading Parking Authority, 385 Pa. 592, 124 A.2d 92 (1956); Schenck v. City of Pittsburgh, 364 Pa. 31, 70 A.2d 612 (1950).

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