Sclafani v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp.
| Decision Date | 17 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. CV 12–3013 SVW. |
| Citation | 14 F.Supp.3d 1351 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
| Parties | David SCLAFANI, et al., Plaintiffs, v. AIR & LIQUID SYSTEMS CORPORATION, et al., Defendants. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Defendants' motion granted. Benno B. Ashrafi, Josiah W. Parker, Ari Scott Friedman, Carlos J.E. Guzman, Weitz and Luxenberg PC, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiffs.
Glen R. Powell, Richard R. Ames, Gordon and Rees LLP, Lance Wilson, Tucker Ellis West LLP, Charles S. Park, Edward R. Hugo, Karleen Frances Murphy, Shaghig D. Agopian, Thomas Jeffrey Moses, Brydon Hugo and Parker, Reshma A. Bajaj, Bassi Edlin Huie and Blum LLP, San Francisco, CA, John F. Hughes, Gordon and Rees LLP, Oakland, CA, Rod J. Cappy, Selman Breitman LLP, Suzanna Lianna Minasian, Maryam Danishwar Foley and Mansfield PLLP, Nathan T. Newman, Tucker Ellis LLP, Bradley W. Gunning, Daniel Scott Hurwitz, Geoffrey M. Davis, Michele C. Barnes, Stephen P. Farkas, K & L Gates LLP, Farah Sohaili Nicol, William J. Sayers, McKenna Long and Aldridge LLP, Charles William Jenkins, Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman and Dicker LLP, Elan N. Stone, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard and Smith LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Nina I. Webb–Lawton, Vorys Sater Seymour and Pease LLP, Columbus, OH, Arpi Galfayan, Carla Lynn Crochet, Jeremy David Milbrodt, Prindle Amaro Goetz Hillyard Barnes and Reinholtz LLP, Long Beach, CA, for Defendants.
ORDER ON JOINT DEFENSE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING CAUSATION [339, 340, 342, 345]
This is a wrongful death product liability action brought by the survivors of David Sclafani. It is undisputed that Sclafani died from mesothelioma, a cancer associated with exposure to asbestos. Defendants' motion addresses one prong of the liability analysis: causation. For purposes of resolving the motion, the Court assumes that defendants manufactured or supplied products containing asbestos, and that Sclafani came into contact with those products during his four years of service in the Navy. The sole issue for decision is whether there is a genuine factual dispute over causation, specifically, whether Sclafani's exposure to defendants' products “was, in reasonable medical probability, a substantial factor in causing or contributing to his risk of developing cancer.” Rutherford v. Owens–Illinois, Inc., 16 Cal.4th 953, 957–58, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 16, 941 P.2d 1203 (1997).
Decedent David Sclafani enlisted in the Navy in January of 1960, serving as a boiler technician aboard the U.S.S. Morton from 1960 until 1963 and the U.S.S. Rogers for approximately six months in 1963. Among other things, Sclafani performed maintenance and repair work on various pumps, valves, and boilers aboard each ship. Sclafani claims that while working with these pumps, valves, and boilers, he inhaled asbestos-laden dust which later caused him to develop mesothelioma, the disease that caused his death.
Plaintiffs originally brought suit against twenty-nine defendants, alleging various causes of action under California law. Twenty-five of the defendants eventually settled or were otherwise dismissed from the action. On May 23, 2013, the four remaining defendants—Air and Liquids Systems Corporation (successor to Buffalo Pumps, Inc.), Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, Foster Wheeler LLC, and Crane Co.—filed a joint motion for summary judgment on the issue of causation. (Dkt. 300). After Sclafani passed away, proceedings on the summary judgment motion were temporarily stayed. On August 15, 2013, Sclafani's survivors filed an amended complaint. Three of the defendants subsequently re-noticed their original summary judgment motion. The parties have relied on the briefing previously submitted in connection with the original motion.1 ( See Dkt. 340 at 1.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires summary judgment for the moving party when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Tarin v. County of Los Angeles, 123 F.3d 1259, 1263 (9th Cir.1997). “[I]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party's evidence ‘is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [that party's] favor.’ ” Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552, 119 S.Ct. 1545, 143 L.Ed.2d 731 (1999) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).
