Scott v. Continental Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 29 February 1972
• Docket Number: No. 11776,11776
• Citation: 259 So.2d 391
• Parties: Jessie Aaron SCOTT, Sr., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

Page 391

259 So.2d 391

Jessie Aaron SCOTT, Sr., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 11776.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.

Feb. 29, 1972.

James B. Wells, Bossier City, Love, Rigby, Dehan & Love, by Samuel P. Love, Jr., Shreveport, for Jessie Aaron Scott, Sr., plaintiff-appellant.

Lunn, Irion, Switzer, Johnson & Salley, by Charles W. Salley, Shreveport, for Continental Ins. Co. and L. C. Evans, defendants-appellees.

Cook, Clark, Egan, Yancey & King, by Gordon E. Rountree, Shreveport, for Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., defendant-appellee.

Charles E. Welsh, Bossier City, curator ad hoc for Rickey J. Deese, defendant-appellee.

Blanchard, Walker, O'Quin & Roberts, by Wilton H. Williams, Jr., Shreveport, for Hanover Ins. Co., defendant-appellee.

James D. Southerland, Plain Dealing, curator ad hoc for Bill C. Dickerson, defendant-appellee.

Before AYRES, PRICE, and HEARD, JJ.

AYRES, Judge.

This is an action by a father and mother for damages for the death of their minor son, Donald Gene Scott, who died from injuries he sustained in an accident on November 24, 1969, when Rickey J. Deese, the driver of a 1955 model Chevrolet in which young Scott was a guest passenger, lost control of the automobile, and it overturned several times.

Made defendant in their original petition was The Continental Insurance Company, an alleged insurer of the automobile involved asserted therein to be the property of L. C. Evans. In an amended petition, plaintiffs caused these parties to be made additional defendants: Evans, alleged owner of the car; Rickey J. Deese, driver of the car; Myrtle C. Deese, an aunt of the driver; and The Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, insurer of a 1967 model Plymouth automobile under a policy issued to Myrtle C. Deese. Coverage under the latter policy was alleged to have resulted from the claim that Rickey J. Deese was Myrtle Deese's nephew and a member of her household, and the Chevrolet, being a nonowned automobile, was covered under the provisions of Aetna's policy when operated by Rickey J. Deese.

In a second amended petition, named also as further additional defendants were Bill C. Dickerson, father of Randy C. Dickerson, another guest passenger in the Chevrolet, and Dickerson's insurer, The Hanover Insurance Company, which allegedly afforded coverage under the uninsured-motorist provisions of its policy. Liability is sought because it is claimed Dickerson's minor son, Randy, negligently pushed or shoved the driver of the vehicle, causing the driver to lose control.

To petitioners' action, Aetna and Continental filed separate motions for summary judgments based on the lack of coverage and protection under their respective insurance policies. These motions were sustained and plaintiffs' demands as against these defendants were rejected. From the judgment rendered, only plaintiff Jessie Aaron Scott, Sr., appealed.

The automobile involved in the accident with which we are now concerned was formerly owned by L. C. Evans. During the period of Evans' ownership, defendant Continental issued a public liability policy to Evans designating him as the named insured. The policy had an effective coverage period from March 5, 1969, to March 5, 1970. The accident upon which this litigation is predicated occurred on November 24, 1969. In the meantime, during August, 1969, Evans sold the automobile to Rickey J. Deese for a consideration of $350, payable in weekly installments of $50 each. The car, at the time of the sale, was delivered to Deese, who continued in possession thereafter to the date of the accident. Deese paid $250 on the purchase price, leaving a balance due thereon of only $100 at the time of the accident. These facts as to the reality of the sale and the delivery of the car are established by the testimony of both Evans and Deese. There is no evidence in contradiction.

Moreover, plaintiff-appellant admits in brief the sale of the car and its delivery by Evans to Deese, but contends that the sale was without effect because Deese was a minor and no formal title had issued. Accordingly, it was contended Evans continued as the owner of the car and that, on the occasion of the accident, Deese's status was that of a borrower or user of the car with the permission of the owner. Under such status, it is contended Deese was an insured under appropriate language of the policy issued by Continental to Evans.

These contentions will be considered in reverse order.

LSA-C.C. Art. 2456 provides, with reference to the completion or perfection of a sale:

'The sale is considered to be perfect between the parties, and the property is of right acquired to the purchaser with regard to the seller, as soon as there exists an agreement for the object and for the price thereof, although the object has not yet been delivered, nor the price paid.'

The provisions of the Vehicle Certificate of Title Law, LSA-R.S. 32:701 et seq., do not supersede the aforesaid provisions of the Civil Code nor render the sale of a motor vehicle void because of noncompliance with the statute.

The rule appears now well settled in this State that titles to motor vehicles, though imperfect, may be transferred between parties in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code quoted above, even though there has been no compliance with the Vehicle Certificate of Title Law as the enactment of the law regulating the certificate of title to motor vehicles did not have the effect of repealing the provisions of the Civil Code having reference to the consummation of sales of motor vehicles between parties to such transactions. Whitten v. Travelers Insurance Company, 141 So.2d 40 (La.App., 2d Cir. 1962); Luke v. Theriot, 195 So.2d 685, 690 (La.App ., 1st Cir. 1967).

The registration of sales of motor vehicles under the Vehicle Certificate of Title Law is an administrative proceeding which does not bear any essential relationship to contracts of sale of motor vehicles. Transportation Equipment Co. v. Dabdoub, 69 So.2: 640 (La .App., Orl. 1954--writs denied). Consequently, failure to comply with the administrative regulations prescribed by the statute with respect to the sale of motor vehicles does not invalidate sales consummated under the aforesaid codal provisions. Hammer v. Domingue, 82 So.2d 105 (La.App., 1st Cir. 1955--writs denied); Bedsole v. Lee, 78 So.2d 434 (La.App., 1st Cir. 1955). In this regard, we had occasion to observe in Whitten v. Travelers Insurance Company, supra, 141 So.2d 40, 42:

'The Vehicle Certificate of Title Law clearly does not make the sale of a motor vehicle void if the transfer is not executed in conformity with that statute. The statute does not directly nor by implication repeal the aforesaid codal provisions. Hence, title to motor vehicles, although imperfect, may be transferred as between the parties in accordance with the aforesaid codal authority, even though the purchaser has not complied with the Vehicle Certificate of Title Law.'

See, also: General Finance Corp. of New Orleans v. Harrell, 188 So .2d 211 (La.App., 1st Cir. 1966); W.C.C., Inc. v. Davis, 185 So.2d 607 (La.App., 1st Cir. 1966--writs refused, 249 La. 484, 187 So.2d 450).

Nor do we find any merit in plaintiff's first contention. Public liability insurance...