Scokin v. State of Tex.

• Decision Date: 27 January 1984
• Docket Number: No. 82-1600,82-1600
• Citation: 723 F.2d 432
• Parties: 15 Ed. Law Rep. 122 Mauricio and Dina SCOKIN, Individually and as Next Friend of Davina Scokin, A Minor, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The STATE OF TEXAS, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 432

723 F.2d 432

15 Ed. Law Rep. 122

Mauricio and Dina SCOKIN, Individually and as Next Friend of Davina Scokin, A Minor, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The STATE OF TEXAS, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 82-1600.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Jan. 27, 1984.

James Todd, Austin, Tex., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Conde Thompson Cox, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, Tex., for State.

Henry Akin, Catherine A. Akin, Dallas, Tex., for Richardson Independent School Dist. et al.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before BROWN, THORNBERRY and TATE, Circuit Judges.

THORNBERRY, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs Mauricio and Dina Scokin, on behalf of their developmentally disabled daughter Davina, filed this suit seeking monetary and injunctive relief related to their unilateral decision to withdraw Davina from the Richardson Independent School District and place her at the Institute of Logopedics, a private residential institution. The action was brought under the Education of All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. Secs. 1401-1461 (EAHCA), section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794, and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Defendants are Richardson Independent School District (RISD), the State of Texas, the Texas Education Agency, the State Board of Education, the Cooperative Behavioral Center and various school officials.

In district court, the Scokins argued that defendants were not providing Davina with a free appropriate education as required by the EAHCA, and that the appropriate placement for Davina was at a residential facility. They requested the court to order RISD to finance Davina's education at the Institute of Logopedics, and to reimburse them for past expenses incurred in Davina's private placement with the Institute. The district court held: (1) plaintiff's claim for monetary and injunctive relief under the EAHCA was barred by limitations; (2) by unilaterally withdrawing Davina from RISD, plaintiffs forfeited all rights to recover tuition for the private residential facility; (3) defendants have in the past, and can currently provide Davina with a free appropriate education; and (4) there is no evidence to support plaintiffs' claims that their rights under the Rehabilitation Act or the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment were denied.

At oral argument before this court, plaintiffs stated that Davina is no longer at the Institute of Logopedics and there was no need to address the issue of injunctive relief. They now seek only reimbursement of costs incurred during Davina's stay at that facility.

The issues addressed in this opinion are whether the district court applied the appropriate statute of limitations and whether plaintiffs are precluded by law from recovering costs incurred as a result of their unilateral action. We affirm the district court's holding that plaintiffs are not entitled to reimbursement in this case. We also hold that the 30-day statute of limitations applied by the district court is inconsistent with the goals and policies of the EAHCA.

I. Background

Davina Scokin, now fifteen years old, has been diagnosed as having a serious speech disorder with an overlay of emotional problems. From 1973 to 1976, Davina was enrolled at the Children's Development Center in Dallas, Texas, at the recommendation and expense of RISD. In August 1976, at the recommendation of the Central Admissions, Review and Dismissal Committee of RISD, Davina was placed at the Cooperative Behavioral Center (CBC). The CBC serves RISD students with the primary handicapping condition of emotional disturbance or autism. The facility emphasizes behavioral training and operates six hours a day for nine months, with one additional month of summer school.

At the CBC, Davina was classified as having a primary handicapping condition of emotional disturbance, and was assigned to a class with other emotionally disturbed children. During the 1976-77 school year, Davina made some progress. At the beginning of the next school year (1977-78), however, Davina regressed significantly. The district court found several reasons for this regression: (1) the summer vacation; (2) her older brother leaving for college; (3) the cognitive levels of her fellow students; and (4) a temporary lack of qualified teacher aides. Despite this initial regression, the district court found that during the 1977-78 school year Davina benefitted from the instruction and facilities at the CBC.

