Scott K., In re

Decision Date25 May 1979
Docket NumberCr. 20361
Parties, 595 P.2d 105 In re SCOTT K., a person coming under the Juvenile Court Law. Kenneth F. FARE, as Acting Chief Probation Officer, etc., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SCOTT K., Defendant and Appellant.
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court

Wilbur F. Littlefield, Public Defender, Dennis A. Fischer, Harold E. Shabo, Kenneth I. Clayman, Michael Allensworth and Albert J. Menaster, Deputy Public Defenders, for defendant and appellant.

D. Heather Werthmuller, Los Angeles, as amicus curiae on behalf of defendant and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. Winkler, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Norman H. Sokolow and Roy C. Preminger, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

NEWMAN, Justice.

A 17-year-old defendant appeals from an order declaring him a juvenile court ward and placing him on probation. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) The order was based on the court's finding that defendant unlawfully possessed marijuana for purpose of sale in violation of section 11359 of the Health and Safety Code. The question is whether a warrantless, parent-approved, police search of defendant's personal property was permissible.

Defendant's mother found marijuana in his desk drawer. She gave it to an off-duty police officer who lived in the neighborhood and told him that conversations with other parents led her to believe that her son might be selling marijuana. A week later that officer's report was given to Narcotics "And I asked him, 'Is it all right with you then that I go to the garage and arrest your boy there and do you wish to join us out there then, or what shall we do to make it easy on maybe the rest of the family?'

[595 P.2d 107] Officer Schian for follow-up. He telephoned the father to advise that he was about to arrest defendant. The conversation was as follows: "In substance, I advised the father that I was in charge of the follow-up investigation of the marijuana that his wife had turned over to the police officer; that an arrest would result from this situation, arrest of the son; that I intended to come out and arrest his son if his son was home, and then I received the information that he was working on his motorcycle in the garage.

"And he indicated, 'Why don't you just come on inside after you have arrested him?' "

Without warrant, Schian and other officers went to the garage. Schian arrested defendant and took him to the house, where the father gave permission to search defendant's bedroom. The search disclosed a locked toolbox. The father told Schian that he had no key and that it was defendant's box. When asked about the key, defendant replied he had lost it. Schian said, "Your father already told me I could break the toolbox open if I couldn't find a key, but it's not in my interest to destroy the lock. Let me see the keys you have in your pocket." Defendant gave Schian his keys, one of which opened the box. Inside were nine baggies of marijuana.

The trial court ruled the arrest illegal for noncompliance with People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263, 127 Cal.Rptr. 629, 545 P.2d 1333, because no exigent circumstances existed and there was sufficient time for the officer to secure an arrest warrant. The court nonetheless denied a motion to suppress as evidence the marijuana found in the toolbox. It concluded that search of the box was independent from the arrest and was pursuant to a valid consent. The court reasoned that, because the father owned the house and had a duty to control his son's activities, he could permit the search at any time, whether or not his son was present or under arrest. 1

After hearing the trial court's ruling, defendant admitted possessing marijuana for sale on the date of his arrest as charged and was adjudged a juvenile court ward. He contends on appeal that denial of his motion to suppress was erroneous. If so, he is entitled to withdraw his admission. (People v. Hill (1974) 12 Cal.3d 731, 767-769, 117 Cal.Rptr. 393, 528 P.2d 1.)

The People contend that a father has authority to inspect the belongings of a minor child to promote the child's health and welfare; also, that in consenting to the search this father was "merely using the police as an instrumentality to assist him in complying with his parental duty." 2

The formulation of issues in both the trial court's ruling and the People's argument seems misleading. Is not an important distinction obscured the distinction between the parent-child relation and a constitutionally prescribed relation between people and government? A minor's interest in both

[595 P.2d 108] those relations is identifiable even when, as here, his or her assertion of privacy rights against the government appears to conflict with parental authority. The primary issue in this case involves the minor's rights regarding his government.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Article I, section 13 of the California Constitution provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated; and a warrant may not issue except on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized."

