Scott v. Clarke

• Decision Date: 02 January 2019
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:12-cv-00036
• Citation: 355 F.Supp.3d 472
• Parties: Cynthia B. SCOTT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Harold W. CLARKE, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia

355 F.Supp.3d 472

Cynthia B. SCOTT, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Harold W. CLARKE, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 3:12-cv-00036

United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Charlottesville Division.

Signed January 2, 2019

Adeola Oluremilekun Ogunkeyede, Pro Hac Vice, Richmond, VA, Elizabeth Wilson Hanes, Leonard Anthony Bennett, Consumer Litigation Associates, PC, Newport News, VA, Kimberly Anne Rolla, Mary Catherine Bauer, Shannon Marie Ellis, Abigail Turner, Angela A. Ciolfi, Brenda Erin Castaneda, Charlottesville, VA, Andrew Joseph Guzzo, Casey Shannon Nash, Kristi Cahoon Kelly, Kelly & Crandall, PLC, Fairfax, VA, Philip Jerome Fornaci, Pro Hac Vice, for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, Theodore Augustus Howard, Pro Hac Vice, Wiley Rein LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Edward J. McNelis, III, Elizabeth Martin Muldowney, Ruth Thomas Griggs, Sands Anderson, PC, John Michael Parsons, Diane Marie Abato, James Milburn Isaacs, Jr., Kate Elizabeth Dwyre, Richard Carson Vorhis, Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, Richmond, VA, John Chadwick Johnson, Katherine Cabell Londos, Nathan Henry Schnetzler, Frith Anderson & Peake PC, Roanoke, VA, for Defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

NORMAN K. MOON, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This is an Eighth Amendment class action concerning the long-term failure to provide adequate medical care to inmates at the Fluvanna (Va.) Correctional Center for Women (FCCW). FCCW is Virginia's primary women's medical prison. The present defendants are officials employed by the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC).¹

After years of litigation, the parties reached a detailed settlement agreement ("Settlement Agreement" or "the agreement") to provide for constitutionally adequate medical care at FCCW. On the parties' request, the Court preliminarily approved the Settlement Agreement. In February 2016, the Court entered a final judgment order that conclusively approved the agreement, declared it operative, and retained jurisdiction to enforce it. The agreement provides similarly.

On September 5, 2017, Plaintiffs moved to hold Defendants in contempt. The Court permitted extensive discovery. A one-week trial was held in June 2018. The parties provided substantial post-trial argument, as well as proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Court finds that, in some respects, Defendants have breached the Settlement Agreement. The Court will therefore enforce its terms, although not through contempt.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

To prove civil contempt, a party must show: (1) a valid decree exists that the alleged contemnor has knowledge of; (2) the decree was in the movant's favor; (3) the alleged contemnor violated the decree and knew it was doing so, and; (4) the movant was harmed as a result. Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc. , 218 F.3d 288, 301 (4th Cir. 2000).

District courts "have inherent authority, deriving from their equity power, to enforce settlement agreements." Hensley v. Alcon Labs., Inc. , 277 F.3d 535, 540 (4th Cir. 2002). To enforce an agreement, a court must first conclude "that a complete agreement has been reached and determine[ ] the terms and conditions of that agreement." Id. If the court finds those preconditions satisfied, it may reach the merits and "draw[ ] upon standard contract principles" in enforcing the agreement. Id. at 540–41 ; Bradley v. Am. Household, Inc. , 378 F.3d 373, 380 (4th Cir. 2004).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs filed the underlying lawsuit in 2012. (Dkt. 1). Various portions of their complaint survived dispositive motion practice. (See generally dkts. 33, 34, 84, 85, 201, 202). The Court also certified a class of inmates seeking medical treatment at FCCW. (Dkts. 188, 189). After two years of litigation and days before a scheduled bench trial, the parties reached a settlement in principle. (Dkts. 203, 204). They spent the next ten months hashing out the details.

On September 15, 2015, the parties jointly filed what the docket reflects as a "consent motion to approve consent judgment." (Dkt. 220). The substance of the filing, however, referred to "preliminary approval of the settlement." (Id. at 1). Attached to the brief in support of that motion was Exhibit 1, filed as a 27-page "settlement agreement," (dkt. 221-1 at 1, 3), along with appendices. In a section entitled "ENFORCEMENT ," the Settlement Agreement provided that the Court "shall retain jurisdiction over the Parties for the purposes of ensuring the implementation of this Settlement Agreement and shall preside over such further proceedings as may be necessary or appropriate to enforce its terms and conditions." (Id. at 23).

