Schweiger v. Kia Motors Am., Inc.
| Decision Date | 21 March 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 2012AP962.,2012AP962. |
| Citation | 347 Wis.2d 550,830 N.W.2d 723,2013 WI App 55 |
| Parties | Randal M. SCHWEIGER, Plaintiff–Respondent–Cross–Appellant, v. KIA MOTORS AMERICA, INC., Defendant–Appellant–Cross–Respondent. |
| Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HEREAppeal and Cross–Appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for Rock County: Kenneth W. Forbeck, Judge. Affirmed.
Before LUNDSTEN, P.J., SHERMAN and BLANCHARD, JJ.¶ 1BLANCHARD, J.
This case arises from two Wisconsin Lemon Law claims and a federal Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act claim that Randal Schweiger brought against Kia Motors America, Inc. A jury found in favor of Schweiger on one of the Lemon Law claims and on the Warranty Act claim. The circuit court dismissed the remaining claim. Kia appeals the resulting judgment, and Schweiger cross-appeals.
¶ 2 Kia's appeal raises five issues:
(1) whether Kia's offer of a refund barred Schweiger's claims;
(2) whether Kia was entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict because Schweiger failed to provide evidence of a “nonconformity” in the vehicle that remained unrepaired during the first year after delivery;
(3) whether the jury's damages finding in the special verdict rendered the entire verdict invalid;
(4) whether Kia was entitled to a new trial because the special verdict form was improper; and
(5) whether the circuit court erred in awarding Schweiger his full attorney's fees and costs.
We resolve all five of these issues against Kia. Schweiger raises two issues in his cross-appeal:
(1) whether the circuit court erred in dismissing the remaining Lemon Law claim; and
(2) whether the circuit court erred in reducing the amount of the jury's damages finding.
We resolve both issues against Schweiger. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's judgment.
¶ 3 We provide limited facts for purposes of background but reference additional facts as needed in our Discussion section below. The background facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated.
¶ 4 Schweiger purchased a 2008 Kia Spectra EX on behalf of his step-daughter, April Kirichkow, who was unable to make the purchase. He financed the entire cost of the vehicle, including the purchase price, taxes, fees, and a service contract at an interest rate of zero percent.
¶ 5 Kirichkow experienced a problem starting the vehicle on a number of occasions, first in October 2008, and several more times during the summer of 2009. The Kia dealership was unable to remedy the starting problem after replacing various components and eventually told Kirichkow in September 2009 that she should not have a starting problem if she maintained at least one-quarter tank of gasoline in the vehicle.
¶ 6 Schweiger sent a Wisconsin Lemon Law claim notice to Kia, demanding a refund calculated in accordance with the Lemon Law. Kia responded in writing, agreeing to provide a refund. However, the parties disputed the proper calculation of the amount of the refund.
¶ 7 Schweiger filed his two Wisconsin Lemon Law claims and his Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act claim against Kia. Kia's answer to the claims included as an affirmative defense that Kia offered a refund complying with the Lemon Law and the Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act, thus barring Schweiger's claims.
¶ 8 For convenience, we refer to Schweiger's two Wisconsin Lemon Law-based claims as his “failure-to-refund” claim and his “failure-to-repair” claim. We recognize that the parties dispute the nature of what we call the “failure-to-refund” claim and that Schweiger maintains that the allegations in this claim stated a breach of contract claim. Our shorthand terms are not intended to carry any legal significance.
¶ 9 The circuit court concluded that Schweiger's failure-to-refund claim should be tried separately from his other two claims in order to avoid jury confusion. The court thus held a jury trial on Schweiger's failure-to-repair claim and the Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act claim. In a special verdict, the jury found in favor of Schweiger on Kia's liability for both claims, and further found that the value of the vehicle was diminished by $7,000 because of a defect.
¶ 10 In ruling on post-verdict motions, the circuit court denied Kia's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. The court entered a partial judgment on the jury verdict. As part of that judgment, the court awarded Schweiger his attorney's fees and costs and reduced the jury's damages award from $7,000 to $4,307.
