Scott v. ILA Local 140 Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n
| Decision Date | 26 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION 19-1038-WS-C |
| Citation | 449 F.Supp.3d 1270 |
| Parties | Derrick SCOTT, Plaintiff, v. ILA LOCAL 140 INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama |
Brigg Hails Austin, L. Bratton Rainey, III, Rainey Austin, P.C., Mobile, AL, for Plaintiff.
Laurence M. Goodman, Pro Hac Vice, Willig, Williams & Davidson, Philadelphia, PA, for Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on the defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Doc. 18). The plaintiff has filed a response and the defendants a reply, (Docs. 20, 21), and the motion is ripe for resolution. After careful consideration, the Court concludes the motion is due to be granted in part and denied in part.
According to the amended complaint, (Doc. 14), the plaintiff was a member of the defendant labor organization ("Local 1410"), whose president is co-defendant Mark Bass. In January 2019, the plaintiff was involved in a minor incident of horseplay with another union member. Several days later, he returned to the hiring center and was instructed by Bass to leave until it was determined when he could return to work. A week later, the plaintiff returned to the hiring center to file a grievance and received a letter from Bass stating that Local 1410 and the employer had agreed that, for just cause as defined in the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"), the plaintiff was permanently ineligible for hire by any ILA employer. The plaintiff did not receive notice of any charges or of any hearing, did not know of the hearing, and did not attend it; nor were his interests represented at the hearing. The plaintiff was not fired for just cause.
The defendant promptly filed a grievance against both the employer and the union, alleging discrimination and retaliation. He also requested Local 1410's vice president to represent him in opposing his ineligibility for hire. The vice president attempted to obtain a second hearing and/or appeal but was told there would be none because the plaintiff failed to attend the first hearing. This information was not relayed to the plaintiff. When, in October 2019, he hand-delivered a grievance against the union alleging improper representation, he was notified for the first time that he was not a member of Local 1410; the plaintiff maintains he was a union member throughout this process.
The amended complaint asserts three claims.1 Count One alleges that the defendants violated 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) by failing to provide certain procedural safeguards before disciplining him. Count Two alleges that Bass violated 29 U.S.C. § 529 by colluding with the employer to violate the plaintiff's due process rights and to punish the plaintiff for his support of Bass's political rival. Count Three alleges that Local 1410 violated its duty of fair representation with regard to the hearing, the plaintiff's appeal, and the plaintiff's grievances.
The defendants challenge the plausibility of certain allegations of the amended complaint. To survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must first satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain ... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief...." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Pleading elements is necessary, but it is not enough to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). The rule "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not" satisfy that rule. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. There must in addition be a pleading of facts. Though they need not be detailed, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level...." Id. That is, the complaint must allege "enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). "The plausibility standard ... asks for more than a sheer possibility that the defendant has acted unlawfully," and "[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." Id. (internal quotes omitted). A complaint lacking "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face" will not "survive a motion to dismiss." Id. But so long as the plausibility standard is met, the complaint "may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (internal quotes omitted).
"No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined except for nonpayment of dues by such organization or by any officer thereof unless such member has been (A) served with written specific charges; (B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair hearing." 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5). Count One invokes this provision and describes it as "requir[ing] a union to provide certain enumerated procedural safeguards before it [i.e. , the union] may suspend, expel or otherwise discipline a member." (Doc. 14 at 4).
Despite these allegations, the defendants assume the Section 411(a)(5) claim addresses only the agreement between Local 1410 and the employer to make the plaintiff permanently ineligible for hire. (Doc. 18 at 9). Because Count One actually challenges the plaintiff's removal from the union, (Doc. 14 at 4; Doc. 20 at 3), it fits squarely within the scope of Section 411(a)(5).2
In their reply brief, the defendants for the first time argue that the amended complaint fails to allege plausibly that the plaintiff was expelled from the union. (Doc. 21 at 2-4). "District courts, including this one, ordinarily do not consider arguments raised for the first time on reply." Clarke v. Tannin, Inc. , 301 F. Supp. 3d 1150, 1173 (S.D. Ala. 2018). The defendants offer, and the Court discerns, no reason to depart from the general rule. The scope of Count One was plain from the face of the amended complaint, so the defendants' suggestion that they were unfairly surprised to learn the claim addresses the plaintiff's removal from the union does not hold water.
Even were the Court to consider the defendants' belated argument, it would fail. The amended complaint expressly alleges that the plaintiff was a member of Local 1410 at the time of the horseplay incident in January 2019, at the time he was told he was not a union member in October 2019, and "[t]hroughout th[e] process" in between. (Doc. 14 at 2, 3). The defendants, however, insist that, to satisfy Twombly , the plaintiff was required to plead "specific facts" demonstrating that he "fulfilled the membership requirements" of Local 1410 and that he never "voluntarily withdr[ew]" from the union. They continue that the plaintiff was also required to plead specific facts regarding "the basis of" Local 1410's "understanding that Plaintiff was not a member." (Doc. 21 at 2-3 (internal quotes omitted)).
Let's put that in the context of an employment discrimination action. By the defendants' reasoning, a plaintiff could not survive a motion to dismiss by alleging he was employed by the defendant and later fired (for an impermissible reason); he would have to allege specific facts showing that he really had been hired (a congratulatory letter? an employee handbook?), that he had never quit (a recent pay stub?), and that he had not misunderstood the employer but that he really had been fired (a termination letter?).
Unsurprisingly, the defendants offer no authority in support of their reading of the plausibility standard. "[W]e do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. As this Court has held, "the plaintiffs need not support those [pleaded] facts with secondary facts, tertiary facts, ad infinitum in order to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2)." Howard v. Bayrock Mortgage Corp. , 2010 WL 4628120 at *3 (S.D. Ala. 2010). This proposition flows naturally from the principle that the plaintiff "need not prove his case on the pleadings – his Amended Complaint must merely provide enough factual material to raise a reasonable inference, and thus a plausible claim, that" the defendants expelled him from the union (without providing the procedural safeguards Section 411(a)(5) requires). Speaker v. United States Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Disease Control and Prevention , 623 F.3d 1371, 1386 (11th Cir. 2010). When a plaintiff alleges he was a union member throughout a specific time frame, that the defendants treated him as a member,3 and that the defendants without warning announced he was not a member, there is far more than a reasonable inference (and thus a plausible claim) that the plaintiff was a union member and that he was involuntarily removed from the union.
"It shall be unlawful for any labor organization, or any officer ... of a labor organization, ... to fine, suspend, expel or otherwise discipline any of its members for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of this chapter." 29 U.S.C. § 529. Count Two alleges that Bass violated this provision by "collud[ing] with the applicable employers to violate the Plaintiff's substantive due process rights, and to arbitrarily punish the plaintiff due to the...
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