Scott v. Giant Eagle Mkt.
| Decision Date | 02 March 2018 |
| Docket Number | 2:17-cv-00289 |
| Parties | PATRICIA A. SCOTT, Plaintiff, v. GIANT EAGLE MARKET ET AL, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Pending before the Court are two Motions to Dismiss - the first is a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) filed by Defendant Giant Eagle Market ("Giant Eagle") and the second is a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by Defendant Pittsburgh Police Department Zone 4 Station ("City of Pittsburgh").1 For the reasons that follow, both motions will be granted.
On March 8, 2017, Plaintiff Patricia A. Scott ("Scott") filed a complaint against Giant Eagle and the City of Pittsburgh alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 and 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. She seeks $1,000,000 in punitive damages.
On May 1, 2016, while Scott was seated in the restaurant section of a Giant Eagle, a Giant Eagle employee rushed up to her and whispered in her ear that she needed to leave the store. (ECFNo. 5 ¶ III). The employee then left without any further explanation. (Id.) After Scott remained in the store, the Giant Eagle employee returned a second time and reiterated that Scott needed to leave the store and, again, left without any further explanation. (Id.) Thereafter, a security guard walked into the restaurant and hostilely asked Scott whether the "supervisor", i.e., the Giant Eagle employee, had asked her to leave. (Id.) Scott responded by asking that the supervisor and the security guard provide her with a legal explanation as to why she was being asked to leave. (Id.) The security guard and the supervisor refused to do so, and the security guard then told her he was going to call the police. (Id.)
When two police officers employed by the City of Pittsburgh arrived, they asked Scott for her store receipt, which she provided and which demonstrated that she had purchased her food in the store. (Id.) The police officers then showed the receipt to the security guard; however, the guard still insisted that Scott leave the store. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that because she was ejected from Giant Eagle she was deprived of the opportunity to charge her smart phone, the opportunity to charge her wheelchair, and she was excluded from using a "public entity". (Id.)
On May 12, 2017, Giant Eagle filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), (ECF No. 15), and a brief in support thereof, (ECF No. 16). The City of Pittsburgh filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), (ECF No. 17), and brief in support thereof, (ECF No. 18). Scott filed a response in opposition on May 26, 2017, adding new facts to her claim and making reference to for the first time "Section 1983," asserting a "breach of trust" by the police. (ECF No. 26).2
Pro se pleadings, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite the litigant's failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (); Freeman v. Dep't of Corrections, 949 F.2d 360, 361 n.1 (10th Cir. 1991). Under our liberal pleading rules, during the initial stages of litigation, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83, 86 (3d Cir. 1997) (). Because Scott is a pro se litigant, this Court will consider facts and make inferences where appropriate.
Under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1), "a court must grant a motion to dismiss if it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a claim." In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012). "A motion to dismiss for want of standing is . . . properly brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), because standing is a jurisdictional matter." Ballentine v. United States, 486 F.3d 806, 810 (3d Cir. 2007).
In evaluating a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), a court first must determine whether the movant presents a facial or a factual attack. See Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016). The distinction is important because it determines how thecomplaint must be reviewed. See Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). A facial attack "challenges subject matter jurisdiction without disputing the facts alleged in the complaint, and it requires the court to 'consider the allegations of the complaint as true.'" Davis, 824 F.3d at 346 (citation omitted). A factual challenge "attacks the factual allegations underlying the complaint's assertion of jurisdiction, either through the filing of an answer or 'otherwise present[ing] competing facts.'" Id. (citation omitted). Here, Giant Eagle makes a facial challenge because it has not disputed the validity of Scott's factual claims in its Motion to Dismiss. In essence, Giant Eagle contends that the allegations of the complaint, even accepted as true, are insufficient to establish Article III standing as to Scott's Title III claim.
In considering a facial challenge to standing, courts are to apply the same standard as on review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim. See Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 299 n.1 (3d Cir. 2006) () (citation omitted).
When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). Plaintiff's factual allegations must "raise aright to relief above the speculative level" and state a plausible claim for relief to survive a motion to dismiss. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A well-pleaded complaint may not be dismissed simply because "it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts isimprobable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal citation and quotation omitted). The Court need not accept as true any unsupported conclusions, unsupported inferences, and "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Defendant Giant Eagle argues that Scott has failed to plead sufficient facts to establish standing to bring an ADA Title III claim or, alternatively, if she has standing, that she has not pled sufficient facts to set forth a Title III claim and seeks punitive damages, which are unavailable under Title III.
Article III of the Constitution limits the scope of federal judicial power to the adjudication of "cases" or "controversies." U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2. "[T]he standing question is whether the plaintiff has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant [her] invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on [her] behalf." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
It is well-established that the "irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing consists of three elements. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). "The plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Spokeo, I...
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