Sciandra v. Shovlin
| Decision Date | 30 June 1965 |
| Citation | 211 A.2d 437,418 Pa. 378 |
| Parties | Angeline SCIANDRA, Administratrix of the Estate of Anthony Sciandra, Deceased, v. Francis SHOVLIN, Defendant, and Myrle J. Swingle, Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Patrick J. Toole, Jr., Wilkes-Barre, for appellants.
J Earl Langan, Pittston, for appellee.
Before BELL C. J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.
At about 9 p m., January 7, 1961, Anthony Sciandra, age 32, started on foot to cross South Main Street in Pittston, walking from the west to the east side, when an automobile driven by Francis Shovlin, headed southwardly, struck him, hurling his body several feet into the air. As it descended, it was struck again by an automobile driven by Myrle J. Swingle which was proceedings northwardly. Sciandra died three hours later.
His widow, as administratrix of his estate, brought suit against both Shovlin and Swingle, averring concurrent negligence. At the trial, the judge charged the jury:
The jury returned a verdict in favor of both defendants and, upon proper motion, the Court ordered a new trial stating it had committed fundamental error in charging the jury that it was not permissible to return a verdict against either defendant, individually
The defendant Swingle appealed, contending that the Court's charge was proper because the facts would not support a verdict against either defendant alone. The record reveals evidence as to the force of the impacts caused by the Shovlin and the Swingle cars. Damage done to the individual cars shed further light on the manner in which Sciandra was struck and the injuries he probably sustained because of the separate collisions. Thus, there were facts from which the jury could make a reasonable determination that if both defendants were not concurrently negligent, one of them, individually, may have caused Sciandra's death.
In Coyne v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 393 Pa. 326, 141 A.2d 830, this Court said:
'Equally and relevant is this Court's pronouncement in the case of Burrell Tp. v. Uncapher, 117 Pa. 353, 363, where we said: 'If the defendant's negligence concurred with some other event (other than the plaintiff's fault) to produce the plaintiff's injury, so that it clearly appears that but for such negligence the injury would not have happened, and both circumstances are closely connected with the injury in the order of events, the defendant is responsible, even though his negligence act was not the nearest cause in the order of time.'
In the case at bar, the jury could find under the evidence and the applicable law that the first driver was liable not only for the injuries then inflicted but also for the death that followed. On the other hand, the jury could as fairly conclude that, under the evidence, the driver of the first car was not negligent but the second driver was. It could also find from a comparison of the effects of the two impacts upon the decedent's body and the corresponding vehicles that the first impact would not have been sufficient to cause the decedent's death but that the second impact did accomplish that result. In that event, the fact that the original injuries inflicted by the first impact may have contributed to the death would not insulate the driver of the second car from liability since a tortfeasor is liable to the full extent of the damage inflicted, even though that damage would not have been so great had there not been an already existing condition which was aggravated by the tortfeasor's misconduct.
In the case of Brazel v. Buchanan, 404 Pa. 188, 171 A.2d 151, William Brazel, while in an intoxicated condition, was struck by an automobile. As he lay inertly in the street he was struck by a second motorist, Buchanan, who defended against a charge of negligence by asserting that Brazel's eventual injuries resulted from his own original inebriation. We said that:
'So far as Buchanan is concerned, he entered on to the stage of events as an actor in a play wholly different from the one which had already ended with the curtain falling on Brazel's lying motionless in the highway.'
Thus, here, Swingle knew of Sciandra's presence in the area he, Swingle, was to traverse. He had seen him in the middle of the street when he was still 80 feet away. It was his duty, therefore, to have his car under such control that he could stop to avoid an accident which was foreseeable and thus preventible. He was asked:
'Why didn't you come to...
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