Scott v. BJC Behavioral Health

• Decision Date: 20 July 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. 4:11CV00633 JCH
• Parties: WALTER SCOTT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BJC BEHAVIORAL HEALTH, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

WALTER SCOTT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BJC BEHAVIORAL HEALTH, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 4:11CV00633 JCH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

Dated: July 20, 2011

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Vinita Park Police Department's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 26), Defendants City of Vinita Park, McGee, Jones, Farmer, and Altes' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 28), Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Claims Against Ellen Depker and BJC Behavioral Health (Doc. No. 48), and State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 55). These Motions are fully briefed and ready for disposition.

STANDARD

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must view the allegations in the Complaint liberally in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Eckert v. Titan Tire Corp., 514 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Luney v. SGS Auto Servs., 432 F.3d 866, 867 (8th Cir. 2005)). Additionally, the Court "must accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Coons v. Mineta, 410 F.3d 1036, 1039 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (abrogating the "no set of facts" standard for Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) found in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailedfactual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Huang v. Gateway Hotel Holdings, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1140 (E.D. Mo. 2007).

BACKGROUND

On January 29, 2008, Plaintiff Jarvis Simms pled guilty to arson, and was sentenced to five years of supervision by the State Board of Probation and Parole and mental health evaluation and treatment. (Third Amended Complaint ("TAC"), Exhibit 1, Doc. No. 23-1, Police Report, pp. 4-5).¹In March 2011, Simms was still under the supervision of the State Board of Probation and Parole and was being treated by BJC Behavioral Health ("BJC") for mental health problems. (TAC, Ex. 1, pp. 3-5). Ellen Depker ("Depker") was the social worker for BJC and was assigned as Simms' case manager (TAC, ¶6, Ex. 1, p. 3), and Daniel D. Spring was Simms' probation officer (TAC, ¶¶6(f), 48).

According to the Police Report,² Depker asked for police assistance when she went to check on the welfare of Simms on March 29, 2011. (Ex. 1, p. 3). Scott invited Officer Jones and Depker into the residence, and Depker spoke to both Scott and Simms. (Id.). Officer Jones indicated that the conversation was cordial. (Id.). Plaintiffs, however, allege that Depker lied to Vinita Park police officers by claiming, among other things, that Plaintiff Simms' father, Plaintiff Scott, did not wantSimms "to receive the treatment that is given and has made verbal threats in reference to shooting anyone that comes to the house." (TAC, ¶7; Ex. 1, p. 3). Depker apparently also told police that Simms has been diagnosed as a manic depressant schizophrenic, but that he been off his medication for approximately two weeks and missed an appointment. (TAC, ¶8(a), (b); Ex. 1, p. 3).

On March 31, Depker called Simms and informed him that she had spoken with his probation officer, Spring. (TAC, ¶43(b)). Depker arranged for Simms to meet her and Springs at the probation office on April 21, 2011. (Id.). Plaintiffs filed the Original Complaint on April 11, 2011. (Doc. No. I) .

On April 21, 2011, Simms met Spring in his office. (TAC, ¶44). Spring "[threatened] Simms to be locked up because of the pending litigation and for Simms failing to take the drug shot from BJC; even though Spring knows there is pending litigation between BJC, Depker et al. and Simms cannot associate/deal with the Defendants." (Id.). Plaintiffs allege that Spring continues to harass Simms. (TAC, ¶¶45, 48).

On May 16, 2011, Plaintiffs filed the Third Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 23).³ Therein, Plaintiffs attempt to state claims for libel and slander (Count I), violations of 42 U.S.C. §1981 (Count II) , violations of 42 U.S.C. §1983 (Count II and IV), and negligence (Count III).

DISCUSSION

I. Vinita Park Police Department

Under Missouri law, a defendant must be a must be a legal entity, i.e., corporation, quasi-corporation, or natural person. See Parker v. Unemployment Compensation Com., 358 Mo. 365, 371 (1948)("a party to an action in court must be a legal entity, that is either a natural person, an artificial person or a quasi artificial person"); Reifschneider v. Des Peres Public Safety Com., No. 54370, 1988Mo. App. LEXIS 1589, at *5 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 1988); see Gill v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 856 S.W.2d 96, 100 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (holding the Missouri Farm Bureau Federation was a legal entity and therefore not recognized as a party for purposes of the court's review); Conrod v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 810 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (noting that "[i]t is far from clear that the Missouri State Highway Patrol as a legal entity is a proper party defendant").

