Scott v. Genuine Parts Company, Cause No. IP00-866 C-T/K (S.D. Ind. 2/1/2002), Cause No. IP00-866 C-T/K.
| Decision Date | 01 February 2002 |
| Docket Number | Cause No. IP00-866 C-T/K. |
| Parties | CANDY J. SCOTT Plaintiff, v. GENUINE PARTS COMPANY Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
Plaintiff Candy J. Scott is a licenced truck driver who sought employment with Defendant Genuine Parts Company. Upon learning that it had misfiled Scott's application for employment, Defendant invited Scott to interview for a truck driver position at its Indianapolis facility. When Scott notified Defendant in her interview that she had a criminal record that included three felony convictions, and explained she had been terminated from her most recent job for failing a drug test, Defendant did not offer Scott employment. In turn, Scott filed suit, claiming that Defendant failed to hire her because of her sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq.
There are two motions before the Court: Scott's motion to strike Defendant's interrogatory responses filed with the Court in support of Defendant's motion for summary judgment, and Defendant's motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that Scott's motion to strike be DENIED, and Defendant's motion for summary judgment be GRANTED.
The evidence viewed in a light most favorable to Scott reveals the following. Defendant Genuine Auto Parts1 and its subsidiaries ("Defendant") manufacture and supply automobile parts. Since 1997, Steven Ward has served as Defendant's Midwest Terminal Manager at its Indianapolis facility. Ward's responsibilities include overseeing all dock and trucking operations and hiring truck drivers.
On or about December 26, 1998, Scott and her ex-husband, Paul Scott ("P. Scott"), submitted applications of employment to Defendant for the position of truck driver. Since Ward was on vacation that day, the Scotts slid their applications under Ward's office door. Subsequently, on March 31, 1999, Ward interviewed P. Scott for a vacated truck driver position. During the interview, P. Scott inquired into the status of Scott's application. Vaguely recalling that he received two applications for employment with the same last name, Ward discovered that Scott's application was erroneously filed in a folder for a position other than truck driver due to the application's references of other positions on Scott's application. Upon this discovery on March 31, Ward invited, and Scott accepted, an invitation to submit another application for employment and interviewed her the same day.
Scott's application revealed that she had been convicted of two Class B felonies and one Class D felony for "Marijuana and LSD." [Pl. Dep. Ex. 6]. In 1980, Scott was convicted of "[p]ossession with the intent to deal marijuana and LSD and dealing LSD." [Pl. Dep., p. 14]. Scott served time in prison for these offenses. Scott also noted on her application that in July 1997 she had been terminated from her employment as a truck driver with Ryder Integrated. In her interview, she told Ward that she was terminated from Ryder for failing a drug test. Scott indicated that at the time of the failed drug test she was "on a lot of meds" and that she "wasn't allowed to retest." Id. at 78. According to Defendant, Ward advised Scott that her previous felony convictions, coupled with her recent termination for failing a drug test, rendered her am undesirable candidate. [Ward Dep., pp. 49, 103]. However, Scott testifies that Ward told her neither the convictions or the termination would be a problem, and that she was eligible for hire. [Scott Affid., ¶ 4].
P. Scott, now an employee of Defendant, urged Ward to reconsider his decision not to hire Scott. Ward agreed, and contacted his supervisor Paul Williams at Defendant's corporate headquarters in Atlanta. When Ward discussed Scott's candidacy, Williams responded by saying there was "no need to send [Scott's application] down based on [Scott's history]." [Ward Dep., pp. 104-05]. At P. Scott's further insistence, and despite Williams' instructions, Ward forwarded Scott's application to Tom Williams ("T. Williams"), Defendant's personnel manager also located in Atlanta. Upon reviewing the application, T. Williams requested that Scott complete and return a missing form so he could conduct a background check. After review, T. Williams also concluded that Scott was not a suitable candidate for hire.
