Scott v. City of Albuquerque
| Decision Date | 05 October 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 15-2154,15-2154 |
| Parties | QUENTIN SCOTT, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE; RAY SCHULTZ, former Chief of Police; D. HENSLEY, Albuquerque Police Officer, Defendant - Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
(D. N.M.)
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*Before HARTZ, HOLMES, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
A New Mexico statute makes it illegal to "willfully interfere with the educational process" at a public school. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-20-13(D). In 2009, an Albuquerque Police Officer assigned to a middle school as a School Resource Officer ("SRO") relied on that statute to arrest a thirteen-year-old for skipping class. The main question before us is whether qualified immunityshields that officer from a civil suit arising from the arrest. We find that it does. We also conclude that the plaintiff's other two claims—for municipal liability and violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12132—have no merit.
The relevant events happened in January 2009.1 At the time, Quentin Scott2 was a thirteen-year-old seventh-grader at Grant Middle School in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Scott had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and oppositional defiant disorder. Both affected his behavior and concentration when he was in class.
Scott had a "504 plan"—a document acknowledging that a student has special needs—and an Individualized Education Program ("IEP") that detailed how his disabilities might affect him in class. The IEP listed a few accommodations for Scott in the classroom. Specifically, teachers were told to let him choose where he sat, to minimize auditory and visual distractions, and to lethim move around the classroom every so often. Scott also had permission to leave the classroom if he was anxious or distracted. See Aplt.'s App. at 217-22 (Individualized Education Program, dated Aug. 11, 2008) (advising teachers to give Scott "[f]requent breaks" and to "encourage [Scott] to . . . get a drink" in the hallway if he felt overwhelmed). Scott said that when he had those feelings, he was usually allowed "to just kind of roam the halls" and to "g[e]t [his] mind off whatever was troubling [him]." Id. at 84 (Dep. of Quentin Scott, dated June 8, 2015).
Scott usually went to the janitor's office during these breaks. Id. He later testified that the office "was just kind of [his] safe haven" and felt that the janitors seemed "very understanding with [him]." Id. at 84, 86. Most of the time, he helped them sweep or mop the floors. If they were on a break when he arrived, Scott would sit down, read a magazine, and eat sunflower seeds with them. That is what he did on the morning of January 16, 2009.
After getting frustrated in typing class, Scott told his teacher that he was taking a break. He left the classroom and sat down at a desk that his teacher had put in the hallway. He tried returning to class a few minutes later, but the lesson was too far ahead by that point, and he "was already at the point of just being done." Id. at 201. He signaled to the teacher that he was going for a walk, then headed down the hall to the janitor's office. See Aplt.'s App. at 201, 209 (Test.of Charlotte Scott) (commenting that Scott was permitted to give "a nonverbal signal" to a teacher whenever he needed a break).
Scott was walking in the school hallway when Lupe Griego, the front desk secretary, noticed that he was out of class. Ms. Griego said something to Scott.3 Scott did not hear her, so he continued walking to the janitor's office. Officer Damon Hensley, the SRO for Grant Middle School, heard Ms. Griego call out Scott's name. Officer Hensley later testified that, two days before the arrest, Scott had come into school "really late." Id. at 70. That instance of tardiness, along with the fact that Scott had run away from school once before, led Officer Hensley to think that Scott might be skipping class again. Officer Hensley asked Nancy Wiggins, Scott's teacher, whether Scott had permission to be in the hallway; Ms. Wiggins told Officer Hensley that she thought that Scott was skipping class.
Officer Hensley looked down the hallway towards the janitor's office. He saw Scott standing "like he was halfway in the door and halfway out the door." Aplt.'s App. at 72. He walked to the office and asked Scott if he had permissionto be there; Scott told Officer Hensley that he did. But Ms. Wiggins, who was standing next to Officer Hensley, disagreed, telling Officer Hensley that Scott was "not supposed to be" out of class. Id.