Vinita Park Police Department ("Police Department") asserts that it should be dismissed from Counts I-III of this lawsuit because it is not a legal, suable entity.⁴ In response, Plaintiffs mistakenly argue that the Police Department is either a "private individual" or a "legislatived [sic] governmental body". (Doc. No. 33, pp. 1-2). Similarly, Plaintiffs erroneously cite to case law related to lawsuits against "municipal officials." (Id., p. 3).

The Court holds that the Police Department is "merely an administrative arm of the City" and is not a legal entity. Jordan v. Kansas City, 929 S.W.2d 882, 888 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (holding the Neighborhood and Community Services Department is not a legislatively created entity but is an administrative arm of the City which lacks a legal identity apart from the City and, therefore, is not a suable entity); In re Scott County Master Docket, 672 F. Supp. 1152, 1163, n. 1 (D. Minn. 1987), aff’d sub. nom. Myers v. Scott County, 868 F.2d 1017(8th Cir. 1989) (noting that the Scott County Sheriff's Department is not a legally suable entity). Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs' claims against the Police Department. See also Reifschneider, 1988 Mo. App. LEXIS 1589, at *4-5 (the St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners could only be sued by bringing an action against the individual members of the board in their official capacities).

II. Count I (Libel and Slander)

In Missouri, the elements of defamation are: (1) publication, (2) of a defamatory statement, (3) which identifies the plaintiff, (4) that is false, (5) that is published with a requisite degree of fault and (6) damages the plaintiff's reputation. Sterling v. Rust Communs., 113 S.W.3d 279, 281 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303 (Mo. banc 1993)); Doe v. City of Creve Coeur, No. 4:07CV00946, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95115, at *13 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 21, 2008)(citing State ex rel. BP Products N. Am. Inc. v. Ross, 163 S.W.3d 922, 929 (Mo. banc 2005)). Whether language is defamatory and actionable is a question of law. Pape v. Reither, 918 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Mo. App. E.D. 1996); Anton v. St. Louis Suburban Newspapers, 598 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Mo. App. E.D. 1980). "The common law provides the defamation defendant with three general types of defenses. First, truth may always be asserted as an absolute defense. Mo. Const. art 1, § 8. Second, certain statements are absolutely privileged: for example, statements made during judicial proceedings. Third, other statements receive a conditional or qualified privilege." Henry v. Halliburton, 690 S.W.2d 775, 779 (Mo. 1985).

Plaintiffs base their defamation/libel claim against Depker, BJC, and Officers Jones, Farmer and Altes on statements that Depker allegedly made to police in connection with the March 29, 2011 check on Simms' welfare. (TAC, ¶¶7-9). According to the Police Report, Depker allegedly told the Vinita police department:

1) "Simms'... 'father does not want Simms to receive the treatment that is given.'" (TAC, ¶¶7, 19(d)).

2) Plaintiff Scott "had [sic] made verbal threats in reference to shooting anyone that comes to the house." (TAC, ¶7).

3) "Simms has been off his medication for approximately two weeks.'" (TAC, ¶8(a)).

4) "Simms has been diagnosed as a manic depressant schizophrenic". (TAC, ¶8(b)).

Upon review of the Complaint, the Court finds Plaintiffs have not pled an adequate claim for defamation. "Proof of actual reputational harm is an absolute prerequisite in a defamation action." Kenney v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 100 S.W.3d 809, 817 (Mo.banc 2003); Weidner v. Anderson, 174 S.W.3d 672, 684 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005)(requiring concrete proof that a person's reputation has been injured). Plaintiffs allege, with any factual support, that their reputation and pecuniary interests were damaged as a result of the Defendants' (particularly Depker) alleged statements. Plaintiffs merely provide formulaic claims that they were "stigmatized" (TAC, ¶14), have been "humiliated" (TAC, ¶16), and lost "political standing" and reputation (TAC, ¶¶16, 17). Plaintiffs' allegations consist of merely labels and conclusions. Doe v. City of Creve Coeur, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95115, at *7-8. Plaintiffs' pleadings are insufficient to allege damage for defamation, and Count I is dismissed.⁵

III. Counts II and IV (42 U.S.C. §§1981 and 1983)

A. §1981

Section 1981 provides that all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have "the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Because the focus of section 1981 is on contractual...