Schweiker v. Chilicky

• Decision Date: 24 June 1988
• Docket Number: No. 86-1781,86-1781
• Citation: 101 L.Ed.2d 370,487 U.S. 412,108 S.Ct. 2460
• Parties: Richard SCHWEIKER, et al., Petitioners, v. James CHILICKY, et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

487 U.S. 412

108 S.Ct. 2460

101 L.Ed.2d 370

Richard SCHWEIKER, et al., Petitioners,

v James CHILICKY, et al.

No. 86-1781.

Argued March 1, 1988.

Decided June 24, 1988.

Syllabus

In 1980, Congress enacted legislation requiring that most disability determinations under Title II of the Social Security Act be reviewed at least once every three years. Under the "continuing disability review" (CDR) program, as originally implemented by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, benefits were usually terminated if the state agency performing the initial evaluation found that a claimant had become ineligible, and were not available during administrative appeals. Finding that benefits were frequently being improperly terminated by state agencies under CDR, only to be reinstated by a federal administrative law judge (ALJ) on appeal, Congress enacted reform legislation in 1983 and 1984, which, inter alia, provided for the continuation of benefits through the completion of ALJ review. Respondents, individuals whose Title II benefits were improperly terminated in 1981 and 1982, but were later restored, filed suit in Federal District Court. They alleged that petitioners, one Arizona and two federal officials who were CDR policymakers, had violated respondents' due process rights by adopting illegal policies that led to the benefits terminations. Respondents sought money damages from petitioners, in their individual capacities, for emotional distress and for loss of necessities proximately caused by petitioners' conduct. The court dismissed the case, but the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, noting that respondents' money damages claims were predicated on the constitutional tort theory of Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619, and concluding, inter alia, that it could not be determined as a matter of law that respondents could prove no state of facts warranting recovery.

Held: The improper denial of Social Security disability benefits, allegedly resulting from due process violations by petitioners in their administration of the CDR program, cannot give rise to a cause of action for money damages against petitioners. Pp. 420-429.

(a) A money damages remedy against federal officials for constitutional torts will not be devised by the courts where "special factors counse[l] hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress." Bivens, supra, at 396, 91 S.Ct., at 2005. Such "special factors" include the existence of statutory mechanisms giving meaningful remedies against the United States, even though those remedies do not provide "complete relief" to the claimant. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 76 L.Ed.2d 648. Thus, the courts must give appropriate deference to indications that congressional inaction has not been inadvertent, and should not create Bivens remedies when the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it considers to be adequate remedies for constitutional violations that may occur in the course of the program's administration. Pp. 420-423.

(b) Since the elaborate CDR remedial scheme devised by Congress does not include a money damages remedy against officials responsible for unconstitutional conduct that leads to the wrongful denial of benefits, such a remedy is unavailable. The present case is indistinguishable from Bush, supra. In both, Congress failed to authorize "complete relief" for emotional distress and other hardships, but Congress is presumed to have balanced governmental efficiency and individual rights in an acceptable manner. Moreover, congressional attention to problems in CDR administration (including the very problems that gave rise to this case) has been frequent and intense, as shown by the enactment of reform legislation on two occasions. Congress' unwillingness to provide compensation for consequential damages is at least as clear here as it was in Bush. Bush is not limited to its civil service context, since its reasoning—that Congress is in a better position than courts to decide whether the creation of a new substantive legal liability would serve the public interest applies as much, or more, in this case. Respondents' attempt to distinguish Bush on the ground that the plaintiff there received compensation for the constitutional violation itself, while respondents here have merely received benefits to which they would have been entitled had there been no constitutional violation, is not analytically meaningful, since the harm resulting from the alleged constitutional violation can in neither case be separated from the denial of the statutory right. The fact that respondents have not been fully compensated for the injury caused by lengthy delays in providing the benefits on which they depended for the necessities of life cannot be remedied by this Court. Congress is charged with designing welfare benefits programs, and with balancing the need for administrative efficiency against individual rights, and Congress has discharged that responsibility to the extent that it affects this case. Pp. 424-429.

