Scott Bridge Co. v. Wright
| Citation | 883 So.2d 1221 |
| Parties | SCOTT BRIDGE COMPANY v. Michael WRIGHT. |
| Decision Date | 19 December 2003 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Alabama |
Arnold W. Umbach III and Colin R. Stockton of Bradley Arant Rose & White, LLP, Birmingham; and Stanley A. Martin, Opelika, for appellant.
Clay Hornsby of Morris, Haynes & Hornsby, Birmingham, for appellee.
Scott Bridge Company appeals, pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R.App. P., from the trial court's order denying its motion for a summary judgment in a retaliatory-discharge action filed against it by Michael Wright. We reverse the trial court's order and render a judgment for Scott Bridge Company.
Scott Bridge Company hired Michael Wright on June 26, 1997, as a carpenter on a bridge-construction project in Georgia. When he was hired, Wright was a resident of Georgia. Wright claims that he suffered an on-the-job injury on March 18, 1998, while working on a bridge project in Augusta, Georgia. On or about September 28, 1998, Wright filed a claim for benefits with the Georgia State Board of Workers' Compensation. Wright never sought benefits under the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act. In October 1998, Scott Bridge assigned Wright to work at its office in Opelika, where he remained employed until he was discharged on April 21, 2000.
The trial court then amended that order, finding expressly that "Plaintiff never sought workers' compensation benefits in Alabama, but claims only that he sought workers' compensation benefits in Georgia." Continuing, the trial court observed that "Alabama law may recognize a claim for retaliatory discharge, pursuant to Ala. Code § 25-5-11.1, based on the facts alleged by Plaintiff." Scott Bridge then filed with this Court a petition for permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R.App. P. We granted the petition.
This Court reviews de novo a trial court's interpretation of a statute, because only a question of law is presented. Simcala, Inc. v. American Coal Trade, Inc., 821 So.2d 197, 200 (Ala.2001).
This Court has repeatedly embraced the rule that an employee at will may be discharged for any reason, including a "wrong" reason, or for no reason. For a recent example of our reiteration of this long-standing rule, see Coca Cola Bottling Co. Consolidated v. Hollander, [Ms. 1020520, October 31, 2003] ___ So.2d ___ (Ala.2003), and the cases cited therein.
Section 25-5-11.1 provides, in pertinent part:
"No employee shall be terminated by an employer solely because the employee has instituted or maintained any action against the employer to recover workers' compensation benefits under this chapter...."
(Emphasis added.) This statutory provision prohibiting retaliatory discharge was enacted in response to this Court's 5-4 decision in Meeks v. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc., 459 So.2d 814 (Ala.1984), where the Court acknowledged the employment at-will doctrine and refused to recognize an exception in a case in which an employee maintained that his discharge from employment was the result of his having filed a workers' compensation claim. In Meeks, this Court referred to Bender Ship Repair, Inc. v. Stevens, 379 So.2d 594 (Ala.1980), in which the Court had refused to recognize an exception to the at-will doctrine for an employee who alleged that he had been fired because he had missed work to serve on a grand jury. After Bender Ship Repair was released, as the opinion in Meeks points out, the Legislature enacted § 12-16-8.1, Ala.Code 1975, creating a remedy for an employee who was discharged for serving on a jury. Section 12-16-8.1(a) provides as follows:
"No employer in this state may discharge any employee solely because he serves on any jury empanelled under any state or federal statute; provided, however, that the employee reports for work on his next regularly scheduled hour after being dismissed from any jury."
(Emphasis added.) The Legislature accepted this not-so-subtle hint in Meeks as to the proper course of action and enacted § 25-5-11.1. Section 25-5-11.1 quite plainly creates a remedy where an employee has been discharged solely for instituting or maintaining an action for workers' compensation benefits "under this chapter."1 Wright urges us to apply the oft-cited rule of construction requiring that we construe workers' compensation statutes liberally in favor of the employee in order to achieve the beneficent purposes of the workers' compensation laws so as to, in effect, read the phrase "under this chapter" out of the statute. This we cannot do. We recently reiterated in Ex parte Weaver, 871 So.2d 820, 824 (Ala.2003), the settled principle that "`[c]ourts must liberally construe the workers' compensation law "to effectuate its beneficent purposes," although such a construction must be one that the language of the statute "fairly and reasonably" supports.'" (Quoting Ex parte Dunlop Tire Corp., 706 So.2d 729, 733 (Ala.1997), quoting in turn Ex parte Beaver Valley Corp., 477 So.2d 408, 411 (Ala.1985).) In Hollander, supra, we referred to § 25-5-11.1 as a "narrow exception" to the general rule that an employment contract is terminable at will by either party, "forbidding employers from terminating an at-will employee solely because that employee sought workers' compensation benefits." ___ So.2d at ___.
Wright refers us to McClain v. Birmingham Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 578 So.2d 1299 (Ala.1991), in which this Court held that the word "action," as used in § 25-5-11.1, included a claim as well as a judicial proceeding. Wright urges this example of a construction consistent with the beneficent purposes of the Workers'...
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