Scott v. Nashville Bridge Co.
| Decision Date | 22 June 1920 |
| Citation | 223 S.W. 844 |
| Parties | SCOTT v. NASHVILLE BRIDGE CO. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Action by A. J. Scott against the Nashville Bridge Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Modified and affirmed.
Atkinson & Atkinson, J. B. Daniel, and Geo. E. Kennard, all of Nashville, for plaintiff in error.
Aust & McGugin, Cecil Sims, and Jno. M. Cate, all of Nashville, for defendant in error.
The sole question involved in this case is the constitutionality of chapter 123 of the Public Acts of the General Assembly of 1919, commonly known as the "Workmen's Compensation Act."
The appellant, A. J. Scott (plaintiff below) brought a common-law action in the circuit court of Davidson county against the Nashville Bridge Company to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by him through the negligence of said bridge company on the ____ day of October, 1919, while in its employ, and subsequent to the date upon which the act above referred to went into effect, which was July 1, 1919.
The defendant, bridge company, filed a special plea, setting up the fact that the defendant was engaged, at the time the appellant sustained his injuries, in structural iron work and bridge building; that it had in its employ regularly more than ten employés, and that the alleged injuries to appellant arose out of and in the course of his regular employment; that under the terms of chapter 123 of the Acts of 1919, both the plaintiff and defendant had elected to accept and operate under the provisions of said act, and that defendant had complied with all the provisions of said act, and was ready, able, and willing to pay to appellant compensation for his injuries in accordance with the terms and provisions of said act, and that said act was a bar to his common-law action.
To this special plea appellant demurred, his grounds of demurrer being that the act was violative of the Constitutions of the state and of the United States in the particulars hereinafter referred to.
After consideration of the demurrer and appellant's declaration, the circuit judge overruled the demurrer, holding that the act was constitutional and valid.
Thereupon the parties agreed, in open court, that the facts set forth in the special plea were true, and judgment of the court was asked upon the defendant's plea and stipulation. Whereupon the court dismissed appellant's suit. To this action he excepted, and prayed and perfected an appeal to this court, and has assigned numerous errors.
The act under consideration is very voluminous and contains many sections, and we will not undertake to set out the act in its entirety in this opinion, but only such sections as we deem material in the determination of the questions presented for decision. The title of the act is as follows:
"An act to provide an elective system of workmen's compensation for industrial accidents; to prescribe the manner of election and the rights and liabilities of employers, employés, and third parties; to define and regulate the liability of employers to employés for injuries sustained by such employés in the course of their employment resulting in disability or death; to provide medical and surgical care for such injured employés; to provide compensation for injured employés; or in case of death, for the dependents of such employés, to make claims payable hereunder preferred claims, and to make all sums paid as compensation under this act exempt from the claims of creditors; to provide methods for insuring and securing the payment of such compensation; to make minors sui juris for certain purposes; to prescribe a method for the execution of this act and for the determination of liability of employers to employés for compensation, and to regulate the procedure in such cases; to provide revenue for the administration of this act; to provide for and regulate the business of insurance companies writing workmen's compensation insurance under this act, and to impose fees upon such insurance companies and upon employers and employés who are subject to this act; to provide penalties for violations of this act; and to make appropriations out of the revenue of the state for the purpose of executing and administering this act."
Section 1 of said act provides that it shall be known as the "Workmen's Compensation Act."
By section 3 it is provided as follows:
"Be it further enacted, that from and after the taking effect of this act, every employer and every employé, except as herein stated, shall be presumed to have accepted the provisions of this act, respectively to pay and accept compensation for personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, and shall be bound thereby unless he shall have given, prior to any accident resulting in injury or death, notice to the contrary in the manner herein provided."
Section 4 provides that either an employer or employé who has excepted himself by proper notice from the operation of the act may at any time waive such exemption and later accept its provisions. If the employer elects not to accept the provisions of the act, he shall give notice in the form and manner therein provided. If the employé elects not to accept the provisions of the act, he shall likewise give notice as provided in said section.
Section 6 provides that the provisions of said act shall not apply to the following classes of persons:
By section 11 it is provided that every employer who elects not to operate under said act as therein provided shall not, in any suit brought against him, by an employé who has elected to operate under the provisions of said act, to recover damages for personal injury or death arising from accident, be permitted to defend such suit upon any of the following grounds, viz.:
Section 12 provides that every employé who elects not to operate under the provisions of the act, in any action to recover damages for personal injury or death by accident brought against an employer who has elected to operate under the act, shall proceed as at common law, and the employer in such suit may avail himself of all common-law defenses.
Section 13 provides that, when both employer and employé elect not to operate under the act, the liability of the employer for injury or death from accident shall be the same as at common law, and the employer may avail himself of all common-law defenses in actions brought by such employé to recover damages for personal injury or death due to accident.
It will be noted from the provisions of the foregoing sections of said act that, if an employer and employé do not elect to accept the act, the rights and remedies of each remain as they were before the passage of the act. If the employer elects to accept the act and the employé does not, then the employer's rights and remedies remain as they were before the passage of the act. If the employé elects to accept the act and the employer does not, then the employer is deprived of the three common-law defenses in any suit which may be brought against him by an employé to recover damages for an injury to such employé, to wit: Contributory negligence, negligence of a fellow servant, and assumption of risk. If both elect to accept the act (and their election is presumed in the absence of notice to the contrary), then the employer must pay to the employé compensation for his injuries according to the schedule set forth in section 28 of the act, without respect to whether the employé was negligent or not.
Section 10 provides, however, that if injury or death results from the willful misconduct of the employé, or injury intentionally self-inflicted, or by reason of intoxication or willful refusal to use a safety appliance, he shall not be entitled to compensation.
It is insisted by counsel for appellant that the act is coercive and not elective, because:
(1) The employé is presumed to have elected to accept the act, whether he actually knows of it or not, unless he gives notice to the contrary; and
(2) It is coercive as to the employer because if he does not elect to accept...
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