Scott v. Md. State Dep't of Labor
| Decision Date | 20 December 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 15-1617,15-1617 |
| Parties | MR. ADRIAN R. SCOTT, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MARYLAND STATE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, LICENSING & REGULATION; JENNIFER DASHIELL REED, Director of the Office of Fair Practices; ALICE L. WIRTH, Deputy Assistant Secretary Office of Educational & Workforce Skills Training for Correctional Institutions; JAMES YOUNGER, III, Principal Maryland Correctional Institute; EDWARD W. SCHWABELAND, Principal Maryland Correctional Institute; RANDOLPH J. SHIPE, Principal Maryland Correctional Institute; LEANN LORENZ, Defendants - Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
UNPUBLISHED
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District Judge. (1:14-cv-02432-JFM)
Before NIEMEYER and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and Irene M. KEELEY, United States District Judge for the Northern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: JoAnna M. Esty, MAJESTY LAW GROUP, Middle River, Maryland, for Appellant. M. Willis Gunther, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Brian E. Frosh, Attorney General of Maryland, Christopher Bowie Lord, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
Adrian R. Scott appeals the district court's dismissal of his employment discrimination suit against the Maryland State Department of Labor, Licensing & Regulation ("DLLR") and six DLLR employees for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (the "ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. Finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the claims against DLLR under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5), and that the six DLLR employees are not subject to suit in their individual capacities, we affirm the judgment.
This case is before us on a motion to dismiss, so we accept the factual allegations of Scott's complaint as true. See De'Lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 524 (4th Cir. 2013). Anne Arundel Community College ("AACC") contracted with DLLR on a yearly basis to provide academic, occupational, and library instruction at various Maryland correctional institutions. AACC bore the primary responsibility for recruiting and hiring instructors, but DLLR also interviewed and approved candidates. Beginning in March 2009, AACC employed Scott as an instructor for the Employment Readiness Workshop at Maryland CorrectionalInstitution - Jessup ("MCI-J"). His contract was renewed every year until 2012.
Although Scott's experience as a contract employee was initially satisfactory, it took a decidedly unpleasant turn in the spring of 2012. During that time, Scott allegedly suffered sexual and workplace harassment, as a consequence of which he filed at least three administrative complaints with DLLR. This action resulted in further harassment and retaliatory behavior from his immediate supervisor, the MCI-J school principal, and eventually the replacement principal. Finally, in July 2012, at DLLR's direction, AACC refused to renew Scott's contract. After that, DLLR advised Scott that, in order to return to work, he would be required to drop all his complaints and agree not to file any others. On October 12, 2012, Scott signed an agreement that allowed him to return to work at a different DLLR facility, Metropolitan Training Center ("MTC"), located in Baltimore. The harassment and retaliation resumed while Scott was at MTC, however, and, on October 22, 2012, DLLR again terminated his employment.
In September 2012, while between jobs at MCI-J and MTC, Scott filed a charge with the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission ("EEOC") alleging that DLLR and its agents had subjected him to discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII and the ADEA. The EEOC dismissed thematter because it was "unable to conclude that the information obtained establishe[d] violations of the statutes." J.A. 54. It then issued a Notice of Suit Rights on April 30, 2014, informing Scott that his EEOC charge had been dismissed and that he had a right to file suit within 90 days of receiving the notice. On July 30, 2014, Scott filed a pro se complaint charging employment discrimination and naming as defendants DLLR and six DLLR employees.
In his complaint, Scott alleged violations of Title VII and the ADEA. More particularly, he alleged that the defendants wrongfully failed to hire him, terminated his employment, and failed to promote him, all on the basis of his race, color, sex, and age. At the time he filed his complaint, Scott chose not to have any summonses issued. Instead, he sent a copy of the complaint to each defendant by certified mail to a satellite DLLR office located in Baltimore. The administrative office of DLLR is located elsewhere, however; neither the DLLR secretary nor any registered agent is located at the address used by Scott. Apparently, a mail room employee at the DLLR satellite office signed for the complaints on August 4, 2014, while at the Post Office picking up the building's mail.
On October 30, 2014, the district court granted Scott's request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and provided him with specific instructions about how to properly effect serviceon the defendants through the United States Marshals Service ("USMS"). In its Order, the district court directed the Clerk to mail Scott a USMS service form for each defendant, and also directed Scott to complete the form and return it, together with a copy of the complaint for each named defendant, within 21 days.
At the end of its Order, the district court directed the Clerk to deliver only one copy of the USMS form. According to Scott, the Clerk only sent him one form, which he addressed to DLLR and returned to the Clerk's office on November 20, 2014, the last day to do so. Scott asked the Clerk's office what he should do in order to serve the other defendants, and was advised that the Clerk would mail the appropriate forms to him. The Clerk then issued the summons to DLLR on November 21, 2014.
The USMS mailed the summons and complaint for DLLR to the address provided by Scott, by certified mail, return receipt, and restricted delivery. Despite the district court's careful instructions to him about how to obtain an address sufficient for serving DLLR's resident agent, Scott directed service to "Maryland State Department of Labor Licensing Regulation" and listed the same DLLR satellite office address to which he had initially mailed the complaints.
On December 1, 2014, a mail room employee at the satellite office accepted service of the summons directed to DLLR.According to this employee's affidavit, he later gave the envelope to the Unemployment Insurance Board of Appeals, from where it eventually wound its way to the Office of Fair Practices on or about December 3, 2014. Counsel then noted an appearance on behalf of all the defendants on December 11, 2014. In mid-December, Scott again went in person to the Clerk's office to pick up the additional USMS forms he had not received by mail.
On January 22, 2015, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. On February 2, 2015, the Clerk received additional USMS forms and service copies of the complaint from Scott. Although the USMS form for DLLR listed its secretary, Scott inexplicably directed that service be made at the Baltimore satellite office. The individual defendants' forms directed that service be made at various addresses, including several correctional facilities, and also at the Baltimore DLLR satellite office. Ultimately, the summonses were sent by certified mail, return receipt and restricted delivery, and were executed either on March 9 or 10, 2015.
On March 10, 2015, Scott's attorney noted her appearance, and, on March 12, 2015, the parties consented to a second 30-day extension of time for Scott to respond to the motion to dismiss, which he finally did on April 10, 2015. That response addressed the substantive issues raised in the motion to dismiss, and alsoincluded brief requests for an extension of time in which to cure service, if necessary, and also for leave to file an amended complaint should the Court find the first complaint defective. Aside from those embedded requests, Scott never moved for an extension of the time in which to serve the defendants, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b), nor did he separately move for leave to file an amended complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a)(2) and the Local Rules of the District of Maryland.
The district court dismissed the complaint on May 7, 2015,1 finding that Scott had not properly effected service on DLLR, had not served the individual defendants within the 120-day service period, and had failed to show good cause to extend the service period. It also determined as a matter of law that the defendants were immune from suit in federal court. It concluded that the six individual DLLR employees are not proper defendants under Title VII or the ADEA, that DLLR was not Scott's employer under Title VII, and that DLLR was not subject to suit under the ADEA.
We review a district court's decision for abuse of discretion where, as here, it dismisses a claim for improper service of process under Rule 12(b)(5). Shao v. Link Cargo (Taiwan) Ltd., 986 F.2d 700, 708 (4th Cir. 1993). A district court abuses its discretion by failing to exercise any discretion, failing to apply the proper standard, or by using "erroneous factual or legal premises." James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 1993). We review de novo a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). Wag More Dogs, Ltd. Liab. Corp. v. Cozart, 680 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 2012). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving adequate service once a ...
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