In the middle of the 1977-78 school year, Davina's parents requested that RISD place Davina at the Institute of Logopedics in Wichita, Kansas. They pursued this request through administrative channels for one year, until the State Board of Education denied the Scokins' request in January 1979. In June 1978, when the Scokins were halfway through their administrative appeals, they unilaterally withdrew Davina from the CBC and placed her at the Institute of Logopedics. Nine months after the State Board of Education decision, the Scokins filed this suit in federal district court.

II. Statute of Limitations

The EAHCA establishes a procedural scheme by which parents or guardians of handicapped children may appeal decisions relating to their child's public education. ¹ After the last administrative appeal before the state educational agency, a parent or guardian may appeal to a state or federal district court. 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(e)(2) provides in relevant part:

[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision made [by the state educational agency] shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented pursuant to this section, which action may be brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States without regard to the amount in controversy. In any action brought under this paragraph the court shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.

The statute is silent as to the appropriate limitations period for such actions. When a federal statute creates a right but does not specify a period of limitations, federal courts generally determine which state cause of action is most analogous to the federally created cause of action. If the limitations period applicable to the analogous state cause of action is consistent with the underlying policy of the federal act, the court will borrow that limitations period and apply it to the federal cause of action. Occidental Life Insurance Company of California v. E.E.O.C., 432 U.S. 355, 97 S.Ct. 2447, 2455, 53 L.Ed.2d 402 (1977).

The most analogous state cause of action to a suit filed under the EAHCA would seem to be an appeal from a state agency to a state court. In Texas, such appeals are governed generally by a thirty-day statute of limitations. TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 6252-13a (Vernon Supp.1982-1983) (Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act). The district court in the present case applied this statute and held that the Scokins' claims, filed nine months after the State Board of Education decision, were barred. ² On appeal, plaintiffs argue that this thirty-day period is not the appropriate limitations period to apply to actions brought under the EAHCA. We agree.

Other circuit courts have addressed the question of which period of limitations is appropriate for EAHCA actions and have arrived at varying conclusions. In Monahan v. Nebraska, 491 F.Supp. 1074, 1083-85 (D.Neb.1980), modified, 645 F.2d 592 (8th Cir.1981), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 1252, 75 L.Ed.2d 481 (1983), the court rejected the Nebraska thirty-day statute governing administrative appeals. That court noted that in determining which state statute of limitations should apply to a federal claim, a court must find not only that the state and federal causes of action are similar, but that the proceedings in each action are analogous as well. Under the EAHCA, the court bases its decision on a preponderance of the evidence. Plaintiffs can request consideration of additional evidence, and the court can grant any appropriate relief. 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(e)(2). The Nebraska thirty-day statute of limitations at issue in Monahan applies to a more limited proceeding. Under that statute, judicial review is limited to a determination of "whether the agency decision is based on substantial evidence or is arbitrary and capricious." 491 F.Supp. at 1084. Parties are not entitled to a trial de novo of factual issues. For that reason, the court in Monahan held that the Nebraska thirty-day administrative appeal statute of limitations was not sufficiently analogous to an action brought under the EAHCA.

The same issue was addressed by the Third Circuit in Tokarcik v. Forest Hills School District, 665 F.2d 443 (3rd Cir.1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121, 102 S.Ct. 3508, 73 L.Ed.2d 1383 (1982). The appellants in that case suggested several Pennsylvania statutes of thirty days or less as appropriate analogies. Some of those statutes, unlike the Nebraska statute, provide for de novo review and "therefore approach the extent of judicial review contemplated in 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415." Tokarcik, 665 F.2d at 450 n. 11. The court, however, added that there were significant distinctions between a state appeal and an EAHCA action. One difference is that parties appealing under the Pennsylvania statute do not switch to a federal system after having dealt with a state system. The court also noted that the issues and evidence involved in a state agency appeal may be much less complex than an EAHCA action. 665 F.2d at 450-51 n. 11.

The court in Tokarcik also found that a thirty-day limitations period was inconsistent with the underlying policies of the EAHCA. The court noted that by creating an independent cou...