A. Motion to Strike Scott moves to strike Defendant's interrogatory responses that include: (1) Defendant's Responses and Objections to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories; (2) Defendant's Supplemental Responses and Objections to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories; (3) Defendant's Responses and Objections to Plaintiff's Second Set of Interrogatories; (4) Defendant's Second Supplemental Responses and Objections to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories; and (5) Defendant's Responses and Objections to Plaintiff's Third Set of Interrogatories. Scott claims, in part, that Defendant did not comply with 28 U.S.C. § 1746's requirement that a statement be "under penalty of perjury." [Pl.'s Mot. to Strike, p. 4]. Scott's reliance on this statute is misplaced, given that the discovery responses were verified under oath before a notary public.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(b)(1) does not incorporate the language of § 1746, but rather provides:
Each interrogatory shall be answered separately and fully in writing under oath, unless it is objected to, in which event the objecting party shall state the reasons for objection and shall answer to the extent the interrogatory is not objectionable.
In this case, Defendant submitted with each set of interrogatory response a "verification" page in which the signator was "duly sworn" before a notary public who signed, placed a notary seal, and dated the document. [See Pl. Exs. B-J]. Accordingly, Defendant has complied with Rule 33 in submitting its responses to the interrogatories. See Pfeil v. Rogers, 757 F.2d 850, 859 (7th Cir. 1985) (in the execution of affidavit, court refused to be "hyper-technical," holding that "the absence of the formal requirements of a jurat in . . . sworn affidavits [does] not invalidate the statements or render them inadmissible [if] they were sworn to before an officer authorized to administer an oath." Id. at 859.
Scott also states that Defendant's interrogatory response should be stricken because Defendant must answer through an "officer or agent" of the corporation, and that Ward and T. Williams cannot sign the verification since they are not employees of Genuine Parts Company. [Pl.'s Mot. to Strike, pp. 3-4]. As noted in footnote one, the Court finds that Ward, as the Midwest Terminal Manager for General Parts Company/R.M.D.S./Rayloc, is an employee of the named Defendant in this action, and therefore has personal knowledge to sign the verification to the interrogatory responses. Likewise, T. Williams, as the Human Resource Manager for Defendant, also has personal knowledge to be a signator to the interrogatories.
Finally, Scott asserts that Defendant's Second Supplemental Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories (Ex. E) should be stricken from the record because the verification page (Ex. F) signed by Ward (who works and lives in Indiana) was signed by a notary public in the state of Georgia. [Def.'s Mot. to Strike, pp. 4-5]. Assuming that the Georgia notary public's affirmation to Ward's signature made the document inadmissible, this defect was cured when Defendant submitted a verification page bearing Ward's signature with an Indiana notary's signature.
Accordingly, Defendant's motion to strike Defendant's interrogatory responses is DENIED.
B. Standard for Summary Judgment
A grant of summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, and other supporting materials leave no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hall v. Bodine Elec. Co., ___ F.3d ___, 2002 WL 15815, *3 (7th Cir. Jan. 8, 2002); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). To determine whether any genuine fact exists, the Court must pierce the pleadings and assess the proof as presented in depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits that are part of the record. First Bank & Trust v. Firstar Information Services, Corp., ___ F.3d ___, 2001 WL 1662511, *3 (7th Cir. Dec. 31, 2001). Thus, in ruling on a summary judgment motion, the district court must decide "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Oest v. Ill. Dep't of Corrections, 240 F.3d 605, 610 (7th Cir. 2001), quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
There is no special version of Rule 56 that applies to employment discrimination cases. Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1396 (7th Cir. 1996). However, the Court applies the summary judgment standard with "particular care" in employment discrimination cases since intent and credibility are crucial issues. Adusumilli v. City of Chicago, 164 F.3d 353, 361 (7th Cir. 1998); Alexander v. Wisconsin Dept. of Health and Family Services, 263 F.3d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 2001). The Court must view the evidence making all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, (Anderson, 477 U.S. 242, 250; Warsco v. Preferred Technical Group, 258 F.3d 557, 563 (7th Cir. 2001)), and is not permitted to conduct a paper trial on the merits of the claim. Ritchie v. Glidden Co., 242 F.3d 713, 723 (7th Cir. 2001).
C. Title VII Claim
Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,...
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