Scott v. Jackson Cnty.

Decision Date22 July 2022
Docket NumberCivil Action 1:21-CV-318-TBM-RPM
PartiesJACOB BLAIR SCOTT, PLAINTIFF v. JACKSON COUNTY, MS, ET AL., DEFENDANTS
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

ROBERT P. MYERS, JR. UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. Introduction

On October 21, 2021, plaintiff Jacob Blair Scott (Scott) filed a Complaint alleging numerous claims against defendants Jackson County, MS, Mark Maples (Chancellor Maples), Amanda Capers (“Capers”), Matthew Lott (“Lott”) Lott Law Firm LLC (“Lott Law Firm”), and Jamie Marie Rouse (“Rouse”). Before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by defendant Chancellor Maples. Doc [12]. This motion is opposed. Doc. [15].[1]

II. Factual Background

In February 2017, Scott was arrested on sexual assault charges; he pleaded not guilty. Doc. [1], Ex. 1, at 6. Scott's then-wife, Rouse, filed for divorce through her retained attorney, Lott, around this time. Ibid. On January 5, 2018, Chancellor Michael L. Fondren (“Chancellor Fondren”) conducted a trial in connection with the division of marital property. Id., Ex. 1, at 6-7. Equitably distributing the marital property, Chancellor Fondren awarded permanent periodic alimony and attorneys' fees to Rouse. Doc. [1], Ex. 4. Chancellor Fondren also found Scott in contempt and sanctioned him. Ibid.

Around this time, Scott allegedly began experiencing threats and violence in connection with his pending criminal charges. Doc. [1], Ex. 1, at 8. For example, tacks were allegedly thrown on his lawn and his car was allegedly vandalized. Ibid. Prior to his criminal trial, Scott absconded from Mississippi. Ibid. On January 28, 2020, U.S. Marshals discovered Scott living in Antlers, OK and arrested him. Ibid. After Scott's arrest, law enforcement officials seized Scott's motorcycle, camper van, and “larger motor home” along with valuables therein (collectively, “Oklahoma property”). Ibid. On February 7, 2020, Lott, on behalf of Rouse, filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) in Mississippi chancery court. Id., Ex. 8. Granting Rouse's emergency motion for a TRO, Chancellor Maples directed that Scott's Oklahoma property be held by Rouse pending further order of the Court. Id., Ex. 1, at 9-10, 14; Ex. 8, 16.[2] According to Scott, he was “never served” with the emergency order and only received a copy from his mother. Id., Ex. 1, at 10. In compliance with the Order, Lott travelled to Oklahoma to collect the Oklahoma property pending Chancellor Maples' final decision. Doc. [1], Ex. 1, at 10.[3] Lott “illegally” seized at least some of the Oklahoma property and returned to Mississippi. Id., Ex. 1, at 11-12.

On June 4, 2020, Chancellor Maples conducted a hearing in connection with the reopened divorce proceedings; Scott attended with counsel. Doc. [1], Ex. 1, at 12, Ex. 13. During these proceedings, Scott alleges, Chancellor Maples made statements demonstrating his prejudice against Scott. Id., Ex. 1, at 13. Scott also alleges that Chancellor Maples intentionally inflicted emotional distress on him by “mockingly” questioning the whereabouts of the Oklahoma property. Id., Ex. 1, at 16. On December 9, 2020, Chancellor Maples entered final judgment and awarded, inter alia, Scott's social security payments and Oklahoma property to Rouse. Id., Ex. 18. By ordering the Oklahoma property to be seized, Scott alleges, Chancellor Maples' ruling was made in the complete absence of jurisdiction. Id., Ex. 1, at 15. Scott further claims that Chancellor Maples' decision contains errors reflecting his “bias and manipulation.” Id., Ex. 1, at 17. In 2021, Scott subsequently moved for replevin and recusal. Id., Ex. 1, at 16-17. After these motions were denied, Scott appealed Chancellor Maples' final decision. Ibid.

