Scott v. Paychex Ins. Agency
| Docket Number | 22-62052-CIV-ALTONAGA/Strauss |
| Decision Date | 08 August 2023 |
| Parties | DENNIS SCOTT, Plaintiff, v. PAYCHEX INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
THIS CAUSE came before the Court on Plaintiff, Dennis Scott's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [ECF No. 74] and Defendant, Paychex Insurance Agency, Inc.'s Motion for Final Summary Judgment [ECF No. 78]. Plaintiff and Defendant filed their respective Responses (see [ECF Nos. 84, 88]), followed by Replies (see [ECF Nos 93, 97]). The Court has carefully considered the record, the parties' written submissions,[1] and applicable law. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's Motion is granted in part and denied in part, and Defendant's Motion is denied.
This case arises from an allegedly fraudulent or misleading Certificate of Insurance (the “COI”) that Defendant issued to non-party James A. Jones, a general contractor. . As described below, Jones later assigned to Plaintiff any claims it might have against Defendant stemming from the COI. (See Def.'s Mot. SOF ¶ 7). In this action, Plaintiff asserts those assigned claims. (See generally SAC).
By way of background, in early 2018, Jones - the general contractor on a construction project (the “Project”) - engaged the services of non-party Central Florida Siding Pros, LLC (“CFSP”) as a subcontractor on the Project. (See Def.'s Mot. SOF ¶ 5). Jones required proof of workers' compensation insurance from subcontractors in the form of certificates of insurance verifying the subcontractor's insurance coverage. (See id. ¶ 22).[2] General contractors may require these certificates as a method of verifying a subcontractor's insurance status. (See, e.g., Def.'s Reply SOF ¶ 63).
CFSP had a workers' compensation policy issued by non-party NorGuard, an insurer. (See Def.'s Mot. SOF ¶ 8). CFSP obtained the policy through Defendant, an insurance agent. (See Id. ¶ 3). At the time the policy was obtained, the coverage period was April 29, 2017 through April 29, 2018. (See id.). On February 6, 2018, Defendant issued the COI to Jones, verifying CFSP's insurance status and stating the coverage period was April 29, 2017 through April 29, 2018. (See id. ¶ 24). The COI also contained multiple disclaimers regarding the language and information it provided. (See generally COI). After receiving the COI, Jones did nothing further to verify the information regarding CFSP's insurance. (See Def.'s Mot. SOF ¶ 41).[3]
At the time the COI was issued, CFSP's workers' compensation insurance policy was in jeopardy. ). In short: under the terms of CFSP's coverage, CFSP was to run payroll and pay its insurance premiums through Defendant. (See Def.'s Mot. SOF ¶ 11). Should CFSP fail to pay its premiums, Defendant was required to notify NorGuard. (See id. ¶ 9). Further, Defendant knew that reporting this information to NorGuard might “result in [CFSP's] loss of coverage and/or non-renewal of coverage.” (Id. (alteration added; citations omitted)).
Defendant was also aware that once it notified NorGuard of CFSP's noncompliance, NorGuard would likely soon cancel the policy. . How “soon” that cancellation could occur, as well as how “aware” Defendant was of this possibility, are disputed. .
As of January 16, 2018, CFSP had failed to run payroll and pay its premiums, and on January 23, 2018, Defendant informed NorGuard of CFSP's noncompliance. (See Def.'s Mot. SOF ¶ 16). Thus, on January 24, 2018, NorGuard sent a Notice of Cancellation to CFSP, indicating the policy coverage would expire on February 10, 2018. (See id. ¶ 19). The parties dispute when Defendant in fact obtained knowledge of this pending expiration date. . The parties also dispute the extent to which Defendant can monitor the status of policies - like CFSP's at the time - which are pending cancellation, and whether Defendant may include that information in issued certificates. .
Despite the pending cancellation, the COI stated that CFSP's insurance would run through April 29, 2018. (See COI). The policy was cancelled on February 10, 2018. (See Def.'s Mot. SOF ¶ 20). On April 24, 2018, Plaintiff was injured while working on the Project. (See id. ¶ 52).
