Scofield v. Quinn

• Decision Date: 28 June 1893
• Citation: 55 N.W. 745,54 Minn. 9
• Parties: SCOFIELD v QUINN.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

54 Minn. 9

55 N.W. 745

SCOFIELDvQUINN.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 28, 1893.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

In an action, under the statute, to determine adverse claims to real estate, the defendant asserted title by a conveyance from the plaintiff to her (plaintiff's) mother, and by devise from the latter to the defendant. In reply, the plaintiff alleged that, simultaneously with the delivery of the deed (quitclaim) to her mother, the latter executed and delivered to her a written instrument, not under seal, (set forth in full,) referring to the deed, and declaring the intention of the parties to be that the grantee should hold only a life estate; it being pleaded also that this was in accordance with the agreement of the parties, and that the two instruments were parts of the same transaction, and were intended to carry into effect the agreement and purpose to convey a life estate. The conveyance was made upon considerations of filial duty. Held, that the two instruments should be read together, to ascertain the intention of the parties. It being apparent that the parties intended the unsealed writing to qualify the deed referred to therein, equity will afford relief, and carry that intention into effect, notwithstanding it was not so executed as to affect in law the absolute terms of the deed. Upon the facts alleged in the reply, (in this statutory action,) the plaintiff was entitled to relief in equity, and it was error to grant judgment for the defendant on the pleadings.

Appeal from district court, Hennepin county; Lochren, Judge.

Action by Annie E. Scofield against Jennie E. Quinn to determine the validity of adverse claims to realty. Defendant had judgment, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

R. J. Burglehaus and F. V. Brown, for appellant.

J. F. Fitzpatrick, for respondent.

DICKINSON, J.

On motion of the defendant, judgment was rendered in her favor on the pleadings, and the plaintiff appealed therefrom. The plaintiff being in the possession of certain real estate, and asserting title thereto, instituted the action under the statute to determine adverse claims asserted by the defendant. The defendant, this respondent, answered, setting up title through a conveyance made by the plaintiff to Margaret Brosseau in 1879, and who died in 1888, leaving a will, by which she devised to this respondent an undivided one-fourth of the premises. The plaintiff replied, setting forth this state of facts: The plaintiff was a daughter of Margaret Brosseau, who had no home, and was in indigent circumstances. For the purpose of providing a home for her mother, the plaintiff proposed to give to her a life estate in the land in question, and for the purpose of doing so the plaintiff executed a quitclaim deed of conveyance to her mother in such form as would have conveyed the whole estate. The deed was executed in August, but was not delivered until October 21st, at which time, for the purpose of limiting the grant to a life estate, in accordance with the agreement of the parties, Margaret Brosseau made, signed, and executed, and delivered to the plaintiff, simultaneously with the delivery of the deed of conveyance, and as a part of the same transaction, this instrument in writing: “Oct. 21st, 1879. Bloomington, Findley Farm. I, Margaret Brosseau, do agree and promise to my daughter, Annie E. Findley Scofield, not to bargain, sell, or dispose, without her consent, the lands lying in Bloomington, known as the ‘Findley Farm,’ conveyed to me by quitclaim deed the 23d of August, 1879, it being understood between us that I shall hold only a life estate in said land. Signed and delivered by me, Margaret Brosseau.” If this instrument and the deed therein referred to are to be read together as though they had been but one instrument, and effect given to both according to the expressed intention of the parties, the grant should be construed as being only of a life estate. The language of the above-recited instrument clearly indicates that such was the intention of the grantee, and according to the allegations of the reply,-the truth of which is to be taken as admitted,-such was also the intention of the grantor, evinced by requiring the execution of that instrument and by her acceptance of it when she delivered her deed, and as a part of the same transaction. It would seem to be difficult, reading the two instruments together, to attribute to the parties any other intention. It is of secondary importance in what part of the instruments the intention is expressed, if, notwithstanding any technical impropriety in the...