Schweiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp., s. 92-2500

• Decision Date: 10 March 1993
• Docket Number: Nos. 92-2500,92-2647,s. 92-2500
• Citation: 987 F.2d 548
• Parties: 124 Lab.Cas. P 10,575, 8 IER Cases 886, 1993 O.S.H.D. (CCH) P 30,000 Ann C. SCHWEISS, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. CHRYSLER MOTORS CORPORATION, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 548

987 F.2d 548

124 Lab.Cas. P 10,575, 8 IER Cases 886,

1993 O.S.H.D. (CCH) P 30,000

Ann C. SCHWEISS, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. CHRYSLER MOTORS CORPORATION, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Nos. 92-2500, 92-2647.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 14, 1993.

Decided March 10, 1993.

John A. Lally, St. Louis, MO, argued (Thomas J. Casey and John A. Lally, on the brief), for appellant/cross-appellee.

Charles A. Newman, St. Louis, MO, argued (Charles A. Newman, Harry W. Wellford, Jr. and Ellen F. Cruickshank, on the brief), for appellee/cross-appellant.

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, FLOYD R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

Ann Schweiss worked for the Chrysler Motors Corporation from 1984 through early 1989, when she was discharged. The reason given for her discharge was chronic and excessive absenteeism. Ms. Schweiss sued Chrysler in state court in 1989, alleging that she had actually been fired because she had reported various health and safety violations to the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and that her discharge was therefore tortious under state law. Chrysler removed the case to federal court.

On motion, the trial court held that Ms. Schweiss's suit was preempted by federal statutes relating to employee health and safety and that those statutes provided no private right of action. This court reversed the preemption holding on appeal and remanded for consideration of whether Ms. Schweiss's suit was preempted by federal labor law instead. See Schweiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 922 F.2d 473 (8th Cir.1990). On remand, after additional briefing, the trial court ¹ held that the suit was not preempted by federal labor law but granted summary judgment to Chrysler nonetheless, ruling that Ms. Schweiss had failed to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact on the reason for her discharge. See Schweiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 782 F.Supp. 88 (E.D.Mo.1992). The trial court denied Ms. Schweiss's subsequent motion for reconsideration.

Ms. Schweiss appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Chrysler. On cross-appeal, Chrysler challenges the trial court's holdings that Ms. Schweiss has stated a claim under state law and that the claim is not preempted by federal labor law. Because we agree with the trial court that Ms. Schweiss has failed to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to why she was fired, we need not address the issues raised by Chrysler in its cross-appeal.

I.

In considering this retaliation case, we adopt the principles we have applied to retaliation cases in other contexts and use the "three-stage framework," Rath v. Selection Research, Inc., 978 F.2d 1087, 1089 (8th Cir.1992), applicable to discrimination cases in general. Under that construct, the plaintiff must initially establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing participation in a protected activity, subsequent adverse action by the employer, and some evidence of a causal connection between the protected activity of the plaintiff and the subsequent adverse action by the employer. See, e.g., id. at 1090. The evidence necessary to support the allegation of a causal connection for a prima facie case may be circumstantial, i.e., "proof that the discharge followed the protected activity so closely in time as to justify an inference of retaliatory motive." Id.

Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, "the employer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory [or nonretaliatory] reason for its actions. If the employer meets that burden, [the] plaintiff must prove that the proffered reason is pretextual." Id. at 1089-90. Pretext may be proved either "by persuading the court that a discriminatory [or retaliatory] reason more likely motivated the employer or ... by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is...