796 F.2d 1131 (CA 9 1986), reversed.

O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined, and in all but n. 3 of which STEVENS, J., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. ---. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post p. ---.

Sol. Gen. Charles Fried, Washington, D.C., for petitioners.

Laurence H. Tribe, Cambridge, Mass., for respondents.

Justice O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case requires us to decide whether the improper denial of Social Security disability benefits, allegedly resulting from violations of due process by government officials who administered the federal Social Security program, may give rise to a cause of action for money damages against those officials. We conclude that such a remedy, not having been included in the elaborate remedial scheme devised by Congress, is unavailable.

I

A.

Under Title II of the Social Security Act (Act), the Federal Government provides disability benefits to individuals who have contributed to the Social Security program and who, because of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment, are unable to engage in substantial gainful work. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a), (d) (1982 ed. and Supp. IV). A very similar program for disabled indigents is operated under Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. IV), but those provisions are technically not at issue in this case. Title II, which is administered in conjunction with state welfare agencies, provides benefits only while an individual's statutory disability persists. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 421(a), 423(a)(1) (1982 ed. and Supp. IV). In 1980, Congress noted that existing administrative procedures provided for reexamination of eligibility "only under a limited number of circumstances." H.R.Cong.Rep. No. 96-944, p. 60 (1980); see also S.Rep. No. 96-408, pp. 60-61 (1979), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 1980, pp. 1277, 1338, 1408. Congress responded by enacting legislation requiring that most disability determinations be reviewed at least once every three years. Pub.L. 96-265, § 311(a), 94 Stat. 460, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 421(i) (1982 ed. and Supp. IV). Although the statute did not require this program for "continuing disability review" (CDR) to become effective before January 1, 1982, the Secretary of Health and Human Services initiated CDR in March 1981. See Pub.L. 96-265, § 311(b), 94 Stat. 460, note following 42 U.S.C. § 421; Brief for Petitioners 10.

The administration of the CDR program was at first modeled on the previous procedures for reexamination of eligibility. Under these procedures, an individual whose case is selected for review bears the burden of demonstrating the continuing existence of a statutory disability. The appropriate state agency performs the initial review, and persons who are found to have become ineligible are generally provided with administrative review similar to the review provided to new claimants. See 42 U.S.C. § 421(i) (1982 ed. and Supp. IV); Brief for Petitioners 10. Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335-339, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903-905, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). Under the original CDR procedures, benefits were usually terminated after a state agency found a claimant ineligible, and were not available during administrative appeals. See H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 98-1039, p. 33 (1984), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 1984, p. 3038.

Finding that benefits were too often being improperly terminated by state agencies, only to be reinstated by a federal administrative law judge (ALJ), Congress enacted temporary emergency legislation in 1983. This law provided for the continuation of benefits, pending review by an ALJ, after a state agency determined that an individual was no longer disabled. Pub.L. 97-455, § 2, 96 Stat. 2498; see also Pub.L. 98-118, § 2, 97 Stat. 803. In the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984 (1984 Reform Act), Congress extended this provision until January 1, 1988, and provided for a number of other significant changes in the administration of CDR. Pub.L. 98-460, §§ 2, 7, 98 Stat. 1794-1796, 1803-1804, 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(f), (g) (1982 ed. and Supp. IV). In its final form, this legislation was enacted without a single opposing vote in either Chamber. See 130 Cong.Rec. 26000, 26145-26146 (1984); see also id., at 6621; id., at 13247.

The problems to which Congress responded so emphatically were widespread. One of the cosponsors of the 1984 Reform Act, who had conducted hearings on the administration of CDR, summarized evidence from the General Accounting Office as follows:

"[T]he message perceived by the State agencies, swamped with cases, was to deny, deny, deny, and, I might add, to process cases faster and faster and...