SCM Corp. v. United States
Decision Date | 11 June 1979 |
Docket Number | Court No. 77-4-00553.,C.R.D. 79-11 |
Citation | 473 F. Supp. 791 |
Parties | SCM CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES (Brother International Corporation, Party-In-Interest), Defendant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) |
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Barbara Allen Babcock, Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D. C. (David M. Cohen, Washington, D. C., Branch Director, Federal Programs Branch, Sheila N. Ziff, New York City, trial atty.), for defendant.
Tanaka, Walders & Ritger (H. William Tanaka, Lawrence R. Walders and Wesley K. Caine, Washington, D. C., of counsel), for party-in-interest.
This is an American manufacturer's action brought by SCM Corporation SCM, a domestic typewriter manufacturer, under the provisions of 19 U.S.C. § 1516(c). Plaintiff, SCM, seeks to review the failure of the Secretary of the Treasury to assess dumping duties on certain Japanese typewriters under the terms of the Antidumping Act of 1921, as amended.
For dumping duties to be assessed, it is necessary that the Secretary of the Treasury determine that a class or kind of imported merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States or elsewhere at less then fair value. In addition, the International Trade Commission must determine that an industry in this country is being, or is likely to be, injured, or is prevented from being established by reason of the importation of such merchandise at less than fair value. It is only when both of these determinations are made in the affirmative, i. e., less than fair value and injury, that dumping duties may be assessed. Thus, if the Secretary finds no sales at less than fair value, or if the International Trade Commission makes a negative injury determination, no dumping finding can be published and no dumping duties can be assessed. 19 U.S.C. § 160 et seq. ("Antidumping Act").
The history and underlying issues of this litigation are discussed in SCM Corporation v. United States (Brother International Corporation, Party-in-Interest), 450 F.Supp. 1178, 80 Cust.Ct. 226 (1978), in which this court decided that it had jurisdiction to review the negative injury determination of the International Trade Commission.
During the course of the litigation, plaintiff, by interrogatories, sought from the defendant, among other things, all documents and things in the files of the International Trade Commission and each Commissioner in investigation number AA1921-145. In response, defendant categorized and identified all of the documents and things that it claimed were in the files of the Commission or Commissioners at the time of the negative injury determination.
Defendant did not produce the documents requested, and plaintiff sought an order compelling discovery. Defendant filed a cross-motion for a protective order, and moved to be relieved from responding to plaintiff's interrogatories and motion to produce.
The court entered an order requiring that the Secretary of the International Trade Commission prepare and transmit to the Clerk of the United States Customs Court, the following:
(1) A certified copy of the transcript of proceedings, and all exhibits introduced before the Commission in its investigation numbered AA1921-145;
(2) Certified copies of all written submissions, questionnaires, reports and other documents which relate to investigation AA1921-145;
(3) All other things in the files of the Commission relating to that investigation.
The order further provided that the denial of defendant's cross-motion for a protective order was without prejudice, and was subject to renewal for the documents or things that were received by the Commission on a confidential basis, or that were otherwise privileged. SCM Corporation v. United States (Brother International Corporation, Party-in-Interest), 81 Cust.Ct. 159, C.R.D. 78-13 (1978).
In compliance with that order, copies of all documents, confidential and nonconfidential, were transmitted to the court. Based upon a claim of executive privilege asserted by the Honorable Joseph O. Parker, Chairman of the International Trade Commission, the defendant now moves for a protective order as to nine (9) documents. A formal affidavit executed by Chairman Parker was submitted and attached to defendant's brief.
When defendant, in response to plaintiff's discovery request, identified every document and thing in the files, it identified only one of the nine documents now claimed to be privileged, i. e., item No. 44, the "pros and cons" statement. Defendant contends that it has validly asserted privilege not only as to document No. 44, but also as to the other eight documents not previously identified.
The nine disputed documents listed by the defendant are described as follows:
Plaintiff's opposition to the defendant's motion for a protective order is based upon its contention that the claim of executive privilege has been waived by defendant's conduct, and, that, in any event, it has not been properly invoked. Plaintiff also maintains that the privilege against interagency advisory opinions is not absolute but qualified.
Plaintiff states that, in response to its discovery request, defendant identified only one of the nine documents now claimed to be privileged, item No. 44, the "pros and cons" statement. At that time, this document was not produced by the defendant on the ground that it was outside the scope of judicial review in these proceedings. Consequently, it is plaintiff's contention that, since the defendant based its refusal to produce item No. 44 solely upon the scope of judicial review, the defendant has waived its claim of privilege.
The plaintiff also contends that, when asked to identify and produce, the defendant's response did not identify the eight additional documents produced after the court entered its order requiring production of all documents and things in the files of the Commission and Commissioners. Plaintiff argues that the defendant has offered no explanation for its failure to produce except that the eight documents were recently located. Also as to these documents, therefore, plaintiff contends that the defendant's conduct is tantamount to a waiver of its claim of executive privilege.
Plaintiff submits an additional reason to deny the defendant's motion for a protective order. It asserts that the claim of executive privilege must be made by the "head" of the department or agency who must personally review the matter to determine whether the privilege should be invoked, and that the Chairman of the International Trade Commission is not the appropriate official to invoke the privilege for that agency.
Finally, plaintiff urges that the privilege which attaches to interagency advisory communications does not apply "to purely factual communications within or...
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In re sealed Case
...privilege exists to aid the governmental decisionmaking process, a waiver should not be lightly inferred." SCM Corp. v. United States, 82 Cust.Ct. 351, 473 F.Supp. 791, 796 (1979); see also Nixon v. Sirica (Sirica), 487 F.2d 700, 717 (D.C.Cir. 1973) (explicit statement by President Nixon th......
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Sealed Case, In re
...privilege exists to aid the governmental decisionmaking process, a waiver should not be lightly inferred." SCM Corp. v. United States, 82 Cust.Ct. 351, 473 F.Supp. 791, 796 (1979); see also Nixon v. Sirica (Sirica), 487 F.2d 700, 717 (D.C.Cir.1973) (explicit statement by President Nixon tha......
- SCM Corp. v. United States
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Leopold v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Action No. 19-1278 (RBW)
...F.3d at 740, and because "a waiver [of this privilege] should not be lightly inferred," id. at 741 (quoting SCM Corp. v. United States, 82 Cust. Ct. 351, 356, 473 F.Supp. 791 (1979) ); see also Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 717 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (concluding that President Nixon's statement ......