Also attached to the brief was a proposed consent order granting preliminary approval of the settlement. (Dkt. 221-3). The Court entered the order in substantially similar form to the proposal. (Dkt. 222). The preliminary approval order provided, among other things, that the Court "shall have continuing jurisdiction, during the term of this Settlement Agreement, to enforce the Agreement's terms, and to enforce the Final Judgment." (Id. at 5).

After notice to the class, the Court held a fairness hearing where it received testimony about the propriety of the proposed Settlement Agreement, heard comments from objectors, and entertained oral argument. (Dkt. 242). Plaintiffs subsequently filed—with Defendants' approval—proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law urging final approval of the settlement. (Dkts. 255, 259). The parties also submitted a stipulated proposed final order that would (1) approve the Settlement Agreement, (2) declare the Settlement Agreement implemented as of the date of the final order, and (3) retain jurisdiction with the Court to ensure implementation of the Settlement Agreement and the Court's power to preside over "such further proceedings as may be necessary or appropriate to enforce its terms and conditions." (Dkt. 260).

On February 5, 2016, the Court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Court reasoned that the Settlement Agreement was proper under both Rule 23 and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, and it found that the objectors' concerns did not counsel against final approval of the Settlement Agreement. (Dkt. 261 at 25–30). The Court, in summarizing the Settlement Agreement, referenced Plaintiffs' ability to "enforce the settlement, seek contempt sanctions, or both." (Id. at 7).

That same day, the Court entered its final judgment order. (Dkt. 262). The order granted final approval of the Settlement Agreement. (Id. at 1–2). The order further stated that, "[a]s contemplated by the Settlement Agreement, the Court shall retain jurisdiction for purpose of ensuring implementation of the Settlement Agreement and shall preside over such further proceedings as may be necessary or appropriate to enforce its terms and conditions." (Id. at 2). No party appealed.

Just over a year-and-a-half later, Plaintiffs filed their motion to show cause why Defendants should not be held in contempt for failing to abide by the terms of the Settlement Agreement—what they called the Court's "consent judgment" of February 5, 2016. (Dkt. 265). The Court set the matter for a week-long bench trial in June 2018. (Dkt. 292). In December 2017, after the parties briefed the motion, the Court adopted the parties' joint request for a discovery plan, which set the discovery deadline at May 1, 2018. (Dkts. 303, 304).

For the next several months, the volume and intensity of discovery rivaled that of the hardest-fought merits litigation. The presiding magistrate judge held several conferences and hearings to resolve various motions and discovery matters, and he provided a few modest accommodations for the May 1st discovery deadline to allow the parties to complete discrete discovery tasks. Meanwhile, the Court, upon inquiry by the parties, indicated it would rule on the motion to show cause after receiving Plaintiffs' prima facie evidence at the June trial. (Dkt. 312).

As the trial date approached, the parties submitted numerous Daubert motions, motions in limine , and trial briefs. (E.g. , dkts. 395, 397, 398, 401, 403, 411, 412, 414, 416). Defendants even filed a motion for summary judgment, less than two weeks before the trial date. (Dkts. 417, 453).²

Finally, trial arrived. At the close of Plaintiffs' evidence, the Court granted the motion to show cause, concluding that "the prima facie case has been made"—"there's certainly a prima facia case of at least to some extent that the settlement has not been carried out." (Dkt. 495; dkt. 521 at 69). At the time, Defendants did not argue that contempt was improper for lack of an operative injunctive order to enforce. (See dkt. 521 at 70–77).³

FINDINGS OF FACT⁴

Internal Assessments about Compliance at FCCW

1. In the weeks and months after final approval of the Settlement Agreement, Defendants, their employees, and others associated with FCCW doubted that the terms of the Settlement Agreement were being, or would be, met. (See infra FF ¶¶ 2–11).⁵

2. When he joined FCCW in July 2016, Dr. Thomas Gable, the then-acting medical director, realized that the level of medical staffing at FCCW was inadequate, and that staffing needs exceeded what VDOC (and its contractor that operated FCCW) previously thought was necessary. (Dkt. 523 at 188, 191–93).

3. Dr. Gable informed the contractor's CEO, regional vice president, and chief financial officer of his opinion. (Dkt. 523 at 193).

4. In fact, medical personnel at FCCW had historically been understaffed dating back to at least 2015. (Dkt. 522 at 199–200, 201–02).

5. On February 10, 2016, VDOC's deputy director Cookie Scott convened a meeting with the "top people" at FCCW, as well as medical personnel from other VDOC facilities. The attendees shared 13 "problem" areas where they believed the contractor was underperforming—e.g. , sick call, medication errors, mismanagement of patients. (Dkt. 524 at 185–87).

6. At a similar session of FCCW's "top people" on February 23, 2016, deputy...