Scott v. Garber

Decision Date21 February 1964
Docket NumberNo. A--696,A--696
Citation82 N.J.Super. 446,198 A.2d 103
PartiesAlma SCOTT, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Ethel GARBER, n/k/a Ethel Garber Bergman, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

James B. Emory, Ridgewood, for appellant (J. Chester Massinger, Paterson, attorney).

John E. Campo, Bloomfield, for respondent (Joseph Teich, Passaic, attorney).

Before Judges CONFORD, FREUND and SULLIVAN.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

SULLIVAN, J.A.D.

This is an icy sidewalk fall case. Plaintiff filed suit against the defendant for damages for personal injuries. The alleged cause of the fall as asserted by plaintiff in her original complaint was that defendant had negligently and carelessly shoveled the public sidewalk on her property causing a layer of ice to be on the sidewalk thereby rendering it more dangerous than it had been prior to shoveling. Plaintiff also contended that the aforesaid condition constituted a nuisance. The pretrial order in setting forth plaintiff's factual contentions repeated the assertion that plaintiff was caused to fall on the sidewalk due to the negligent and careless manner in which it had been shoveled.

Prior to trial, but more than two years after the accident had happened, plaintiff applied for leave to amend her complaint to add the contention that the ice on the sidewalk on which she fell had been caused by the collection of water from the roof of defendant's building and the discharge of such water through pipes onto the abutting sidewalk in an unreasonable, negligent and careless manner. Defendant objected to said amendment solely on the ground that it introduced a new cause of action on which the statute of limitations had run. No other prejudice to defendant was claimed. The trial court allowed the amendment. Defendant thereupon filed an answer to said amendment setting up the defense of the statute of limitations, and also sought leave to file a third-party complaint against the adjoining property owner on the ground that conditions on defendant's sidewalk resulted from the acts of the third-party defendants in collecting water from the building on their property and from the land and discharging it through pipes, so that it eventually flowed onto defendant's sidewalk. Plaintiff then moved to strike the defense of the statute of limitations.

After hearing argument on the cross-motions, the trial court struck the defense of the statute of limitations. The court also refused leave to file the proposed third-party complaint, holding it would only complicate the proof in the case and that it would be better to keep the two matters separate.

Defendant by leave of this court appeals from the order allowing the amendment to plaintiff's complaint, the order striking out the defense of the statute of limitations, and the order denying defendant's application to file a third-party complaint.

Basically, two questions are involved. (1) Was the amendment to plaintiff's complaint a new cause of action beyond that asserted in the original complaint? (Defendant does not object to the amendment other than in that it introduced a new cause of action which was barred by the statute of limitations.) (2) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying defendant's application to file a third-party complaint?

Amendments to pleadings are governed by R.R. 4:15. Once issue has been joined a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; 'and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.' R.R. 4:15--1. When the claim asserted in the amended pleading 'arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading'. R.R. 4:15--3.

In the instant case defendant challenges the allowance of the amendment solely on the ground that it introduces a new cause of action after expiration of the statute of limitations. Therefore the inquiry is whether plaintiff's claim as set forth in the amended complaint arose out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original complaint. If it did, the amendment relates back to the date of the original complaint, and the statute of limitations is inapplicable.

We conclude that the amendment does not state a new cause of action. Plaintiff's claim against the defendant is for damages for personal injuries suffered in a fall on ice on the defendant's sidewalk. Both the original complaint and the amendment refer to the same accident and the same icy condition of defendant's sidewalk. The only difference is in the asserted causal basis for the icy condition.

Prior to the adoption of R.R. 4:15--3, the general rule was that amendments which did not introduce a new cause of action or defense were ordinarily held to relate back to the time of filing the original pleading. Cases took divergent views on the application of this rule. See Doran v. Thomsen, 79 N.J.L. 99, 74 A. 267 (Sup.Ct.1909); Scott v. Schisler, 107 N.J.L. 397, 153 A. 395 (Sup.Ct.1931); Magliaro v. Modern Homes, Inc., 115 N.J.L. 151, 178 A. 733 (E. & A. 1935); Meyers v. Otz, 123 N.J.L. 215, 8 A.2d 381 (E. & A. 1939); O'Shaughnessy v. Bayonne News Co., 9 N.J.Misc. 345, 154 A. 13 (Cir.Ct.1931) affirmed o.b., 109 N.J.L. 271, 160 A. 696 (E. & A. 1932); Casavalo v. D'Auria, 12 N.J.Misc. 81, 169 A. 520 (Sup.Ct.1933). Various tests were formulated as a means of determining whether a new cause of action was being introduced. For example, if the same evidence which would establish the cause set forth in the original complaint would also establish that set forth in the amended complaint no new cause of action was held to have been pleaded. This test, while mentioned in some of the more recent...

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4 cases
  • Bolger v. Chris Anderson Roofing Co.
    • United States
    • New Jersey County Court
    • November 23, 1970
    ...will there be a reversal as to discretionary matters, unless there is an erroneous application of the law. Scott v. Garber, 82 N.J.Super. 446, 451, 198 A.2d 103 (App.Div.1964); 5A C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 1583 at 25. The rule applies both as to the time of trial (see Fotopak Corp. v. Merlin,......
  • Miranda v. Fridman
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • July 21, 1994
    ...Co., 236 N.J.Super. 349, 364, 565 A.2d 1113 (App.Div.1989), certif. denied, 121 N.J. 617, 583 A.2d 316 (1990); Scott v. Garber, 82 N.J.Super. 446, 451, 198 A.2d 103 (App.Div.1964). A motion to file a third-party complaint should not be denied on the thesis that a potential defense to the pr......
  • Molnar v. Hedden
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • October 27, 1992
    ...omitted inadvertently, which arose out of the same accident, and of which the defendant had prior notice. In Scott v. Garber, 82 N.J.Super. 446, 198 A.2d 103 (App.Div.1964), rejecting the "same evidence" test in favor of the single-controversy test, we permitted amendment of a complaint aft......
  • Estate of Rhoda v. S. Jersey Extended Care, H.W./Weidco/Ren, LLC, DOCKET NO. A-0607-20
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • May 4, 2021
    ...for leave to proceed against a third-party defendant is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial" court. Scott v. Garber, 82 N.J. Super. 446, 451 (App. Div. 1964). We will overturn the trial court's determination only when there is a clear abuse of discretion. Ibid. We have sustai......

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