Scott v. Antero Res. Corp.
| Decision Date | 20 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 17-cv-0693-WJM-SKC |
| Citation | 540 F.Supp.3d 1039 |
| Parties | Vincent SCOTT, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, v. ANTERO RESOURCES CORP., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
Andrew Wells Dunlap, Lindsay R. Itkin, Michael Andrew Josephson, Taylor Ashley Jones, Josephson Dunlap LLP, Matthew Scott Parmet, Parmet PC, Houston, TX, for Plaintiffs.
Dina M. Hayes, Emily Newhouse Dillingham, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Chicago, IL, Edwin Packard Aro, Evan Michael Rothstein, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Denver, CO, Joshua Freeman Alloy, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Washington, DC, Vanessa M. Griffith, Vinson & Elkins LLP, Dallas, TX, for Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT ANTERO RESOURCES CORPORATION'S SECOND AMENDED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DECERTIFICATION
Plaintiff Vincent Scott brings this action individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated (collectively, "Plaintiffs") against Defendant Antero Resources Corp. ("Antero") for alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (ECF No. 1.) Scott claims that he and others similarly situated were misclassified as independent contractors and therefore unlawfully denied overtime wages. (Id. )
Before the Court are Antero's Second Amended Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motion for Summary Judgment") (ECF No. 205), Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Motion for Partial Summary Judgment") (ECF No. 206), and Antero's Motion for Decertification (ECF No. 138). For the reasons explained below, the Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, and the remaining motions are denied as moot.
Summary judgment is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is "material" if, under the relevant substantive law, it is essential to proper disposition of the claim. Wright v. Abbott Labs., Inc. , 259 F.3d 1226, 1231–32 (10th Cir. 2001). An issue is "genuine" if the evidence is such that it might lead a reasonable trier of fact to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Allen v. Muskogee , 119 F.3d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1997).
In analyzing a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ). In addition, the Court must resolve factual ambiguities against the moving party, thus favoring the right to a trial. See Houston v. Nat'l Gen. Ins. Co. , 817 F.2d 83, 85 (10th Cir. 1987).
Antero is a Colorado-based oil and natural gas company engaged in the exploration, development, and production of natural gas and oil properties in West Virginia and Ohio. (ECF No. 205 at 7.) Plaintiffs worked for Antero as drilling consultants and were classified by Antero as independent contractors and, accordingly, were not paid overtime compensation. (ECF No. 182 at 1.)
Antero paid Plaintiffs a day rate of at least $1,000 for a total of at least $200,000 per calendar year. (ECF No. 205 at 19 ¶ 34.) Further, Antero states that it paid Plaintiffs in regular intervals. (ECF No. 205 at 19 ¶ 35.) The Master Consulting Services Agreements, signed by Plaintiffs, provide that Plaintiffs were to be paid within 30 days of Antero's receipt of an invoice. (ECF No. 181-1 at 2.) One plaintiff, Virgil Gaither, testified that he was paid once a month and always received payment in a given month. (ECF No. 180-5 at 9.) According to Antero, it paid Plaintiffs a guaranteed amount of no less than $1,000 per day for each hitch.2 (ECF No. 205 at 22 ¶ 36.) In addition, Antero states that Plaintiffs typically worked at indoor desks, and did not perform manual labor. (ECF No. 205 at 22 ¶ 37; ECF No. 180-5 at 7.)
Plaintiffs agree that Antero paid them a day rate of at least $1,000 per day for each hitch.3 (ECF No. 207 at 9 ¶ 34.) While Plaintiffs contest that Antero paid them in regular intervals, they provide no evidence to support their contention.4 (ECF No. 207 at 10 ¶ 35.) Instead, Plaintiffs reiterate the fact that Antero paid Plaintiffs a day rate for each day worked, and dispute the notion that Antero paid them any guaranteed weekly compensation or paid them using any predetermined or fixed "regular intervals." (Id. ) Further, Plaintiffs state that Antero did not pay them any compensation if they did not work during a week. (ECF No. 206 at 7 ¶ 8.) Plaintiffs contest Antero's statement that they typically worked at desks and performed no manual labor, but only to the extent that they state "Drilling Consultants worked on location at the rig site, including on the rig floor or cement truck, in addition to monitoring drilling in a trailer known as the ‘shack’ or ‘bump out office.’ " (ECF No. 207 at 10 ¶ 37.)
On March 17, 2017, Plaintiffs filed the Collective Action Complaint ("Complaint"). (ECF No. 1.) They allege that Antero knowingly, willfully, or in reckless disregard of their rights, violated Section 7 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207, by employing employees in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA for workweeks longer than 40 hours without compensating them for their employment in excess of 40 hours per week at rates no less than 1.5 times the regular rates for which they were employed. (Id. ¶¶ 53–54.) Plaintiffs filed the Complaint on behalf of a putative class of similarly situated employees consisting of:
Current and former Drilling Consultants employed by, or working on behalf of, Antero Resources Corp. during the past three years who were classified as independent contractors and paid a day-rate.
(Id. ¶ 8.)
On May 10, 2017, Antero filed its Answer. (ECF No. 18.) On February 26, 2018, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for Conditional Certification, conditionally certifying this action as a collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), with the eligible collective action members defined as "all current and former Drilling Consultants who worked for Antero Resources Corp., who were classified as independent contractors and paid a day-rate, at any time from February 26, 2015 to present." (ECF No. 39 (emphasis in original).)
On March 30, 2020, Antero filed its Motion for Decertification, which is fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 138, 158, and 163.) Antero argues the Court should decertify the collective and dismiss the claims of the opt-in Plaintiffs because the claims at issue are wholly individualized.
On May 7, 2021, Antero filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, which is fully briefed.5 (ECF Nos. 205, 207, and 209.) Antero argues that summary judgment in its favor is warranted because Plaintiffs were correctly classified as independent contractors, or alternatively, because even if Plaintiffs are found to be employees, they are exempt from overtime under FLSA's highly compensated employee or administrative employee exemptions. Additionally, Antero argues it acted in good faith and did not willfully misclassify Plaintiffs or recklessly disregard the law.
On May 7, 2021, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, which is fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 206, 208, and 210.) Plaintiffs request partial summary judgment on three of Antero's affirmative defenses, including the exemption defenses, good faith defense, and estoppel defense.
Thus, all motions are ripe for review.
Antero argues that even if Plaintiffs are employees, they "fall squarely" within the FLSA's highly compensated and administrative exemptions to overtime pay.6 (ECF No. 210 at 23.)
Under the FLSA "any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity ... (as such terms are defined and delimited from time to time by regulations of the Secretary [of Labor] ...)" are exempt from the FLSA's overtime pay requirements.
29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). Some highly-compensated employees are also exempt from the FLSA requirements. 29 C.F.R § 541.601.
An employee is considered a "highly compensated," and thus exempt from overtime, if the individual earns more than $100,000 in total compensation per year and performs administrative duties, as opposed to manual labor; he is not entitled to overtime under this exemption as long as he performs at least one or more duties typical of an exempt employee and is paid at least $455 per week on a "salary basis." See 29 C.F.R. § 541.601. "A high level of compensation is a strong indicator of an employee's exempt status, thus eliminating the need for a detailed analysis of the employee's job duties." Id. § 541.601(c).
Under the FLSA's "administrative" exemption in effect during the relevant time period, an employee's primary duty must involve work directly related to general business operations or management and customarily and regularly involve the use of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance, and the employee must be paid at least $455 per week on a "salary basis." See 29 C.F.R. § 541.200.
The FLSA defines "salary basis" as follows:
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