In the ensuing workers' compensation proceedings,[4] the JCC determined that, at the time of the injury, CFSP employed Plaintiff; CFSP did not have workers' compensation insurance; Jones was to be considered Plaintiff's employer; and Jones did not carry the required workers' compensation coverage for non-lease employees - making Jones liable for Scott's injuries.[5] .[6] Following the JCC's Compensation Order, Jones and Plaintiff entered a joint stipulation, approved by the JCC, which stated there were $1.85 million in damages to Plaintiff, for which Jones was liable. . After the stipulation's approval, Jones and Plaintiff settled their dispute. (See Def.'s Mot. SOF ¶ 7). By the terms of their settlement, Jones assigned to Plaintiff all claims Jones might have against Defendant. (See id.).
Plaintiff alleges four claims for relief arising from Defendant's “misrepresent[ation] [of] the status of the insurance policy” on the COI. (SAC ¶ 16 (alterations added)). First, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant fraudulently misrepresented the material fact of the expiring insurance coverage when it provided the COI. (See id. ¶¶ 35-43). Second, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant negligently misrepresented this material fact and “should have known the statement was false.” (Id. ¶ 47; see also id. ¶¶ 44-51). Third, Plaintiff asserts Defendant negligently provided “inaccurate and misleading” information in the COI. (Id. ¶ 55; see also id. ¶¶ 52-57). Finally, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant “negligently supplied” the “false and misleading information for the guidance of” others - namely, Jones. (Id. ¶ 60; see also id. ¶¶ 58-67).
Both parties now move for summary judgment in their favor on multiple issues. (See generally Pl.'s Mot.; Def.'s Mot.).
Summary judgment may be rendered if the pleadings, discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show there is no genuine dispute of any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), (c). An issue of fact is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute of fact is “genuine” if the evidence could lead a reasonable jury to find for the non-moving party. See id.; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The Court draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. See Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000).
If the non-moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may obtain summary judgment simply by: (1) establishing the nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact as to any essential element of a non-moving party's claim and (2) showing the Court there is insufficient evidence to support the non-moving party's case. See Blackhawk Yachting, LLC v. Tognum Am., Inc., No. 12-Civ-14209, 2015 WL 11176299, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 30, 2015). “Once the moving party discharges its initial burden, a non-moving party who bears the burden of proof must cite to . . . materials in the record or show that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute.” Id. ().
Plaintiff argues that the Court should grant partial summary judgment in his favor on the reliance element of his claims. (See Pl.'s Mot. 4-6). Plaintiff also seeks summary judgment on all 34 of Defendant's affirmative defenses. (See id. 6-18; Am. Answer and Affirmative Defenses 10-18 (hereinafter “Aff. Defs.”)).[7] For its part, Defendant asks the Court to grant summary judgment in its favor on all of Plaintiff's claims. (See generally Def.'s Mot.).
While there are some areas of overlap, the parties mostly talk past one another with their many arguments. (See generally Pl.'s Mot.; Def.'s Mot). The Court addresses each Motion separately and notes the overlapping areas as necessary.
The Court begins by reviewing the elements of each of Plaintiff's four causes of action: fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and information negligently supplied for the guidance of others. (See SAC ¶¶ 35-67).[8] Under Florida law, the elements of a fraudulent misrepresentation claim are “(1) a false statement concerning a material fact; (2) the representor's knowledge that the representation is false; (3) an intention that the representation induce another to act on it; and (4) consequent injury by the party acting in reliance on the representation.” Butler v. Yusem, 44 So.3d 102, 105 (Fla. 2010) (citation, quotation marks, and emphasis omitted).
The elements of a negligent misrepresentation claim are the same as a fraudulent misrepresentation claim, except a negligent misrepresentation does not require knowledge that the representation is false; a party can prevail on a negligent misrepresentation claim by showing that the representor...
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