We are assisted when we interpret those words by United States Supreme Court opinions on the federal Constitution's Fourth Amendment, which of course prescribes minimum standards that may not be violated. 3 That court apparently has not yet considered the Fourth Amendment in a juvenile context. Further, the justices seem to have been reluctant to define the "totality of the relationship" of minors and the state. (In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 13, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527; Carey v. Population Services Intern. (1977) 431 U.S. 678, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 52 L.Ed.2d 675.) Minors are, however, "persons" under our Constitution possessed of rights that governments must respect. 4 (Tinker v. Des Moines School District (1969) 393 U.S. 503, 511, 89 S.Ct. 733, 739, 21 L.Ed.2d 731.) Fourth Amendment protection may be inferable from the court's recognition of minors' rights to privacy; e. g., a state may not condition a minor's decision to have an abortion on parental consent (Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth (1976) 428 U.S. 52, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788); nor may it because of youth restrict one's access to contraceptives (Carey v. Population Services Intern., supra, 431 U.S. 678, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 52 L.Ed.2d 675). Contraceptives are property, inherently personal. Since Carey prevents the state from restricting access to that property, it may indeed also protect the minor from arbitrary search and seizure once the property is obtained.

By no means are the rights of juveniles coextensive with those of adults. (See In re Roger S. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 921, 928, 141 Cal.Rptr. 298, 569 P.2d 1286.) Minors' rights are often legitimately curtailed when the restriction serves a state's interest in promoting the health and growth of children. (See Prince v. Massachusetts (1944) 321 U.S. 158, 168-170, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645; Ginsberg v. New York (1968) 390 U.S. 629, 638, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 20 L.Ed.2d 195.) In juvenile court proceedings, rights may not be asserted if they might disrupt unique features of the proceedings; for example, jury trial is not required. (People v. Superior Court (Carl W.) (1975) 15 Cal.3d 271, 274, 124 Cal.Rptr. 47, 539 P.2d 807.) Search and seizure laws, however, hardly seem disruptive or otherwise inconsistent with the Justice should not be compromised by well-intentioned aims to correct transgressing youths, and the rehabilitative value of treating juveniles with fairness must not be underrated. (In re Gault, supra, 387 U.S. 1, 18, 26, 51-52, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527; In re Roger S., supra, 19 Cal.3d 921, 930, 141 Cal.Rptr. 298, 569 P.2d 1286.) Among sister states the extension of Fourth Amendment protections to minors is widespread. 5 California Courts of Appeal have correctly, we believe, assumed that juveniles do enjoy the rights pronounced in People v. Cahan (1955) 44 Cal.2d 434, 282 P.2d 905; and thus have focused their inquiries on whether the search in question was reasonable. 6 Only recently we endorsed that assumption sub silentio. (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 148 Cal.Rptr. 366, 582 P.2d 957.)

[595 P.2d 109] state's interest in child welfare. It is established that minors have a liberty interest that entitles them to due process whenever a state initiates action to deprive them of liberty. (In re Gault, supra,387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527; Goss v. Lopez (1975) 419 U.S. 565, 574, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725; In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 367, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368; In re Roger S., supra, 19 Cal.3d 921, 141 Cal.Rptr. 298, 569 P.2d 1286; In re Arthur N. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 226, 127 Cal.Rptr. 641, 545 P.2d 1345.) Enforcement of search and seizure protections helps ensure that the factfinding process conforms with standards of due process.

The minor here contends that, because the toolbox was his own property, warrantless police search violated both his right to privacy and his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. He was age 17, old enough to assert his rights. When the police asked him for the key he did not consent to the search; instead the father gave consent.

Though the record discloses some discord in the parent-child relation, no evidence suggests that the discord concerned control of the box. The facts rather support the son's claim that the box was his own. 7 His constitutional rights were at stake; and we need only consult the words of article I, section 13 of the California Constitution to see that its protection applies. 8

PARENTAL CONTROL AND MINORS' RIGHTS

The People argue that, because a parent is responsible for minor children and may himself inspect their property, police search of that property when...

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