Scott v. Menard, Inc.
| Decision Date | 09 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 16 C 723 |
| Parties | NEAL SCOTT, JR. Plaintiff, v. MENARD, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Neal Scott, Jr. originally filed this one-count premises liability action against Defendant Menard, Inc. ("Menard") in the Circuit Court of Cook County. (Doc. 1-1). Menard being incorporated and principally located in Wisconsin and Plaintiff being a citizen of Illinois, Menard timely removed the action to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. 1). The parties later consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge, and the case was reassigned to this Court. (Docs. 4, 11, 13).
Plaintiff alleges that he was injured in a Menard store due to Menard's negligence when he tripped over a pallet jack in an aisle near the cash registers while carrying a large, boxed item that he was there to purchase. (Doc. 1-1). Menard now moves for summary judgment, arguing that the pallet jack was an "open and obvious" condition from which it owed no duty to protect Plaintiff, and that its actions were not the proximate cause of the accident. (Doc. 31). As explained below, however, Plaintiff's assertion of the "distraction exception" to the "open and obvious" rule, and various disputed issues of fact, preclude a ruling in Menard's favor on either of these grounds at this stage of the case.
On April 14, 2015, Plaintiff visited a Menard store in Dolton, Illinois to buy a shelving unit. After selecting the unit, he carried it down a main aisle toward the cash registers. The unit was in "a large box" measuring "about four feet tall and three feet wide," and was "awkward to carry." (Doc. 34-1, ¶ 12) He carried the box against his chest with one arm above the box and the other arm below it, and the box was "even" with his head and "just off to the left." (Doc. 34-6, ¶¶ 20-21). It "partially blocked" his vision. (Doc. 34-1, ¶ 1). Situated in the main aisle that Plaintiff walked down, near the cash registers, was a "pallet jack" -- a tool used to move pallets within the store. The pallet jack had a yellow-colored base and tines, and a black-colored handle that was over four feet tall. The pallet on this jack was 48 inches by 32 to 36 inches. (Doc. 34-6, ¶¶ 5-8).
As depicted in a videotape of the incident, Plaintiff walked directly toward the pallet jack while carrying the large box; however, just before he reached the jack, Plaintiff stepped around it on the right side and proceeded to the cash registers. Plaintiff states that (Doc. 34-1, ¶ 3; Doc. 34-3, ¶ 2; Doc. 34-6, ¶¶ 14-15).
After getting in line at the cash register, Plaintiff saw a shorter line at a different cash register so decided to go to that line. (Doc. 34-1, ¶ 4). As he walked back into the aisle to get to the second cash register, Plaintiff walked directly toward the same pallet jack. As before, Plaintiff was carrying the boxed shelving unit such that the box blocked his vision "some," and he could not see the floor. (Doc. 34-6, ¶ 22). He "was not aware of any obstacle in his path." (Doc. 34-1 ¶ 6). This time, however, Plaintiff walked into the pallet jack, causing him to fall hard on the floor with the large box on top of him. (Id. at ¶ 7). Based on the videotape, this accident occurred at 3:57:54 p.m. Two Menard employees, one of whom was the general manager, picked Plaintiff up and helped him to his feet. (Id. at ¶ 8). Plaintiff did not know "what had tripped him up...until after he had fallen [and] was helped to his feet" by the employees. (Id.). Plaintiff then proceeded to the checkout register. After paying for the item, he left the store while carrying the large box horizontally such that the top of the box was no longer even with his head. (Doc. 34-6, at 8-9; CD06947-15-03, at 4:00:13 to 4:00:17; Doc. 32-6).2
At the time of the accident, Menard had a "Stocking Cart Program - Policy & Procedure # 173," regarding the manner in which all freight "must be handled." (Doc. 34-3, at 17). That policy included the following instructions, among others:
(Doc. Doc. 34-1, ¶ 9, citing Doc. 34-3, at 17, 21-22). As discussed in more detail later, the parties disagree both as to whether the policy was applicable here and whether it was violated. What is not in dispute are the underlying facts concerning the movement of the pallet jack and the Menard employee working with it around the time of the accident, depicted as follows in a videotape (CD06947-15-01):
It is axiomatic that summary judgment may be granted only when there are no disputed issues of material fact and judgment may be rendered as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To recover on a negligence claim such as Plaintiff's, Illinois law requires a plaintiff to establish three elements: (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, (2) the defendant breached that duty, and (3) the defendant's breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Bruns v. City of Centralia, 2014 IL 116998, ¶ 12, 21 N.E.3d684, 688-89.3 Here, Menard focuses on the first and third elements of Scott's negligence claim, asserting that the claim fails as a matter of law because the undisputed facts demonstrate that: (1) the pallet and pallet jack were an "open and obvious" condition from which Menard had no duty to protect Plaintiff; and (2) the pallet and pallet jack were not the proximate cause of Plaintiff's accident and resulting injuries. (Doc. 31, ¶¶ 3-4; Doc. 33, at 5-11). For reasons discussed below, the Court is unable to conclude as a matter of law at this stage of the litigation that Menard owed no duty to Plaintiff, and further, Menard's arguments on both elements raise disputed factual issues that also require denial of its motion.
Illinois law squarely holds that the existence of a duty of care is a question of law for the court to decide. Bruns, 2014 IL 116998, at ¶ 13, 21 N.E.3d at 689. To answer that question, a court must consider "whether defendant and plaintiff stood in such a relationship to one another that the law imposed upon defendant an obligation of reasonable conduct for the benefit of plaintiff." Id. at ¶ 14, 21 N.E.3d at 689 (citing Ward v. K Mart Corp., 136 Ill. 2d 132, 140, 554 N.E.3d 223, 226 (1990)). This inquiry is guided by four factors: "(1) the reasonable foreseeability of the injury, (2) the likelihood of the injury, (3) the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and (4) the consequences of placing that burden on the defendant." Id. at ¶ 14, 21 N.E.3d at 689.
The "open and obvious" rule on which Menard relies in support of its motion for summary judgment affects the first two of the duty of care factors - the foreseeability and likelihood of the injury. Id. at ¶ 19, 21 N.E.3d at 690. Although landowners generally owe invitees a duty of reasonable care, when the injury-causing-condition was "open and obvious," the foreseeability of harm caused by the condition and the likelihood of resulting injury "will be slight," thus "weighing against the imposition of a duty." Id.4 "Whether a condition is open and obvious depends not on subjective knowledge but on the objective knowledge of a reasonable person confronted with the same condition." Perez v. Heffron, 2016 IL App (2d) 160015, ¶ 12, 63 N.E.3d 998, 1002. A condition is thus open and obvious "where a reasonable person exercising ordinary perception, intelligence, and judgment would recognize both the condition and the risk involved." Id. Accordingly, although the issue of whether a condition is open and obvious may in some instances present issues of fact, the issue may be resolved as a matter of law where "no dispute exists as to the physical nature of the condition." Bruns, 2014 IL 116998, ¶ 18, 21 N.E.3d at 690.
Menard contends that the pallet and pallet jack involved in Plaintiff's fall were an open and obvious condition, the pallet being at least 48 inches by 32 inches, and the pallet jack being black and yellow with a handle over four feet tall. (Doc. 34-6, at 3-4).It notes that the jack was in the middle of the store's main (and white) aisle by the checkout registers where it could be seen by customers from all angles and dozens of feet away. (Doc. 33, at 5). Moreover, Menard argues that Plain...
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