Schweiger v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co.

• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Beach
• Citation: Schweiger v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 955 A.2d 1241, 110 Conn.App. 736 (Conn. App. 2008)
• Decision Date: 07 October 2008
• Docket Number: No. 28644.,28644.
• Parties: Jo Anne C. SCHWEIGER v. AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.

955 A.2d 1241

110 Conn.App. 736

Jo Anne C. SCHWEIGER v. AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. 28644.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 2, 2008.

Decided October 7, 2008.

Donald J. McCarthy, Jr., for the appellant (plaintiff).

Steven L. Seligman, Hartford, for the appellee (defendant).

FLYNN, C.J., and BEACH and DUPONT, Js.

BEACH, J.

The plaintiff, Jo Anne C. Schweiger, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered after it granted a motion for a directed verdict filed by the defendant, Amica Mutual Insurance Company, pursuant to Practice Book § 16-37.¹ On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that she failed to present sufficient evidence to remove the issues of negligence and proximate cause from the realm of conjecture, speculation or surmise so as to survive the defendant's motion for a directed verdict for failure to establish a prima facie case. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the plaintiff's appeal. On May 24, 2003, the plaintiff was operating her motor vehicle in an easterly direction on Route 44 in Avon. She was driving in the left lane of two lanes on Route 44 when she slowed and brought her car to a stop behind a line of traffic that was waiting for a car ahead to make a left turn across the westbound lanes of Route 44. The plaintiff considered switching to the right lane but decided against it because of the heavy traffic conditions that she observed. After being stopped for a total of approximately four to five seconds, the plaintiff's car was struck in the rear by a car operated by the alleged tortfeasor, Brianna-Marie Blodgett. The plaintiff described the impact as a hard jolt. She further testified that she did not observe the car that struck her, either before or after the accident. The plaintiff also testified that she did not speak with Blodgett after the accident.

The plaintiff subsequently filed this uninsured-underinsured motorist action against the defendant, alleging liability for the negligent operation of the motor vehicle driven by Blodgett. A jury trial was held in December, 2005. The only evidence presented by the plaintiff addressing the issue of liability was her testimony regarding the incident and photographs of the damage to her car. Neither Blodgett nor any other witnesses to the accident testified. Following the presentation of the plaintiff's case-in-chief, the defendant moved for a directed verdict. The court reserved judgment on the motion and submitted the case to the jury. After the jury announced that it was deadlocked, the defendant filed a motion pursuant to § 16-37 for judgment in accordance with its motion for a directed verdict, which the court granted. The court concluded that "[t]he evidence in this case is insufficient to remove the issue of how this automobile accident occurred from the realm of speculation, conjecture or surmise." This appeal followed.

We begin our analysis by setting forth the legal principles that govern our review of the plaintiff's claim. "The standards for appellate review of a directed verdict are well settled. Directed verdicts are not favored.... A trial court should direct a verdict only when a jury could not reasonably and legally have reached any other conclusion.... In reviewing the trial court's decision to direct a verdict in favor of a defendant we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.... Although it is the jury's right to draw logical deductions and make reasonable inferences from the facts proven ... it may not resort to mere conjecture and speculation.... A directed verdict is justified if ... the evidence is so weak that it would be proper for the court to set aside a verdict rendered for the other party."

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Riccio v. Harbour Village Condominium Assn., Inc., 281 Conn. 160, 163, 914 A.2d 529 (2007). "A verdict may be directed ... where the claim is that there is insufficient evidence to sustain a favorable verdict." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Beale v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 89 Conn.App. 556, 565-66, 874 A.2d 259 (2005).

"[T]o establish a prima facie case, the proponent must submit evidence which, if credited, is sufficient to establish the fact or facts which it is adduced to prove.... [T]he evidence offered by the plaintiff is to be taken as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff], and every reasonable inference is to be drawn in [the plaintiff's] favor." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cadle Co. v. Errato, 71 Conn.App. 447, 455-56, 802 A.2d 887, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 918, 812 A.2d 861 (2002). "[W]hether the plaintiff has established a prima facie case is a question of law, over which our review is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) John H. Kolb & Sons, Inc. v. G & L Excavating, Inc., 76 Conn.App. 599, 605, 821 A.2d 774, cert. denied, 264 Conn. 919, 828 A.2d 617 (2003).

"Negligence involves the violation of a legal duty which one owes to another, in respect to care for the safety of the person or property of that other." Sharkey v. Skilton, 83 Conn. 503, 508, 77 A. 950 (1910). The "essential elements of a cause of action in negligence are well established: duty; breach of that duty; causation; and actual injury." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jagger v. Mohawk Mountain Ski Area, Inc., 269 Conn. 672, 687 n. 13, 849 A.2d 813 (2004).

"To prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant's conduct legally caused the injuries. ... The first component of legal cause is causation in fact. Causation in fact is the purest legal application of ... legal cause. The test for cause in fact is, simply, would the injury have occurred were it not for the actor's conduct.... The second component of legal cause is proximate cause.... [T]he test of proximate cause is whether the defendant's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's injuries.... Further, it is the plaintiff who bears the burden to prove an unbroken sequence of events that tied his injuries to the [defendant's conduct]. ... The existence of the proximate cause of an injury is determined by looking from the injury to the negligent act complained of for the necessary causal connection. ... This causal connection must be based upon more than conjecture and surmise." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Paige v. St. Andrew's Roman Catholic Church Corp., 250 Conn. 14, 24-26, 734 A.2d 85 (1999). "An actual cause that is a substantial factor in the resulting harm is a proximate cause of that harm.... The finding of actual cause is thus a requisite for any finding of proximate cause." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Boehm v. Kish, 201 Conn. 385, 391-92, 517 A.2d 624 (1986).

The plaintiff claims that the court improperly concluded that she failed to present sufficient evidence to remove the issues of negligence and proximate cause from the realm of conjecture, speculation or surmise so as to survive the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. We disagree.

In an automobile accident case, "[a] plaintiff cannot merely prove that a collision occurred and then call upon the defendant operator to come forward with evidence that the collision was not a proximate consequence of negligence on his part. Nor is it sufficient for a plaintiff to prove that a defendant operator might have been negligent in a manner which would, or might have been, a proximate cause of the collision. A plaintiff must remove the issues of negligence and proximate cause from the field of conjecture and speculation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) O'Brien v. Cordova, 171 Conn. 303, 306, 370 A.2d 933 (1976).

Recently, in Winn v. Posades, 281 Conn. 50, 913 A.2d 407 (2007), our Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment of dismissal in an automobile accident case in which no evidence existed regarding liability beyond the fact that the collision had occurred and that the defendant operator had been traveling at an unreasonable, even...