The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party may satisfy this burden by “ ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and identify specific facts that show a genuine issue for trial. See id. at 323–24, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A scintilla of evidence or evidence that is merely colorable or not significantly probative does not present a genuine issue of material fact. Addisu v. Fred Meyer, 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir.2000). Only genuine disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law— i.e., “where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party”—will preclude entry of summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
III. DISCUSSIONA. Standard of Proof for Causation
The California Supreme Court's decision in Rutherford v. Owens–Illinois, Inc. set forth the “controlling two-part test for determining whether exposure to asbestos from a particular product was a legal cause of a plaintiff's injury in an asbestos-induced personal injury case.” Miranda v. Bomel Const. Co., Inc., 187 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1338, 115 Cal.Rptr.3d 538 (2010). First, the plaintiff must “establish some threshold exposure to the defendant's defective asbestos-containing products.” Rutherford, 16 Cal.4th at 982, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 16, 941 P.2d 1203. Second, the plaintiff must establish to a “reasonable medical probability that a particular exposure or series of exposures was a ‘legal cause’ of his injury, i.e., a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.” Id.
Rutherford confirmed that in an asbestos personal injury action based on a products liability theory, as here, “the burden falls on the plaintiff to establish causation.” Id. at 968, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 16, 941 P.2d 1203. The plaintiff “must prove that the defective products supplied by the defendant were a substantial factor in bringing about his or her injury.” Id. The state high court rejected the plaintiff's invitation to shift the burden to manufacturers and distributors of asbestos-containing products to prove that their products did not in fact cause the plaintiff's injuries. See id. at 969–83, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 16, 941 P.2d 1203. Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that “there is scientific uncertainty regarding the biological mechanisms by which inhalation of certain microscopic fibers of asbestos leads to lung cancer and mesothelioma,” and that the question of “which particular fiber or fibers actually caused the cancer to begin forming” is “apparently unanswerable.” Id. at 974–75, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 16, 941 P.2d 1203. In view of these problems of proof, the California Supreme Court concluded that the following standard should govern in asbestos product liability cases:
[P]laintiffs may prove causation in asbestos-related cancer cases by demonstrating that the plaintiff's exposure to defendant's asbestos-containing product in reasonable medical probability was a substantial factor in contributing to the aggregate dose of asbestos the plaintiff or decedent inhaled or ingested, and hence to the risk of developing asbestos-related cancer, without the need to demonstrate that fibers from the defendant's particular product were the ones, or among the ones, that actually produced the malignant growth.
Id. at 976–77, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 16, 941 P.2d 1203 (footnote omitted). To guard against jurors erroneously holding plaintiffs to a higher standard of “prov[ing] that fibers from the defendant's product were a substantial factor actually contributing to the development of the plaintiff's or decedent's cancer,” the court held that jurors should be instructed that a particular asbestos-containing product is a “substantial factor” in causing the plaintiff's injury “if in reasonable medical probability it contributed to the plaintiff or decedent's risk of developing cancer.” Id. at 977, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 16, 941 P.2d 1203.
B. The Role of Expert Medical Testimony in Establishing Causation
Under California law, “[a]lthough juries are normally permitted to decide issues of causation without guidance from experts, the unknown and mysterious etiology of cancer is beyond the experience of laymen and can only be explained through expert testimony.” Jones v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 163 Cal.App.3d 396, 403, 209 Cal.Rptr. 456 (1985); accord Miranda, 187 Cal.App.4th at 1336, 115 Cal.Rptr.3d 538 () (quoting Jones, 163 Cal.App.3d at 402, 209 Cal.Rptr. 456). The Court of Appeal explained:
In the absence of factual circumstances of probability understandable to a jury there must be some scientific testimony that can be interpreted as an inference of hypothetical probability before we can allow a jury to speculate upon the rights of citizens. If the experts cannot predict probability in these situations, it is difficult to see how courts can expect a jury of laymen to be able to do...
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