III. Analysis
A. Official Capacity Claims

Under Rule 12(b)(1), a party or claim can be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Beleno v. Lakey, 306 F.Supp.3d 930, 938-39 (W.D. Tex. 2009). Rule 12(b)(1) applies in the Eleventh Amendment context. Daniel v. Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr., 960 F.3d 253, 256 (5th Cir. 2020). When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the Court “must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, but . . . [it is] not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation .... [A] district court is empowered to find facts as necessary to determine whether it has jurisdiction.” Machete Prods., L.L.C. v. Page, 809 F.3d 281, 287 (5th Cir. 2015).

Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, “the Constitution does not provide for federal jurisdiction over suits against nonconsenting States.” Kimel v. Fla. Bd. Of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000) (collecting cases). This means that the State sovereign, including its departments and agencies, is generally immunized from cases seeking monetary damages or equitable relief. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986). There are, however, exceptions to the general rule of sovereign immunity: (i) a state may consent to be sued, College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675-676, 119 S.Ct. 2219, 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999); (ii) Congress may “unequivocally” abrogate state immunity through “a valid exercise of [its] power,” Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996); or (iii) a litigant may sue a state official in his official capacity seeking prospective injunctive relief to redress an ongoing violation of federal law, Ex parte Young [Young], 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908).[4]

Here, a Mississippi chancery court judge acting in his official capacity is a state actor entitled to raise sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Bowen v. Keys, No. 3:20-CV-296-DPJ-FKB, 2020 WL 4228160, at *5 (S.D.Miss. July 23, 2020); Davis v. City of Vicksburg, Miss., No. 3:13-CV-886 DCB-MTP, 2015 WL 4251008, at *2 (S.D.Miss. July 13, 2015). See also Davis v. Tarrant Cty., Tex., 565 F.3d 214, 228 (5th Cir. 2009). Mississippi has not waived sovereign immunity with relation to Section 1983 suits filed in federal court. See, e.g., Williams v. Errington, No. 1:20-CV-24-RPM, 2022 WL 368817, at *3 (S.D.Miss. Feb. 7, 2022). Likewise, Congress did not abrogate state sovereign immunity in Section 1983 cases. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1145, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979). Finally, Scott only seeks compensatory damages, not prospective injunctive relief, so Young does not apply. See Doc. [1], at 6. For these reasons, Chancellor Maples is entitled to sovereign immunity insofar as Scott is suing him in his official capacity.

B. Individual Capacity Claims

In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court “must accept all well-pleaded facts as true, and [] view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” McCartney v. First City Bank, 970 F.2d 45, 47 (5th Cir. 1992). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ibid. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, [however,] supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice[] as factual allegations and are viewed instead as legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Ibid. Finally, the Court's review encompasses: ‘the complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.' Funk v. Stryker Corp., 631 F.3d 777, 783 (5th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted).

Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit and not just from the ultimate assessment of damages. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991).[5] “‘Although unfairness and injustice to a litigant may result on occasion, ‘it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.' Ballard v. Wall, 413 F.3d 510, 515 (5th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). When judicial immunity is invoked, [i]t is the Judge's actions alone, not intent, that . . . [the Court] must consider.” Malina v. Gonzales, 994 F.2d 1121, 1125 (5th Cir. 1993). As such, “[j]udicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice[,]'” Ballard, 413 F.3d at 515 (quotation omitted), or “mere allegations that . . . [the judge] performed . . . [judicial] acts pursuant to a bribe or conspiracy[,] Holloway v. Walker, 765 F.2d 517, 522 (5th Cir. 1985), “and ‘applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly[,]' Ballard, 413 F.3d at 515 (quotation omitted). Nevertheless, there are two exceptions to the general rule of judicial immunity: (1) “a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity”; and (2) “a judge is not immune from actions, though judicial in nature, [that are] taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Bowling v. Roach, 816 Fed.Appx. 901, 906 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12, 112 S.Ct. 286).

First the Court asks whether Scott's...

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