Scott v. Communications Services, Inc., Civ.A. No. H-90-2502.

• Court: United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. Southern District of Texas
• Writing for the Court: Philip P. Sudan, Jr., Houston, Tex., for defendants
• Citation: 762 F. Supp. 147
• Parties: Gary SCOTT, Plaintiff, v. COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES, INC., and Metromedia Company, Defendants.
• Docket Number: Civ.A. No. H-90-2502.
• Decision Date: 05 April 1991

762 F. Supp. 147

Gary SCOTT, Plaintiff,
v.
COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES, INC., and Metromedia Company, Defendants.

Civ.A. No. H-90-2502.

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division.

April 5, 1991.

762 F. Supp. 148

Charles E. Johanson, Austin, Tex., for plaintiff.

Philip P. Sudan, Jr., Houston, Tex., for defendants.

OPINION ON REMAND

HUGHES, District Judge.

After the corporate plaintiff-counterdefendant sued non-diverse defendants in state court, the defendants counterclaimed. Then the corporate plaintiff-counterdefendant merged into an out-of-state corporation, effectively moving it to a different state. After becoming diverse, the corporate plaintiff-counterdefendant dismissed its claims and removed the counterclaim to federal court, on the apparent diversity jurisdiction. Despite the after-acquired diversity, removal was improper because the corporate plaintiff-counterdefendant was not properly characterized as a defendant for purposes of removal, the parties were not diverse when the suit was commenced in state court, and the removal was not timely.

1. Background.

Metromedia Long Distance (MLD) sued Gary Scott, Lyn Hawthorne, and two other defendants in the 2nd 9th District Court of Texas, Montgomery County in October 1989 (XX-XX-XXXXX), seeking a declaration that MLD owes no duty of indemnification to Scott or Hawthorne for the judgment against them in Hughes, et al. v. Noble in the 150th District Court of Texas, Bexar County (84-CI-02090). All parties in the Montgomery County action were Texans. On December 12, Scott filed counterclaims against MLD and Metromedia Company, a partnership with no Texas partners, for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, fraud, rescission of a 1983 stock sale, and wrongful discharge. MLD then amended its petition, dropping the other two defendants.

The state court granted Scott's motion to transfer the case to Bexar County on June 25, 1990, but before the order was signed, MLD merged into Communications Services, Inc. (CSI), a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in New York, on July 2. On July 23, CSI voluntarily

762 F. Supp. 149

dismissed its claims against Scott and Hawthorne and filed an identical suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. At this point, all that survived in the 2nd 9th District Court were Scott's counterclaims against CSI and Metromedia Company, and the parties were diverse. CSI removed the counterclaims to this court on August 6, on diversity

Scott has moved to remand the case. There are no facts in dispute. The parties were not diverse when MLD (now CSI) originally sued Scott and Hawthorne in state court; the case could not have been filed in federal court. MLD merged into CSI after MLD commenced the suit. After the merger, the plaintiffs and defendants were diverse. CSI removed the case within 30 days of MLD's merger into it, but not within 30 days of the filing of MLD's counterclaim.

The court will remand the case because it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims, for three reasons: 1) CSI is not a defendant within the removal statutes, so it may not remove the case, nor did it become a defendant for purposes of removal by becoming a counterdefendant in Scott's counterclaim; 2) diversity did not exist when MLD commenced suit in state court, and the existence of diversity at removal does not cure that jurisdictional defect; and 3) CSI did not remove the case within 30 days of the filing of Scott's counterclaim.

2. Removal is a statutory right.

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) creates the right of removal:

Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.

(emphasis added).

CSI claims that it may now remove the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) because it became removable when MLD merged with CSI and effectively changed its states of citizenship from Texas to Delaware and New York:

"If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable...."

The party seeking to remove the case has the burden of establishing its right to remove, and a close question is to be resolved in favor of remand. Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 540, 59 S.Ct. 347, 350, 83 L.Ed. 334 (1939); McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189, 56 S.Ct. 780, 785, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936); Laughlin v. Prudential Insurance Co., 882 F.2d 187, 190 (5th Cir. 1989); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1164 (5th Cir.1988); Higgins v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 635 F.Supp. 1182, 1184 (S.D.Tex.1986); Ezon v. Cornwall Equities, Ltd., 540 F.Supp. 885, 889 (S.D.Tex. 1982); Albonetti v. GAF Corporation— Chemical Group, 520 F.Supp. 825, 827 (S.D.Tex.1981). CSI has failed to establish that this court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case.

3. CSI is not a defendant for removal.

Federal law, not state law, determines who is the plaintiff and who is the defendant when a party seeks to remove a case. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 104, 61 S.Ct. 868, 870, 85 L.Ed. 1214 (1941); Chicago R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574, 780, 74 S.Ct. 290, 294, 98 L.Ed. 317 (1954); In re Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 535 F.2d 859, 861 (5th Cir.1976); Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1399 (5th Cir.1974); Estate of Spragins v. Citizens National Bank of Evansville, 563 F.Supp. 424, 426 (N.D.Miss.1983); Carlton v. Withers, 609 F.Supp. 146, 148-49 (M.D.La.1985).

Only the defendant can remove a case. From 1875 to 1887, the removal statute

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allowed any party to remove to federal court, but since the 1887 amendments to the removal statute that narrowed the right of removal, the right of removal has belonged solely to the defendant. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v....