Scott v. King
| Decision Date | 14 February 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. ED 104001,ED 104001 |
| Citation | 510 S.W.3d 887 |
| Parties | Michael SCOTT, Appellant, v. Janice B. KING, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Jonathan P. Beck, St. Louis, MO, for appellant.
Theodore D. Dearing, St. Louis, MO, for respondent.
Michael Scott ("Scott") appeals from the trial court's judgment entered after a bench trial. Scott sued his landlord, Janice King ("King"), for specific performance to enforce a sale agreement for the leased property. King counterclaimed for unjust enrichment and ejectment, arguing that Scott occupied her property without paying rent. The trial court found in King's favor on both Scott's petition and King's counterclaims. On appeal, all five of Scott's points on appeal fail to comply with Rule 84.04(d)(1),1 but we exercise our discretion to review Scott's first two points ex gratia. In Point One, Scott argues that the trial court erred in awarding King unpaid rent for the past nine years because the relevant statute of limitations was only five years. In Point Two, Scott claims that the trial court's award of prejudgment interest under Section 408.0202 was improper because King's unjust-enrichment claim was unliquidated.
Because Scott failed to specifically assert the relevant statute of limitations in his motion to dismiss King's counterclaim, he waived that defense. Further, because King's unjust-enrichment claim for unpaid rent was liquidated, the trial court's award of prejudgment interest was proper under Section 408.020. Points Three, Four, and Five are dismissed for failing to comply with Rule 84.04(d)(1). Accordingly, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.
In June 2006, King agreed to rent a property in the City of St. Louis to Scott. The parties' written agreement required Scott to "pay $250.00 per month for the renting of the property[.]" Further, the agreement required Scott to bring the property up to code by spending an additional $250 per month on improvements. Once the property was up to code, the agreement provided that King would sell it to Scott for $15,000, minus the amount of rent already paid—in other words, the $250 monthly rental payments was to be applied towards the purchase price of the property. The agreement also specified how Scott would make payments. Scott was required to send the monthly rent by a postal money order, and King would send back a receipt for that payment.
In December 2013, Scott sued King. Scott's petition outlined the 2006 written agreement and alleged that he had spent six years bringing the property up to code, using considerable time, money, and "sweat equity." The petition further alleged that Scott notified King that the property was up to code and that he was prepared to purchase the property by paying the outstanding balance. In July 2013, King notified Scott that he still owed $8000 to purchase the property, and Scott agreed to that price, according to the petition. In August 2013, King allegedly presented Scott with a written purchase agreement reflecting the $8000 purchase price, but then King refused to go through with the sale. Thus, Scott's petition sought specific performance to force the sale.
In January 2015, Scott amended his petition by consent. The amended petition reasserted the original count for breach of contract and added additional counts for quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. After the denial of King's motion to dismiss the amended petition, King filed an answer and counterclaims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and ejectment. The unjust-enrichment count alleged that Scott had occupied the property from June 2006 through the present, a period of over nine years, without paying rent. The ejectment count sought return of the property, alleging that Scott's occupation was unlawful.
Scott subsequently moved to dismiss King's counterclaim. As grounds for the motion, Scott asserted: The trial court took Scott's motion to dismiss with the case.3
The case proceeded to a bench trial. At trial, the parties disputed whether Scott had made the rental payments and had improved the property. Scott maintained that he had paid King $250 in rent monthly, and had paid a total of $15,000. King and her daughter4 testified that Scott made very few payments. Regarding his duty to bring the property up to code, Scott testified that he made many improvements, but he admitted that he had never obtained permits or inspections from the city to confirm that the property was up to code. Scott provided the trial court with almost no receipts evidencing his rental payments or the improvements he claimed to have made to the property.
Subsequently, the trial court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment, ruling against Scott on all counts of his petition and for King on her counterclaims for unjust enrichment and ejectment.
Regarding the rental payments, the trial court found Scott's testimony to be "inconsistent, contradictory, and not credible." The trial court found that Scott had been unjustly enriched by occupying the property without paying rent. The trial court determined that the rent due from June 2006 through the date of the order (November 2015) was $28,500. The trial court further found that only three of Scott's payment receipts, totaling $ 1,000 worth of rental payments, were credible. Subtracting the $1,000 in payments made by Scott, the trial court concluded that Scott owed $27,500 in back rent.
Regarding the improvements to the property, the trial court found that Scott had "presented no credible evidence that he brought the Property up to code." Scott, according to the trial court, failed to produce any documents evidencing money spent on the property. The trial court dismissed Scott's evidence supporting his improvements to the property as "inconsistent, unsupported, and/or contradicted by his own ‘receipts' and not credible." This appeal follows.
Scott raises five points on appeal. First, Scott argues that the trial court erred in awarding nine years of unpaid rent to King on her counterclaim for unjust enrichment. Scott posits that this award exceeds the five-year statute of limitations. Second, Scott asserts trial-court error in awarding King prejudgment interest because her counterclaim for unjust enrichment was not liquidated. Scott also alleges trial-court error in Points Three, Four, and Five. However, we dismiss those points for the reasons stated below.
Before we address the merits of Scott's claims, King argues that each of Scott's five points on appeal fails to comply with Rule 84.04. Rule 84.04(d)(1) requires each point relied on to: "(A) Identify the trial court ruling or action that the appellant challenges; (B) State concisely the legal reasons for the appellant's claim of reversible error; and (C) Explain in summary fashion why, in the context of the case, those legal reasons support the claim of reversible error." Rule 84.04(d)(1) provides a template for appellants to follow:
The point shall be in substantially the following form: "The trial court erred in [identify the challenged ruling or action ], because [state the legal reasons for the claim of reversible error ], in that [explain why the legal reasons, in the context of the case, support the claim of reversible error ]." (Emphasis in original.)
We recognize that the Supreme Court's policy is to decide a case on its merits, rather than on technical deficiencies in an appellant's brief. Missouri Bankers Ass'n, Inc. v. St. Louis County , 448 S.W.3d 267, 271 n.5 (Mo. banc 2014). But Rule 84.04 is mandatory , and compliance is necessary to ensure that appellate courts do not become advocates by inferring facts and arguments that the appellants failed to assert. Rockwell v. Wong , 415 S.W.3d 805, 805–06 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013).
Specifically, Rule 84.04(d)(1)'s requirement that each point relied on include specific information is important. The points relied on provide the opposing party with notice as to the precise matters at issue and inform the appellate court of the legal issues presented for review. Osthus v. Countrylane Woods II Homeowners Ass'n , 389 S.W.3d 712, 715 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012). This rule is not a judicial word game or a matter of hypertechnicality; it serves to put opposing litigants and the court on notice of the specific matters at issue. Kieffer v. Gianino , 301 S.W.3d 119, 120–21 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010). Further, an appellant's argument section must "substantially follow" the order of the point relied on. Rule 84.04(e). Deficient points relied on force respondents and appellate courts to search the briefs and the record to determine appellant's assertions, which wastes judicial resources and creates the danger that appellate courts interpret the appellant's arguments differently than the appellant intended or the opponent understood. In re Marriage of House , 292 S.W.3d 478, 482 (Mo. App. S.D. 2009). Given that a template is specifically provided for in Rule 84.04(d)(1), appellants simply have no excuse for failing to submit adequate points relied on.
Keeping in mind the requirements in Rule 84.04(d)(1), Scott's points on appeal state:
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