Officer Hensley "grabbed [Scott's] arm," "stood [him] up," and put him in handcuffs. Id. at 203. He took Scott out of the office, walking behind Scott and holding the links that connected the two cuffs. As they walked through the hallway, Scott stopped abruptly a few times because he was "pissed" by Officer Hensley's physical contact with his person and the physical force he was applying; more specifically, Scott "didn't want to be touched." Id. at 202. When Scott stopped, Officer Hensley would "wrench[]" the links to force Scott forward. Id.
They were in the hallway when the class bell rang. Crowds of students rushed out of nearby classrooms. Scott, still handcuffed, was suddenly surrounded by his peers and classmates. Officer Hensley continued to walk behind Scott and shove him forward by the handcuffs. Scott felt that this was deliberate. It seemed as though Officer Hensley "wanted other kids to see [him] being dragged around" and to "set it in [Scott's] head that [he] was a piece of shit." Id. at 198.
They reached Officer Hensley's office a few minutes later. He ordered Scott to sit. According to Scott's testimony, Officer Hensley began "interrogating" and mocking Scott, who had started crying out of fear. Afterabout twenty minutes, Ms. Wiggins and two other school administrators came into Officer Hensley's office to meet with Scott.
That meeting lasted for about an hour. Scott was handcuffed the entire time. Scott repeatedly complained to the administrators during the meeting about the pain that he was experiencing because of the handcuffs. Eventually, they noticed that Scott was in so much pain that he could not lift his arms to wipe away his tears, so Ms. Wiggins managed to loosen the handcuffs. Still, even after the cuffs were loosened, Scott felt pain in his arms and wrists. According to his testimony, his wrists "were bruised and swollen" for "at least a week afterwards."4 Id. at 204.
The meeting ended. Officer Hensley then took Scott—still in handcuffs—to the Juvenile Detention Center in Albuquerque ("JDC"). Id. at 69, 225 (). There, Scott was booked and charged with violating New Mexico Statute section 30-20-13(D), which provides that "[n]o person shall willfully interfere with the educational process of any public or private school by"doing anything that "would . . . interfere with or obstruct the lawful mission, processes, procedures or functions of a public or private school." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-20-13(D).
Scott filed a lawsuit against Officer Hensley, Chief of Police Ray Schultz, and the City of Albuquerque ("City"). In his complaint, Scott brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: specifically, invoking the Fourth Amendment, Scott alleged that his arrest was unlawful and that Officer Hensley used unconstitutionally excessive force in effecting the arrest. The complaint also alleged that the arrest violated the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and included a municipal-liability claim against the City.5
Scott moved for partial summary judgment on his Fourth Amendment claims. The defendants then moved for summary judgment on all of Scott's claims. The district court denied Scott's motion and granted the defendants' motion.
In its order, the district court found that Officer Hensley was entitled to qualified immunity on Scott's Fourth Amendment unlawful-arrest and excessive-force claims. Scott argues that the court erred in reaching that conclusion.
We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment. See Water Pik, Inc. v. Med-Sys., Inc., 726 F.3d 1136, 1143 (10th Cir. 2013). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). We view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. See, e.g., Talavera ex rel. Gonzalez v. Wiley, 725 F.3d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir. 2013).
Qualified immunity protects governmental officials from liability for civil damages for conduct that does not violate clearly-established statutory or constitutional rights. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2015) (per curiam). We review qualified-immunity summary-judgment decisions differently from other summary-judgment decisions. See Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1114 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc). When a defendant asserts a qualified-immunity defense, the plaintiff must show (1) that the defendant violated a federal constitutional or statutory right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. See Quinn v. Young, 780 F.3d 998, 1004 (10th Cir. 2015). If a plaintiff fails to establish either prong, thedefendant is entitled to qualified immunity. See Cox v. Glanz, 800 F.3d 1231, 1245 (10th Cir. 2015).
Scott argues that Officer Hensley is not shielded by qualified immunity on the unlawful-arrest claim. Specifically, he contends that (1) the arrest was unconstitutional, since Officer Hensley lacked probable cause; and (2) Officer Hensley should have been on notice that the arrest was unlawful because the Fourth Amendment right that he violated was clearly established at the time.
Scott is half right. The arrest was unconstitutional, but Scott's right was not clearly established in January 2009. The district...
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