¶ 11 Schweiger moved for summary judgment on his remaining claim, the failure-to-refund claim.1 Kia opposed the motion and moved for summary judgment in its favor. As part of its motion, Kia argued that it was entitled to judgment on all of Schweiger's claims, based on its affirmative defense that Schweiger's claims were barred by Kia's refund offer.2
¶ 12 The circuit court granted summary judgment to Kia on Schweiger's failure-to-refund claim, dismissing that claim based on the doctrines of election of remedies and unjust enrichment. The court denied Kia's motion on the two remaining claims that were tried. The court entered judgment accordingly. 3
¶ 13 As indicated above, Kia's appeal presents five issues:
(1) whether Kia's refund offer barred Schweiger's claims;
(2) whether Kia was entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict because Schweiger failed to provide evidence of a “nonconformity” in the vehicle that remained unrepaired during the first year after delivery;
(3) whether the jury's damages finding in the special verdict rendered the entire verdict invalid;
(4) whether Kia was entitled to a new trial because the special verdict form was improper; and
(5) whether the circuit court erred in awarding Schweiger his full attorney's fees and costs.
For the reasons explained below, we resolve each issue against Kia.
¶ 14 Kia argues that its refund offer bars all of Schweiger's claims. Schweiger disagrees. The crux of the parties' dispute is whether Kia's offer complied with the statutory standard for calculating a refund under the Wisconsin Lemon Law, Wis. Stat. § 218.0171 (2011–12).4
¶ 15 Kia asserts, and we agree, that the parties' dispute can be resolved as a matter of summary judgment that we may decide de novo because it involves only undisputed facts and may be determined as a matter of law. We need not repeat all of summary judgment methodology here. It is enough to state that summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. SeeWis. Stat. § 802.08(2) and (6).
¶ 16 While we agree with Kia on the standard of review, we disagree that Kia has shown that its refund complied with the statutory standard in the Wisconsin Lemon Law. Stated another way, in terms of summary judgment methodology, we conclude that there is no genuine dispute of material fact preventing summary judgment in Schweiger's favor on this issue.
¶ 17 The record shows that Kia offered Schweiger a refund of $3,306.24. In response, Schweiger wrote Kia explaining that Kia's refund calculation failed to include the $1,301 cost of the service contract that Schweiger purchased and financed. Kia declined to increase the offered refund.
¶ 18 The pertinent statutory provision states that the refund is calculated as follows: The vehicle manufacturer must
refund to the consumer and to any holder of a perfected security interest in the consumer's motor vehicle, as their interest may appear, the full purchase price plus any sales tax, finance charge, amount paid by the consumer at the point of sale and collateral costs, less a reasonable allowance for use.
Wis. Stat. § 218.0171(2)(b) 2.b.
¶ 19 Kia does not dispute that the cost of a service contract is an item to be included in the refund calculation under the statute. Kia argues, however, that its calculation of the refund included the service contract Schweiger purchased. We disagree.
¶ 20 Kia offers the following calculation in its briefing to justify the $3,306.24 refund it offered:
+---------------------------------------+
¦Vehicle purchase price: ¦$17,231.00¦
+----------------------------+----------¦
¦Sales tax: ¦557.26 ¦
+----------------------------+----------¦
¦Title/registration fees: ¦168.00 ¦
+----------------------------+----------¦
¦Manufacturer rebate: ¦–500.00 ¦
+----------------------------+----------¦
¦Allowance for mileage used: ¦–1,089.86 ¦
+----------------------------+----------¦
¦Amount owed to lender: ¦–13,060.16¦
+----------------------------+----------¦
¦Net refund due to Schweiger:¦$3,306.24 ¦
+---------------------------------------+
Schweiger, in contrast, offers this calculation:
+--------------------------------------+
¦Vehicle purchase price: ¦$17,231.00¦
+---------------------------+----------¦
¦Sales tax: ¦557.26 ¦
+---------------------------+----------¦
¦Title/registration fees: ¦168.00 ¦
+---------------------------+----------¦
¦Service contract: ¦1,301.00 ¦
+---------------------------+----------¦
¦Manufacturer rebate: ¦–500.00 ¦
+---------------------------+----------¦
¦Allowance for mileage used:¦–1,089.86 ¦
+---------------------------+----------¦
¦Amount owed to lender: ¦–13,060.16¦
+---------------------------+----------¦
¦Refund due Schweiger: ¦$4,607.24 ¦
+--------------------------------------+
¶ 21 Thus, the parties' refund calculations differ by exactly $1,301, the price Schweiger paid for the service contract. The reason for this discrepancy, as far as we can discern from the parties' briefing and the record, is simply that Kia omitted, and continues to omit, the cost of the service contract from its calculation.
¶ 22 Kia argues that its “proposed payoff to the lender [$13,060.16] would by definition refund the cost of the service contract.” Similarly, Kia argues that, “[b]y including the payoff to the [lender] in Kia's [refund] calculation, the cost of the...
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