Schwindt v. Hernando Cnty.
| Decision Date | 16 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 8:13-CV-809-17EAJ |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
| Parties | SHARON SCHWINDT, Plaintiff, v. HERNANDO COUNTY, Defendant. |
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, filed May 4, 2015 (Dkt. # 31), to which Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, has responded in opposition (Dkt. # 33). For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted.
In this action, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff Sharon Schwindt alleges that Hernando County illegally seized three of her dogs, violating federal constitutional rights guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. Plaintiff maintains that her dogs remain impounded at Hernando County Animal Control, and she requests their release. (Dkt. # 27, pp. 1, 5-6).
Plaintiff originally filed this action in state court. (Dkts. # 1-1, 1-2, 1-3). On March 29, 2013, the County removed the case, invoking this Court's federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (Dkt. # 1). The Court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint, based on the deficiencies identified in the motion, and dismissed Plaintiff's complaint with leave to amend. (Dkts. # 6, 13). After Plaintiff filed an amended complaint (Dkt. # 17), the Court granted the County's motion to quash service and directed Plaintiffto effect service of process (Dkts. # 18, 20). On September 23, 2014, Plaintiff filed another "Amended Complaint." (Dkt. # 27). On February 16, 2015, the County waived service. (Dkt. # 30).
On May 4, 2015, the County filed the instant motion, arguing that the most recent Amended Complaint is confusing, vague, and conclusory. (Dkt. # 31). As detailed below, the Court agrees. The Amended Complaint does not clearly state the circumstances under which Plaintiff's dogs were removed, nor does the Amended Complaint plausibly allege that a constitutional violation occurred. In addition, as the County argues, the Amended Complaint fails to allege a basis for municipal liability under Section 1983. As a result, the Amended Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend.
The allegations of a pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). Nevertheless, pro se litigants must still comply with procedural rules. Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a plaintiff's complaint set out a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Therefore, to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff's complaint "must now contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Am. Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). In considering a motion to dismiss under this plausibility standard, courts follow a two-pronged approach. First, a court must "eliminate any allegations in [a] complaint that are merely legal conclusions." Id. at 1290 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). Then, a court must take any remaining well-pleaded factual allegations, "assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. (citing Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950) (internal quotation marks omitted). In sum, Rule 8's pleading standard "does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 creates a cause of action for the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the federal Constitution or federal law, by any person acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Arrington v. Cobb Cnty., 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998). To state a Section 1983 claim against a municipality, such as the County, Plaintiff must allege that: (1) her constitutional rights were violated; (2) the County had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to her constitutional rights; and (3) the policy or custom caused the violation. McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). An underlying constitutional injury must be found before examining the municipality's policy or custom. Rooney v. Watson, 101 F.3d1378, 1381 (11th Cir.1996).
The Court first addresses whether Plaintiff sufficiently alleges a violation of the Fourth, Fifth, Fourteenth, or Fifteenth Amendments. The Court then considers whether Plaintiff adequately alleges that any violation was caused by the County's policy or custom. As discussed below, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is deficient in both respects.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures and mandates that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures is made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61, 113 S.Ct. 538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992). "The chief evil against which the Fourth Amendment is directed is a government agent's warrantless entry into a person's home." Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). A warrantless and nonconsensual search or seizure "violates the Fourth Amendment unless it is supported by both probable cause and exigent circumstances." Id.
The Amended Complaint fails to plausibly allege that Plaintiff was subjected to an unconstitutional search or seizure. Most problematic, the Amended Complaint does not clearly set forth the circumstances under which Plaintiff's dogs were removed on the day in question, February 20, 2013. (Dkt. # 27, p. 1). For instance, Plaintiff does not allege who removed the dogs. Plaintiff does not specify whether the dogs were removed from her residence or from a public area. Plaintiff does not explain the grounds for removal, or thewritten authority, if any, authorizing the removal. Although Plaintiff alleges that deputies knocked on her door (Dkt. # 27, p. 3), that action alone does not demonstrate a constitutional violation. Morris v. Town of Lexington, 748 F.3d 1316, 1324 (11th Cir. 2014). Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim is therefore dismissed.
Plaintiff also claims an unspecified violation of the Fifth Amendment. (Dkt. # 27, p. 6). To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to allege a violation of the Fifth Amendment's "Just Compensation Clause," that claim is due to be dismissed.
The Just Compensation Clause provides that private property may not "be taken for public use, without just compensation," and is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. V; Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617, 121 S.Ct. 2448, 2457, 150 L.Ed.2d 592 (2001). In order to allege a violation of the Just Compensation Clause, a plaintiff typically asserts that her property was taken for public use, without appropriate compensation. Busse v. Lee County, 317 F. App'x 968, 971-72 (11th Cir. 2009). Alternatively, a plaintiff may allege that her property was taken "for the purpose of conferring a private benefit on a particular private party," which is unlawful regardless of whether the taking is compensated. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2661, 162 L.Ed.2d 439 (2005). As a general rule, the seizure of neglected animals falls within the state's general police power and therefore does not constitute a taking for public use or private benefit. Porter v. DiBlasio, 93 F.3d 301, 310 (7th Cir. 1996); Young v. County of Hawaii, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1103 (D. Haw. 2013).
The Amended Complaint does not include any facts suggesting that Plaintiff's dogswere taken for public use or to confer a particular benefit on a private party. Indeed, because Plaintiff maintains that the dogs are in the custody of Hernando County Animal Control (Dkt. # 27, p. 6), the Amended Complaint suggests that the dogs were removed pursuant to the County's general police power, which includes the rescue of animals and abatement of nuisances. Porter, 93 F.3d at 310. Under the facts currently pled, Plaintiff is unable to state a claim pursuant to the Just Compensation Clause. Id.; Young, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1103; Wilson v. Sarasota County, No. 8:10-cv-489, 2011 WL 5117566, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 25, 2011).
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that "[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 'The Due Process Clause provides two different kinds of constitutional protections: procedural due process and substantive due process." Maddox v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 1109, 1118 (11th Cir. 2013).
In order to state a procedural due process violation, Plaintiff must allege: ...
To continue reading
Request your trial